Practical wisdom: The vital core of professionalism in medical practices. by Bontemps-Hommen, C.M.M.l.
Practical wisdom: The vital core  







en         Practical w
isdom




Voor het bijwonen van
de openbare verdediging
van mijn proefschrift
Practical wisdom:  
the vital core  
of professionalism  
in medical practices




Receptie aansluitend aan de 
promotie in de Pieterskerk
Marij Bontemps-Hommen
Spitsbrug 5,  









The vital core of professionalism 
in medical practices 
 
Praktische wijsheid 
De essentie van professionaliteit 
in medische praktijken 
 
























































copyright © 2020 Marij Bontemps-Hommen, Afferden L. 
 
Printing: ProefschriftMaken || www.proefschriftmaken.nl 
 
Cover: African woodcarving called ‘thinking woman’. It was the trophy awarded to the 
winning quality project of St Jansdal Hospital Harderwijk, from 2004 to 2012 
Photograph: Linda Heller, Communication Department St Jansdal Hospital 
ISBN 978-90-9033603-9  
NUR-code 883 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise, without prior permission of the author or the copyright-owning journals for 
previous published chapters. 
  
Practical wisdom 
The vital core of professionalism 
in medical practices 
 
Praktische wijsheid 
De essentie van professionaliteit 




Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan de Universiteit voor Humanistiek te Utrecht 
op gezag van de rector magnificus Prof. Dr. J. van Saane 
ingevolge het besluit van het College van Promoties 






door Catharina Maria Mechtilda Leonarda Bontemps-Hommen 





Promotoren: Prof. Dr. Frans J. H. Vosman, emeritus Universiteit voor Humanistiek † 
                     Prof. Dr. Andries J. Baart, emeritus Universiteit voor Humanistiek, bijzonder  






Prof. Dr. M.H.N. Schermer, Erasmus Medisch Centrum, Rotterdam  
Dr. M. Visse, Universiteit voor Humanistiek, Utrecht 
Prof. Dr. L.H. Visser, Universiteit voor Humanistiek, Utrecht 
Prof. Dr. M.C. de Vries, Universiteit Leiden 




















Chapter 1     General introduction                                                                            
 
Chapter 2     Practical wisdom in complex medical practices:                                
                      A critical proposal 
                                                                                           
Chapter 3     Methodology                                                                                       
 
Chapter 4     The multiple faces of practical wisdom in complex clinical               
                      practices: An empirical exploration 
 
Chapter 5     Professional workplace-learning: Can practical wisdom be               
                      learned? 
 
Chapter 6     Professional medical discourse and the emergence of practical         
                      wisdom in everyday practices: Analysis of a keyhole case 
 
Chapter 7     Making the best of it: Practical wisdom in professional care for     
                      adolescents with type 1 diabetes mellitus 
 
Chapter 8     Conclusions and reflection                                                                
 
Addendum     References                                                                                        
                        Appendix I: justification data management    
                        Appendix II: glossary 
                        Samenvatting  
                        Dankwoord 
                        Curriculum vitae                                     















“Watch with glittering eyes the whole world around you
Because the greatest secrets are always hidden in the most unlikely places.”




Marieke: a pediatric case 
Marieke is born on June 9 1996 as the third child in the family, after a brother (1987) and a 
sister (1989). Her father is a computer science engineer and is normally abroad on workdays. 
Her mother takes care of the children and the household. Marieke is born in a University 
Hospital (UH1) because her mother was suffering from ulcerative colitis (a chronic 
inflammatory disease of the intestines) and for this reason was treated with prednisolone (a 
medicine that can cause a functional disorder of the adrenal cortex), during the entire 
pregnancy. Fortunately, this problem does not materialize. The pediatrician who examines 
Marieke (2.890 grams) after birth observes a healthy baby. Mother and child go home 
together a few days later.  
However, on June 15, the sixth day of her life, the general practitioner refers the baby 
to the pediatrician in the peripheral hospital (PH), because she is drinking less and less. She 
sleeps too much and cannot keep her temperature up. On admission to hospital, the 
pediatrician sees that she is a little cyanotic, has a rapid breathing rate (50/min), a cardiac 
murmur and an enlarged liver. The oxygen saturation of the blood is far too low (16%) and 
does not increase when extra oxygen is administered. This combination of symptoms is 
indicative of serious congenital heart disease and there is an urgent need to act. The 
pediatrician informs the concerned parents of the facts and after consultation with a pediatric 
cardiologist the little girl is taken at speed to UH1 per ambulance. An ultrasound of the heart 
soon shows what is wrong: a transposition of the great arteries. This means that the body’s 
main artery comes from the right half of the heart and the pulmonary artery from the left half; 
however, the large circulatory system also flows back into the right half of the heart, and the 
lung circulation into the left half. There are therefore two parallel circulations, so that oxygen-
rich blood will circulate within the lungs without finding its way into the body. Survival is 
only possible if there are connections between the circulation of the body and that of the 
lungs, so that high-oxygen and low-oxygen blood can mix. There are connections in the form 
of an opening in the septum between the two heart atria (Atrial Septal Defect: ASD) and a 
channel that is always in place before birth between the aorta and the main pulmonary artery 
(Open Ductus Arteriosus: ODA). It is only due to these small connections that the systemic 
circulation can drain away carbonic acid and supply oxygen. If the connections had closed, as 
is normally the case after birth, the baby would have died. Marieke is given medication and is 
immediately transferred to a second University Hospital (UH2), where she can be operated. 
The major surgery takes place on June 18: an ‘arterial switch operation’ in which both arteries 
are each connected to the right part of the heart and the connections that are no longer needed 
are closed. After the operation Marieke stays in the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) for 
some days and subsequently on UH2’s general pediatric ward. Post-operative arrhythmias are 
treated with medication. Because her weight gain is insufficient, she is given food enriched 
with energy. 
On July 12, a month later, Marieke is discharged. On July 26, the cardiologist changes 
the medication. The same evening, the parents consult the pediatrician at the PH by telephone, 
because the little girl is restless, refuses to drink and is therefore unable to take her 
medication. She is again admitted to the PH. The pediatrician’s diagnosis is that she has 
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gained weight too fast (up to 3.515 grams), partly because she is retaining fluid. It soon 
becomes clear, that the complaints are caused by an adeno virus infection. In addition, the 
arrhythmia has aggravated, despite the fact that medication can be administered in hospital 
through a feeding tube. Marieke has also developed cardiac failure. The pediatrician consults 
the pediatric cardiologist at UH2 by telephone; the cardiologist recommends giving diuretics, 
which causes the little girl to urinate a lot. But she does not recover satisfactorily and after a 
second consultation with the pediatric cardiologist, she is again transferred to UH2. The 
physicians there perform an ultrasound and diagnose ‘post cardiotomy syndrome’: there is 
fluid in the pericardial sac, which is a late effect of the heart surgery. The physicians extract 
the fluid with a puncture, Marieke receives the right medication and on August 20 she is 
finally discharged and returns home fully cured. 
She is doing well until October 2, (almost four months old). Admission to the PH is 
necessary again, due to tachypnea and failure to drink. On this occasion, Marieke recovers 
spontaneously within a day; the pediatrician decides, now that she is in hospital, to give her 
the first vaccinations while it is possible to observe her on a monitor. This does not pose any 
problems and on October 4 the little girl is ready to go home again. Naturally, she is seen by 
several doctors during the following months: she attends the parent-child center, and also on 
various occasions the general practitioner (GP), the pediatrician at the PH, and the pediatric 
cardiologist at UH2. The cardiologist diagnoses a minor pulmonary stenosis as the only 
residual symptom of the major heart surgery. Marieke does not appear to suffer from this 
symptom; she is growing well and is developing nicely. 
From January 13 to 15, 1997, she is then seven months old, she is again admitted to 
the PH with a viral respiratory tract infection and shortness of breath, which does not turn out 
to be serious. At the following hospitalization in August 1997, she is 14 months old and she is 
able to walk. This time, the reason for admission is high fever, vomiting and diarrhea causing 
considerable weight loss. It seems to be gastroenteritis caused by a virus, and she shows 
minor dehydration symptoms. Fluid is administered through tube feeding and she recovers 
quickly. 
This first year of her life, which from a medical point of view, has been very exciting, 
is followed by a relatively quiet period until the spring of 2001. In the interim period, she is 
admitted only once for a day with a stomach virus. She remains under regular supervision of 
several physicians. In November 1998, the pediatric cardiologist decides that an annual 
checkup will do from then on. In 2000, an ENT specialist at UH1 removes her tonsils and 
adenoids, and in 2001, a dental surgeon at the PH extracts a number of carious baby teeth and 
baby molars. Both operations take place using prophylaxis of bacterial endocarditis advised 
by the pediatric cardiologist. In surgeries in which there is a possibility that bacteria may end 
up in the bloodstream and spread through the body, specific antibiotics must be given in 
advance in order to prevent the inflammation of the endocardium which might damage the 
heart valves. 
In March 2001, when Marieke is 4.5 years old, she is again admitted to the PH with 
vomiting, diarrhea and minor dehydration symptoms, which necessitate the administering of 
fluid (Oral Rehydration Salts – ORS) through a feeding tube. A few weeks later, the pediatric 
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cardiologist sees her due to fatigue symptoms at slight physical effort. He does not find a 
cause and puts the parents’ minds at rest about their daughter’s cardiac condition.  
When she is six years old, in 2002, her general practitioner refers Marieke to the 
pediatrician at the PH with a new problem: anemia. Upon further investigation, the 
pediatrician discovers that she has increased red blood cell degradation, partly compensated 
by increased production. He refers her to a pediatric hematologist at UH1 for further analysis 
of the compensated hemolytic anemia. Later and indirectly (there is no written report), it 
appears that the hematologist cannot find a cause and thinks there is a mechanical reason for 
the increased degradation, created by the disturbed anatomy of the cardiovascular system. In 
June 2002, Marieke is again admitted for a day with heavy abdominal pain, with the urge to 
move during attacks (colic pain). As there is also jaundice, the pediatrician thinks it is caused 
by gallstones – a well-known complication of red blood cell degradation. However, no 
gallstones are found in the abdominal ultrasound and the pediatrician decides to wait. 
In October 2002, the pediatric cardiologist at UH2 evaluates her once again, because 
the girl remains chronically tired and is less able to exercise than her peers. The inhalations 
prescribed by her family doctor because of his suspicion of an asthmatic cause of the exercise 
intolerance produce insufficient effect. The cardiologist finds the cardiac condition is good 
and decides to involve his colleague-hematologist at the UH2. After comprehensive tests – 
including a bone-marrow aspiration – the latter concludes that the degradation of the red 
blood cells is the result of a congenital genetic disorder of the cell skeleton (the cell 
membrane) of these cells. He also sees an increase of iron in the bone marrow. Over the 
previous years, Marieke had regularly been prescribed ferro medication by her GP. 
Administering iron is deemed ‘undesirable’ in case of hemolytic anemia, because this 
involves the danger of iron overload in organs. 
In September 2003, when she is nearly eight years old, the pediatrician at the PH 
refers Marieke to the asthma treatment center associated with the hospital, because she wants 
to obtain sufficient evidence on whether the presumed diagnosis of ‘asthma’ can be 
confirmed, but also to improve her physical condition. She appears unable to sustain her 
swimming lessons and physical education classes, she is often absent from school because she 
is too tired and she sleeps a lot; sometimes, she even falls asleep at school. In this treatment 
center, caregivers work in multidisciplinary teams: a child psychologist, a dietician, 
movement therapists and physiotherapists, under the direction of a pediatrician. In the 
treatment center, Marieke and her parents focus on the medical events of the past few years 
and come to terms with them under professional supervision. They can also discuss how to 
cope with being ill and with their fear of more misery to come. It transpires that Marieke and 
her mother in particular tend to see the negative side of their experiences. The psychologist 
tries to show them how to think more positively. 
But this attempt is thwarted by the fact that Marieke’s mother is not well during the 
period of coaching at the treatment center (from November 2003 to March 2005). Her colitis 
ulcerosa is aggressive during this period, and she suffers from the formation of abscesses and 
fistulae, which have to be treated again and again, even surgically. She is repeatedly admitted 
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to hospital. In late 2004 treatment with a new medicine, infliximab, is started, and this turns 
out to be a miracle drug for her. As soon as treatment starts, her condition improves. In 
February 2004, when she is nearly eight years old, Marieke is again admitted to UH2 for the 
removal of her gall-bladder through keyhole surgery. The operation is necessary due to gall- 
stones, which are now apparent and which are causing her a lot of trouble. The operation is 
carried out without complications. At UH2 she also appears to suffer from constipation, 
which is treated with a laxative. Over the course of 2004, Marieke’s condition improves 
considerably through the support of the asthma treatment center. She manages to pass her 
swimming tests. Although the pediatrician cannot objectify the asthmatic complaints, Marieke 
appears to have fewer respiratory complaints than before (perhaps thanks to an anti-
inflammatory inhalation steroid), so that the frequent use of antibiotics connected with these 
can be stopped. 
The team observes that the family, especially Marieke and her mother, are showing 
characteristics of ‘medicalization’: they perceive their lives through a medical lens. 
Moreover, due to their extensive experiences of the medical world, they have become so 
intimately acquainted with the medical caregivers’ habits, way of thinking, peculiarities and 
characteristics that they have learned to control them. The medical caregivers in their turn 
observe this and this is liable to cloud their assessment of whether complaints are really 
important and what is or is not realistic. It also gives rise to feelings of irritation, because 
they feel that their skills are not being recognized or they feel they are being attacked. 
Moreover, Marieke’s mother has experience of things going wrong in her own medical 
history; she also witnesses the emergence of, not one, but several rare and unexpected 
diseases that are unrelated in her own child. As a consequence, she tends to keep pressing 
caregivers with questions until she has received an answer that satisfies her. Physicians 
experience this persistence as irritating, especially when they are unable to answer the 
questions. 
From a medical point of view, 2005 is a quiet year. In January 2006, when Marieke is 
9.5 years old, her GP refers her to the PH with pneumonia, which he has already treated with 
antibiotics but without the desired result. During her admission (from January 24 to 31) for 
antibiotic treatment through intravenous infusion, it is discovered that she has ceased to inhale 
an anti-inflammatory drug. This treatment is started again. Her Hb level has fallen to 5.8 (6.5-
10 is normal for her age) and she is suffering from palpitations. A year later (2007) the 
pediatrician at the PH asks the pediatric cardiologist at UH2 to reflect on the possible causes 
of the anemia and the palpitations. The cardiologist calls in the hematologist, and after long 
consideration and consultation with Marieke and her parents, the hematologist decides to have 
the spleen removed. The spleen is the organ that removes aged and damaged red blood cells 
from circulation. If there is a shape abnormality of the red blood cells, such as an anomalous 
skeleton, the spleen removes too many cells, including young cells, resulting in chronically 
low red blood cell rates. But the spleen cannot just simply be removed, because it plays an 
important role in the body’s defense against infectious diseases, especially bacterial 
infections. That is why a splenectomy must be preceded by a preparatory treatment in the 
form of vaccination against certain types of bacteria, and must be followed up for years by the 
daily prophylactic use of antibiotics, complemented with prompt therapeutic courses of 
antibiotics on suspicion of bacterial infections. The preventive use of antibiotics is mostly 
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stopped after a few years, but the necessity to treat bacterial infections promptly remains for 
the rest of the patient’s life. The splenectomy takes place on December 31. 2007 at UH2, 
without complications. Marieke is 11.5 years old at the time of this intervention. 
Unfortunately, Marieke’s fatigue persists, despite the normalization of her Hb level 
after the splenectomy. In July 2008, the cardiologist at UH2 decides to perform a cardiac 
catheterization because he wants to know what role the heart is playing in causing the fatigue. 
Again, no defects are found in the heart or coronary arteries. The advice given is therefore 
once again that Marieke should improve her physical condition. Marieke has already started a 
second ‘rehabilitation period’ at the asthma treatment center. She continues with this until 
July 2009. As before, she says that she benefits a lot from the support she is given there, 
partly because she finds it difficult to judge how much she is or is not able to handle when it 
comes to physical exertion. She also has the tendency to withdraw herself and not to show 
others what is on her mind. The supervisors help her to express herself. The health care 
providers notice that the mother (understandably) tends to be overly protective of her 
daughter. For instance she will only allow Marieke to go to school on a half-time basis, 
whereas Marieke tells her peers that she can easily manage whole days. Her Cito test (final 
examination at elementary school level) indicates that she is able to attend HAVO (higher 
general secondary education), but the parents instead enroll her in a MAVO (lower general 
secondary education) course ‘to prevent disappointments due to her illness’. The supervisors 
see Marieke’s and her parents’ fear and uncertainty, but suspect that the girl regularly uses her 
complaints to avoid having to do things she does not like to do. Joining in ‘normally’ with her 
peers is very difficult for her. During counselling, it becomes clear that she no longer has any 
asthmatic complaints; repeated pulmonary function tests come up normal, also without 
medication. The asthma medication is therefore stopped. 
In the summer of 2008, Marieke attends the first year of secondary education 
(MAVO); she is able to handle the new school very well. Everything goes as it should up to 
the summer of 2010, but then the fatigue complaints reappear and in October the pediatric 
cardiologist at UH2 consequently carries out a cardio-pulmonary test. She is able to achieve a 
normal activity level for her age, but her heartrate remains too high after the test for too long, 
without any apparent explanation. The cardiologist therefore for the third time recommends 
that she must try to improve her physical condition. At the same time, the pediatrician at the 
PH who has supervised Marieke since her birth retires. At their final consultation, he 
concludes that she is still suffering from unexplained fatigue and still has periods of jaundice 
(a sign of hemolysis). One of the other pediatricians who has also occasionally seen Marieke 
and her parents from the time of her birth onwards takes over her case. The new pediatrician 
suggests another period of rehabilitation at the asthma treatment center. There is no longer 
any question of asthma, but the center has the authority to accept children with other chronic 
diseases who may benefit from a multi-disciplinary treatment. 
At this time, a new psychologist has taken up appointment in the treatment center and 
she concentrates on the chronic fatigue complaints, aiming to find a way for Marieke to learn 
to live with these complaints. Marieke is strongly stimulated by the fact that a boy in her 
group who also has fatigue problems (due to asthma) completes the same program with the 
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psychologist with enthusiasm and with good results. This motivates Marieke to work for the 
same positive results. However, she is admitted to hospital on three occasions in the autumn 
of 2011, when she is 15 years old. First, from the end of September to the beginning of 
October because of increasing jaundice, abdominal pain, fatigue, reduced appetite and a 
headache. The complaints are partly ascribed to constipation, for which she is once again 
treated. The second time, she is admitted for a single day (November 21) after an emergency 
consultation at the general practitioners’ surgery, because of heavy pain in the abdomen and 
back. The GP thinks that this may be due to kidney stones, but an ultrasound of the urinary 
tract does not show any abnormalities. A week later, the pediatrician sees her urgently, 
because she complains about a backache radiating to the left leg, and because this leg is 
heavily swollen. Examination for deep vein thrombosis is positive: the veins from halfway 
down the lower leg to the pelvis are largely thrombosed. An MRI scan shows that blood has 
difficulty travelling through the inferior vena cava and that many bypasses have been formed 
to return blood back to the heart along other routes. The physicians prescribe anti-coagulants 
and a compression stocking. 
In the course of 2012 – Marieke is 16 years old at the time – UH2 carries out further 
examinations, and a congenital defect is detected: the inferior vena cava is not obstructed, but 
is lacking: vena cava inferior agenesis. Therefore, since her birth, backflow to the heart must 
have occurred through smaller blood vessels. This means that the explanation for Marieke’s 
longstanding fatigue complaints has finally been found. Due to the deviant venous system, in 
particular during physical effort, the backflow of the blood is impaired to such an extent that 
there is relative shortage of blood supply (in medical terms: insufficient preload). The heart 
compensates this by working faster, which will cause the hitherto unexplained rapid heartrate 
that persists long after physical exercise. Despite the high heartrate, in this situation the heart 
temporarily pumps too little oxygen and glucose and cannot transport sufficient carbon 
dioxide to the lungs. The consequence of the major abnormality of the venous system 
combined with extensive thrombosis is that Marieke will have to take anticoagulants for the 
rest of her life. The hematologist explains that the use of certain painkillers – NSAIDs – is 
inadvisable combination with the anticoagulants, because it can result in a tendency to bleed 
excessively. This issue becomes pressing when Marieke after some time develops a post-
thrombotic-syndrome (PTS) in her left leg. As the valves in her veins have been damaged 
locally as a result of the massive thrombosis, the backflow of the blood is now impaired even 
more, particularly when she is standing up. This causes complaints whenever the backflow 
has to be expedited, such as during physical effort (venous claudication). The veins cannot 
cope with the blood flow that is delivered extra rapidly, and pain symptoms develop that are 
comparable to complaints arising from malfunctioning arteries. As the valves will not heal, 
the hematologist strongly advises against taking schedule-two-narcotics, because of the real 
danger of dependency (in the worst case addiction). But how can Marieke control her pain 
except by taking paracetamol, which helps only to a certain degree? The answer is that she 
needs to keep moving the affected leg, but in a ‘dosed’ manner. She will have to find a 
balance between moving and resting and prevent her left leg from becoming overloaded. The 
hematologist advises her to determine her INR value (an indication of the coagulation 
tendency of the blood) herself and then send the readings to the thrombosis service. This will 
make her less dependent. He also proposes that she should use a long-acting instead of a 
short-acting coagulant. He further suggests that small pulmonary embolisms (clots that have 
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entered and obstructed lung capillaries) are a possible reason for the complaints she had 
mentioned in recent years (chest pains and shortness of breath) and which had been diagnosed 
as hyperventilation. He also definitively diagnoses the disorder affecting the membrane of the 
red blood cells: this is congenital stomatocytosis. Marieke has probably inherited it from her 
mother. Family research is started. 
Before all this becomes clear (in late 2011) there is a lot of confusion concerning the 
interpretation of Marieke’s complaints, involving the GP and the pediatrician at the PH as 
well as others. As a result the family changes GP’s. At stake were the following questions: is 
Marieke unable or unwilling to move? Are the complaints somatic or psychological nature? 
Is the local thrombosis service capable of adequately regulating her blood values? ( Marieke 
has difficulty trusting this service after receiving several poor recommendations). Marieke is 
afraid to prick herself. There are many questions about how to keep her physical condition at 
an adequate level and about the fatigue complaints that her physiotherapist sometimes cannot 
answer. Since Marieke’s birth, the circumstances in and around the pediatricians’ practice 
have changed: there are now ten rather than three pediatricians. An ED department is set up 
in 2001, which increasingly functions autonomously, with ED specialists. The GP practices 
organize their shifts (daily from 5 pm to 8 am the following morning, and in the weekends) 
through a central out-of-hours GP service for the whole region. Most physicians she meets 
are not familiar with Marieke’s case; moreover, they tend to trust protocols in treatments. It 
is almost impossible for a doctor who does not know the girl to obtain a good picture of what 
is going on. 
Marieke attends the asthma treatment center for rehabilitation from 2011 up to the 
beginning of 2014. This is regarded as the right setting for her to learn what she can and 
cannot do and what the best ways are of putting strain on and training her left leg, while 
keeping her physical condition at a certain level as best as she can. The center has a pool with 
relatively warm water and swimming there suits her well. Marieke learns to recognize the first 
signs of overburdening and to respond to these by resting. She discovers herself that pain 
symptoms subside if she spends an hour a week in a sauna. She trusts the therapist who knows 
her and her possibilities well and who advises her about possible follow-up treatment. 
Marieke and her parents continue to receive counselling from the psychologist. In 2012/2013, 
group discussions take place involving Marieke, both parents, the psychologist and the 
pediatrician. The target of these discussions is, to determine the goal of the treatment in the 
center and to decide when it can be terminated. Together they set the following goals: 
Marieke must be able to function independently from support in the center, to take part in 
sports independently, she must exercise as much as possible to keep her physical condition, 
she must have chosen a suitable MBO (intermediate vocational education) degree course, and 
with the help of a psychologist, she must have learned to think positively and have dealt with 
the traumas experienced. 
In the summer of 2012, after the thrombosis and PTS, and after the discovery of the 
congenital blood vessel system disorder, Marieke and her parents decide to postpone her final 
exam for a year and to apply for individual guidance for her homework in the following 
school year. In 2013, Marieke, who is then 17 years old, passes the exam with flying colors. 
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However, before the exam, a traumatic event occurs. One of her young fellow-patients in the 
treatment center dies while she is on a waiting list for lung transplantation. Marieke is able to 
turn this shocking experience into something positive, by raising awareness among her fellow 
students and teachers for organ donation. She studies this subject, writes a paper on it, gives 
presentations at school and succeeds in recruiting many donors. It is equally positive that she 
does this together with a classmate who does not know the deceased girl but is inspired by 
Marieke’s enthusiasm. The two appear in a local paper and receive a lot of positive feedback. 
Marieke subsequently contacts fellow-sufferers of PTS through social media and obtains a lot 
of support from these contacts. Independently, she takes the decision to have her coagulation 
regulated online by a thrombosis service that operates nationwide instead of the local service. 
All this gives her a new self-confidence. 
After the summer holidays, she starts the advanced degree course she chose and the 
traineeship connected with it. She travels independently by public transport to a nearby town. 
She discovers that it is easier to do sports on her own, and decides to end her treatment at the 
center. She stays in touch with the center’s physiotherapist for individual counselling, and on 
her advice she contacts a first-line psychologist. In 2014, when Marieke is 18, the 
pediatricians at the PH and the UH make appointments with Marieke and her parents to 
discuss transition to adult medical care. Contacts are established, transition discussions held 
and a survey of her case history is written. Ultimately, the pediatrician at the PH has an 
evaluative final meeting with Marieke and her parents. The parents state that Marieke is ready 
for the transition thanks to the independence she acquired, because she has learned to stand up 
for herself. They also identify the quality that they value most in contacts with physicians: a 
willingness to listen, to understand concerns, and to take complaints seriously, and also to 
make an earnest effort to investigate them. 
 
Everyday medical work 
Marieke’s story can certainly be called extraordinary in many aspects. Physicians will 
comment that every case is extraordinary when the specific patient and the specific context of 
time and place are taken into account. However, the story also shows us a range of common 
characteristics of current everyday medical work. 
1. As people turn to a physician with (sometimes vague) complaints and obscure 
problems for which a comprehensive diagnosis very often cannot be given, medical 
work partly consists of a continuous search for the accurate diagnosis, the proper 
treatment, the appropriate support, the correct guidance. It is often not clear where the 
necessary expertise to solve a problem can be found, as the lengthy search for the 
cause of Marieke’s anemia shows. Contrary to what is generally thought, physicians 
must often look for knowledge to apply to the case rather than simply apply 
knowledge they already have. 
2. This means that physicians must be able to deal with incessant, often serious 
uncertainties, which they have to handle prudently for the patient’s sake, as the 
questions concerning Marieke’s long-lasting fatigue problems demonstrate. The 
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physician’s profession and expert knowledge rooted in an age-long tradition of 
research do much to create the impression of someone who ‘has certain knowledge’. 
However, this case also shows that much frequently remains uncertain, from 
diagnostics to the appropriate treatment, from the goal to be pursued to the expertise 
and means required to realize it, from results to the sustainability of the solution, from 
the type of caregiver to the addressee (Marieke? Her parents? Individual family 
members?). Being able to deal with these kinds of permanent uncertainties is part of 
practicing. 
3. Yet the profession requires that the practitioner must act anyway, take decisions 
anyway despite these uncertainties. Doing nothing is not an option. Physicians are 
under great pressure to act even from patients, from the institutions within which their 
practices take place, from healthcare funding systems, from professional 
organizations. Cardiac catheterization? A bone marrow puncture? Ferro medication 
for anemia? An inhaler for shortness of breath? Or would it be better to wait? Or to 
continue investigating? The need to act and to choose under great pressure while 
surrounded by uncertainties, that is the day-to-day-task of many physicians. This case 
shows a non-idealized image of their practices. 
4. Physicians, supported by their training, use all kinds of aphorisms, or opposite 
aphorism pairs, to be able to deal with the uncertainties. One of these is Occam’s 
razor, “Look for a single diagnosis that can explain all the findings”, together with 
Hickham’s dictum, “It’s parsimonious, but it may not be right” (Montgomery, 2006, p. 
113). Yet at the same time they do not learn how to develop the ability to discern 
which aphorism applies to the individual case at hand. Thus, the cause of Marieke’s 
fatigue after physical effort, was sought in the congenital heart disease and/or the 
effects of the early heart surgery (Occam’s razor). However, after years of searching, 
it turned out to be the result of two other rare congenital causes. This despite the 
aphorism, “When you hear hoofbeats, don’t think zebras” (Montgomery, 2006, p. 
122). So aphorisms sometimes help, but sometimes reality contradicts them. In other 
words: despite the appearance of solid ground, when all is said and done, this does not 
always offer the certainty required. And when something that is supposed to give 
support yields, the uncertainty increases. 
5. In order to reach the right insights and determine what is best, physicians use various 
reference frameworks and different sources of knowledge. They make use of medical-
scientific and medical-technical frameworks, medical tradition (see 4), psychological 
and social frameworks, intuitions, routines and habits, experience and knowledge that 
the patients and their relatives have. These different frameworks and sources each 
have their own logic, their own language, their own path of inquiry, and they can lead 
to several, sometimes contrasting interpretations. Choices must then be made on the 
basis of the information gathered, so as to be able to take the following step in the 
diagnostic or treatment process. Alternatively, considerations and interpretations must 
be harmonized or combined. The interpretation of ‘medicalization’ in the case of 
Marieke is one instance. Without the different frameworks and sources, no one will 
get far; medical thinking alone is insufficient. Given the multiplicity of these sources, 
practicing is a great challenge. 
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6. It is very clear that physicians no longer work as soloists with patients, instead they 
work in networks and treatment chains. Marieke attends the mother-child center, the 
GP, the out-of-hours GP service, the pediatrician at the PH (nine doctors in addition to 
her own doctor), the ED, pediatric cardiologists, hematologists, heart surgeons, 
pediatric surgeons, a dental surgeon, an ENT-specialist, a multi-disciplinary team in 
the asthma treatment center, the thrombosis service, and many specialized and non-
specialized nurses. Not only individual professionals must function well, i.e. have up-
to-date expertise and communication skills, the networks and treatment chains, too, 
must function smoothly. In particular, mutual communication and cooperation within 
networks must be effective. Physicians are no longer lonely heroes. It is necessary to 
coordinate, to orchestrate, to repair short-circuits. In Marieke’s case, the ‘regular’ 
pediatrician at the PH was the supervisor. 
7. The case shows that patients, relatives and physicians are required over and over again 
to move into unknown medical territory, into fields for which there are no protocols, 
no routines, and where similar past experiences cannot be completely trusted. There 
are protocols and routines for parts of the long(-term) process (e.g. on how to treat 
gallstones, when a splenectomy is indicated and safe, or what precautions need to be 
taken when a splenectomy is performed) but there are no protocols for the case as a 
whole, for integral, good care for this complex patient. 
8. The case shows that medical, legal, ethical, social, psychological and organizational 
problems are intertwined and can sometimes only be unraveled with difficulty. Are the 
fatigue problems a cry for attention, are they due to poor physical condition, to 
psychologically unhealthy family relationships, are they the symptoms of a well-
known or still unknown physical condition, or are they due to a combination of 
causes? Is it right to use the valuable capacity of the asthma treatment center for a 
patient who has no asthma? How can the patient’s confidence in the GPs of the out-of-
hours GP service be maintained when these are unable to access the patient’s medical 
file? Can a physician resist the demanding behavior of a patient? Or is the patient’s 
behavior not demanding at all on closer inspection and does the demanding behavior 
exist in the physician’s perception? 
9. The case shows that insufficient stability of treatment (and thus of life) was realized 
for this patient (as well as for many others). Again and again, unexpected, new 
problems arose when it seemed that an episode had ended, or unforeseen events 
occurred just when the patient was doing well. This also means, that physicians are 
confronted with their own failures in the form of (partially) wrong assessments, that 
can, moreover, cause the patient’s confidence to wane. Physicians must be able to deal 
with this; they must persevere and persist for the patient’s sake. Caring for a patient in 
the context of this kind of instability is extremely challenging for physicians. 
 
This non-exhaustive list of characteristics of current medical work, which are 
manifested in Marieke’s story as well as in many other patient histories, provide a perspective 
on medical professional work on the basis of everyday reality. The list shows that metaphors 
such as ‘muddling through’ (Brennan, Greenhalgh, & Pawson, 2018), meandering, ‘tinkering’ 
(Mol, Moser, & Pols, 2010), improvising, searching through trial and error, are appropriate 
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for this kind of everyday work. Moreover, it demonstrates that reductionist, schematic and 
idealized images of the profession, which are then used to formulate quality systems, 
proposals for improvement or ethical recommendations, are of little use in doing daily work 
well. 
 
Good work: the multiple good 
As a dedicated pediatrician, I regularly wondered, in this case as well as in the cases of 
hundreds of other patients: are we really doing what is good (beneficent) for these patients 
and their families? And what does professional work essentially consist of? Providing good 
medical care certainly includes being able to deal with the characteristics of the work depicted 
above. But I discovered that the ‘good’ in ‘good medical care’ can, and very often must, mean 
many other things, such as the following: 
1. Good as in: in accordance with standards drawn up by scientific associations, i.e. in 
accordance to the latest scientific knowledge and insights, evidence-based. It can also 
mean: to act skillfully or competently (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Maatschappij ter 
bevordering der Geneeskunst – KNMG – [Royal Dutch Medical Association], 2005). 
Good in this sense also means: in accordance with insights and attitudes that are 
learned during medical training – this involves a process of socialization (Witman, 
2014). 
2. Good as in: in accordance with agreed quality and safety standards and various kinds 
of indicators, sometimes in line with quality or safety systems, not only those drawn 
up by professional organizations (KNMG, 2012), but also by other bodies (health 
insurance companies, inspectorate, patients’ organizations, quality and safety 
institutions), and operating at all levels, from national guidelines to the ideals of a 
local hospital. 
3. Good as in: in accordance with social-psychological insights on communication, 
conversation, being service-oriented, and on how to involve the patient. 
4. Good as in: in accordance with management theories that emphasize efficiency, 
streamlined logistics, and the explicating and realizing of measurable goals (targets). 
5. Good as in: experienced as such by the recipients of care, the patients. Thus, Marieke 
and her parents articulate what they need: caregivers must listen to the patient, must 
try to understand individual concerns and complaints (patient’s concern according to 
Sayer, 2011), and must earnestly investigate complaints. 
6. Good as in: in accordance with moral norms as expressed in the medical oath: “I will 
care for the sick, promote health and alleviate suffering. I will make the patient’s 
interest my first priority and will respect his opinion. I will not harm the patient”. 
(KNMG, 2004). Or in accordance with radical service to the patient, as the 
psychiatrist/neurologist Van den Berg formulated it in 1969, p. 49: “the physician has 




Thus, in my own practice as a pediatrician I discovered that ‘good’ has several 
meanings, that it is ‘multiple’ as Mol and co-authors have frequently described (2004, 2006, 
2013). But it must in all cases also be morally good, and for the greater part, this morality 
overlaps with what the unique patient-in-context needs, i.e. the multiple good has to be 
attuned to the patient. I discovered that the moral good is intertwined with the characteristics 
of medical actions listed above – such as uncertainty, different types of knowledge, instable 
results, continuous searching and much more. I also discovered, that within the medical 
community, in particular among medical specialists, there is a certain embarrassment when it 
comes to the morality of everyday care, while there is plenty of discussion about difficult 
dilemmas, such as the debate about abortion, euthanasia, privacy issues, genetic manipulation, 
patient selection for scarce treatments etc. Moreover, in general discussions, the morality of 
everyday medical practice is often reduced to applying ethical principles in the form of a 
simplified yes/no decision (according to Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of biomedical 
ethics, 1985). The principles in question are: beneficence (do well), non-maleficence (do no 
harm), respect for the autonomy of the patient, and justice. The Dutch edition of the 
CanMEDS model refers to these in its definition of the competence of professionalism: the 
physician must practice medicine “according to the ethical norms of the profession”. 
Precisely in the years when I participated in Marieke’s treatment and struggled with 
the issues above, insights into and views on medical professionalism were changing rapidly. It 
is a measure of this change that KNMG felt the need in 2007 to publish a manifesto on 
“Medical Professionalism”, to communicate its vision on these changes. By then, it had 
become clear to me that if the outcome was going to be a form of professionalism that did not 
offer any help in dealing with the problems of daily medical work, this would be a 
professionalism that lacked something essential. What was needed, I believed, was a 
navigator that can help in cases of uncertainty and complexity to find, a compass that shows 
the right direction and provides a footing when everything is instable and one’s view is 
obscured. It is worthwhile to take a look at the recent history – the past 50 years – of the 
medical professionalization movement and to investigate whether this movement can provide 
such a compass. Again, what we need is not a compass that shows the way in the abstract, but  




The professionalism movement started in parallel with the democratization movement that 
emerged in high-income countries, or ‘societies of levels 3 and 4’ according to Rosling 
(2018), after the reconstruction following the destructions of the Second World War. The 
democratization movement strongly criticized medical professionals (Illich, 1976) in post-war 
societies. According to the protagonists of this movement, medical professionals lived in 
well-protected ivory towers, behaved paternalistically, put their own interests – including 
their financial interests – above those of the patients and abused their right to self-regulation 
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and autonomy by exercising power and maintaining a ‘conspiracy of silence’ about 
malfunctioning colleagues (Lens & Van der Wal, 1997). 
The profession responded to this criticism as did certain other social groups and 
authorities. Thus the medical profession started a process of ‘technical professionalization’ 
(mentioned and criticized by Kinghorn, 2010), aimed at defining professional skills, making 
them verifiable and making lifelong development of those skills compulsory. This tendency 
toward technical professionalization took the form of the Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) 
movement (Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes & Richardson, 1996; Greenhalgh, Howick, & 
Maskrey, 2014), and of Competency-Based Education (CBE) (CanMEDS 2005 Framework, 
The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, 2008). It subsequently led to the 
drawing up of guidelines, standards, mandatory periodical reviews of skills and experience, 
with continuation of registration made dependent upon these (the legal basis for this in the 
Netherlands was the Wet Beroepen Individuele Gezondheidszorg – de Wet BIG, 1993 [the 
Individual Healthcare Professions Act]), and the introduction of supporting quality and safety 
systems. Social groups started the patients’ movement, which lobbied for patients’ rights; 
these rights were then enshrined in law by the government (Wet op de Geneeskundige 
Behandelings Overeenkomst: WGBO, 1994 [the Medical Treatment Agreement Act]; the Wet 
Klachtrecht Cliënten Zorgsector: WKCZ, 1995 [Complaint Rights of Healthcare Sector 
Clients Act]; the Kwaliteitswet Zorginstellingen: WKZ, 1996 [Care Institutions Quality Act]. 
Care organizations were asked to give detailed performance accounts, resulting in the 
emergence of a bureaucracy of inspections and reporting (Van Dartel & Jeurissen, 2008). In 
the context of the dominance of neo-liberal discourse in the entire Western world after the 
collapse of the communist-socialist systems in Russia and Eastern Europe (Biebricher, 2017), 
market thinking and market-oriented control mechanisms were introduced into care (Evetts, 
2009, 2011; Freidson, 2001; Minzberg, 2012; Timmerman 2018). In addition, the explosion 
of technical innovations in the medical domain during the last decades of the twentieth 
century (Le Fanu, 2000) resulted in an unparalleled digitization process that made exchange 
of knowledge possible globally and in real time. As a result of these developments, the 
medical profession has withdrawn, as it were, into technical professionalism, into evidence-
based and supply-oriented practicing and into ever further sub-specialization, while patients 
have been relabeled care consumers, and healthcare organizations are taking over control in 
daily health care. Berwick (2006) has argued that, after the era of protectionism of the 
profession and the era of technologization, reductionism, accountability and market-based 
thinking, a third, moral era, should now be ushered in for medical professionals so that they 
can maintain the honor of the profession, the quality of health care and sincere service to the 
patient. 
It is striking that Dutch colleges of physicians – KNMG, the Federatie van Medisch 
Specialisten (FMS) [Dutch Association of Medical Specialists] and Colleges of General 
Practitioners – are currently working enthusiastically and innovatively on finding a method to 
prepare their colleagues for this third era. This is apparent, for instance in the Visiedocument 
Medisch Specialist 2025 [Vision Paper on Medical Specialists in 2025] and from the 
reformulation of core values and core tasks by GPs in 2019. These envisage not only the 
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fighting of disease, but also the promotion of health, the prevention of illness and supporting 
patients to realize a good life and self-reliance. Patients, physicians and health care 
organizations are asked to cooperate in networks in order to realize these goals. 
However, it is also striking that these medical associations only partially address the 
morality of medicine, despite the fact that this was emphasized by Berwick, whereas it ought 
to be their central priority in the new era. It is true that much attention is given to patients’ 
rights, and this is reflected in the setting up of procedures about informed consent, shared 
decision making and advanced care planning. The Wet kwaliteit, klachten en geschillen in de 
Zorg (Wkkgz), 2015 [Quality, Complaints and Disputes in Healthcare Act] was adopted on 
the recommendation of the various colleges of physicians. The Wkkgz describes good care as 
good-quality care at the right level (i.e. safe, efficient, effective, client-oriented, punctual, 
attuned to the real needs of the client), care consistent with professional standards, in which 
the patient is treated with respect and patients’ rights are respected. However, discussions 
about moral issues in healthcare still are (partly) entrusted to ethicists and are also limited to 
the classical dilemmas such as those concerning the beginning and the end of life, privacy, 
genetic manipulations and to the application of the four ethical principles. 
Thus, the interpretation of medical professionalism has clearly developed over the last 
50 years. But answers to the question: “What is good, especially in daily work?” have failed 
to keep pace. ‘Good care’ is still primarily seen as competent care, the quality of which is 
determined by whether it meets a range of demands and whether it respects the patient and her 
rights. Of course it is true that skill and quality also contribute to the moral quality of 
professional care, but the core of that moral quality remains unidentified. Van Dartel & 
Jeurissen wrote in 2008, p. 254: The most important proof of professionalism is the capacity 
to react adequately to the unique of a situation, beyond the application of off-the-shelf 
solutions to standard problems. The description of the case Marieke and the nine issues that 
this raises demonstrate how the unique can emerge in practice and how this challenges 
professionals. It is hard to say whether the new medical professionalism as described above 
will adequately fulfil the needs that emerge in day-to-day practices. In any case, it lacks 
attention to one essential element: the ability to discern and react adequately to uniqueness 
with the help of a compass, a navigator. 
 
Practical wisdom and care ethics 
At the beginning of the new millennium, the work of Marian Verkerk (2003) and Annelies 
van Heijst (2005) introduced me to care ethics as a moral perspective that focuses on the 
extent to which people interrelate in a caring way (paraphrase of Verkerk, p. 179). Care ethics 
has proven to approximate to the daily practice of professional, morally good care for sick 
people more closely than principles-based ethics and its four well-known principles, and it is 
therefore more appropriate to professionalism in daily work. Thus Verkerk (2003) has argued, 
professionalism does not only exist in technical competence, but also in the competence of 
attentive, responsible and responsive giving and receiving care (p. 189). I read then the joint 
inaugural lecture by Professors Vosman and Baart: Aannemelijke zorg: over het uitzieden en 
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verdringen van praktische wijsheid in de gezondheidszorg [Plausible care: About the 
vaporization and suppression of practical wisdom in health care] (2008). This acquainted me 
with the concept of practical wisdom. Vosman defines this concept as follows: practical 
wisdom is the virtuous capacity to . . . discover what is morally relevant, knowing how to 
decide, knowing how to act, as well as knowing how to learn from what was not done well. 
Professionals with practical wisdom are always able to discern what is general and what is 
specific in nature (and act accordingly) (p. 35). When I read this, I wondered whether 
practical wisdom could be the indispensable, but as yet missing compass for medical 
professionalism, that I was looking for. I decided to start investigating this issue, not only 
theoretically, but also empirically in the daily practices of medical specialists in general 
hospitals. It proved to be an informative and long investigation, in which I regularly 
encountered dead ends, and that led to interesting, partially unexpected results. This book 
contains the report of my research. 
The specific questions that guided my investigations will be explained later in this 
book, but they all generally revolve around the following questions: what is practical wisdom, 
how does it emerge in daily practices, what inhibits and what promotes practical wisdom, why 
is it desirable and what happens when it is missing, can it be learned and how does it 
contribute to good care? To answer these questions I conducted a number of empirical studies 
– field research – closely observing practices of medical specialists in general hospitals. 
Given the results of the research, the interaction between theory and practice occupies a 
central place in this book, as does the meaning of practical wisdom for the medical 
profession, to the further development of which I am happy to contribute. 
The research is described in detail in the following chapters. I now will outline the 
structure of the book. 
 
Structure of the book  
Chapter 2 discusses theoretical studies on the most important concepts used in the empirical 
studies: complexity and complexity science; care ethics; practice theory; phronesis and 
practical wisdom. 
Chapter 3 comprises an account of the methodology of the four empirical studies carried out 
and described in the chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. 
Chapter 4 describes several faces of practical wisdom that emerge from a heuristic analysis of 
the thick description of ten patient cases. 
Chapter 5 explores whether practical wisdom can be learned by medical specialists in the 
workplace, i.e. after finishing their formal education, through multi-disciplinary case 
discussions with a general learning aim. 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 23
1
Chapter 6 contains an analysis of the long-term hospitalization of a patient with the aim of 
determining the ratio between a technical-medical approach and a phronetic approach and the 
influence on this ratio of the dominant discourse and the hospital infrastructure. 
Chapter 7 describes the observational study of an outpatient clinic for adolescents with type 1 
diabetes mellitus and the role of practical wisdom in diabetes care. 
Chapter 8 reflects on and evaluates the four empirical studies and the theoretical premises of 
the study as a whole. It also presents the conclusions of the research. On the basis of the 
empirical findings, we ‘talk back’ to the literature and present a well-founded description of 
practical wisdom. We subsequently reflect on the meaning of this research for other medical 
























particularly if he didn’t understand them.
Guus Kuijer, The Book of Everything.
Practical wisdom in complex medical 
practices: a critical proposal
Chapter 2





In recent times, daily, ordinary medical practices have incontrovertibly been developing under 
the condition of complexity. Complexity jeopardizes the moral core of practicing medicine: 
helping people, with their illnesses and suffering, in a medically competent way. Practical 
wisdom (a modification of the Aristotelian phronèsis) has been proposed as part of the 
solution to navigate complexity, aiming at the provision of morally good care. Practical 
wisdom should help practitioners to maneuver in complexity, where the presupposed linear 
ways of operating prove to be insufficient. However, this solution is unsatisfactory, because 
the proposed versions of practical wisdom are too individualistic of nature, while physicians 
are continuously operating in varying teams, and dealing with complicated technologies and 
pressing structures. A second point of critique is, that these versions are theory based, and 
thus insufficiently attuned to the actual context of everyday medical practices. Now, our 
proposal is to use an approach of practical wisdom that enables medical practices to counter 
the complexity issue and to re-invent the moral core of medical practicing as well. This 
implies a practice oriented approach, as thematized by practice theory, qualitative empirical 
research from the inside, and abduction from actual performed practical wisdom towards an 
apt understanding of phronèsis. 
 
Complexity is penetrating medical practices 
Daily, twenty-first century, medical practices, compared to those some 40 years ago, have 
changed significantly. The most striking change has been the steadily increasing complexity 
of these practices to which, also in medical publications, more and more attention has been 
drawn. “Across all disciplines, at all levels, and throughout the world, health care is becoming 
more complex” (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001, p. 625). “It is a truism that the world we live in 
has become more complex and interdependent and that this development continues to 
accelerate. . . . Similar changes have taken place in health care in the past 40 years” 
(Hollnagel, Wears & Braithwaite, 2015, p. 4). 
In this article, we will focus on medical practices in general hospitals; in doing so, our 
pressing question is: whether the actual complexity still allows for the moral scope of these 
practices: to provide good medical care, taken as a relational affair, for sick and suffering 
patients, with regard to the physician’s position, just as sworn to do when taking the medical 
oath (Vosman, Den Bakker & Weenink, 2016). In order to be able to answer this question, at 
least partly, we will first outline how this complexity appears in modern hospitals. While 40 
years ago, physicians’ day-to-day activities in their practices, compared to nowadays work, 
were still fairly orderly and predictable (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001), today a range of factors 
bringing about complexity can be seen. Firstly, Vosman et al. (2016) mention the ongoing 
specialization and sub-specialization of medical specialists. They quote Cooke (2013, p. 202): 
“Across medicine specialties are becoming subspecialized, and subspecialties are developing 
sub-subspecialties.” Braithwaite and Plumb (2015, p. 34) point to the risk that the sub-
specialization will lead to “bounded clusters – such as organizational silos and professional 
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‘tribes’” which cause “gaps between groups of agents, . . . between professions, departments, 
specialties or local sites.” Communication and cooperation amongst these groups are 
becoming problematic while, at the same time, there is a need for professional teams to 
cooperate in patient care. Secondly, Vosman et al. (2016) indicate the expanding technology, 
both ITC, which supports administration and registration, and high tech, often invasive, 
medicine used for diagnostics and therapy. This technology increases complexity, especially 
because it absorbs the professional’s time and attention. Moreover, it penetrates the patient’s 
body (Tilney, 2011) and the relationship between healthcare professionals and patients 
(Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017). Besides, it has consequences for patients. Cooke (2013), for 
instance, indicates that critical moments in patients’ lives, like birth and death, are often 
mediated by technology. Those technologies, mediating communication, diagnostics and 
therapy, impose their own demands and these technique-linked demands regularly supersede 
caring for the patient (Braithwaite & Plumb, 2015; Hollnagel, Wears & Braithwaite, 2015; 
Verbeek, 2011). Besides, they tend to suppress the patient’s voice (Vosman & Niemeijer, 
2017). Thirdly, Vosman and co-authors (2016) refer to the social pressure which obliges 
hospitals to install safety, quality and financial accountability systems and to report on a wide 
range of indicators. This again, demands time from professionals which cannot be spent on 
patients. A study of Füchtbauer, Norgaard and Backer Mogensen (2013) revealed that 
physicians spend an average of 30% of their time on documentation and registration, 
computerized most of the time. Besides, the systems mentioned, unintentionally increase 
complexity for healthcare workers, because the standards they represent are different from the 
professional norms and those of the individual patient. Fourthly, Atul Gawande (2010, p. 19) 
indicates the rising number of identified diseases as a factor that increases complexity: “The 
ninth edition of the World Health Organization’s international classification of diseases has 
grown to distinguish more than thirteen thousand different diseases, syndromes and types of 
injury. . . . And for nearly all of them, science has given us things we can do to help.” Finally, 
we refer to the ‘tools’ medical professional organizations have developed to support evidence-
based practicing: the guidelines. The number of guidelines has grown to such an extent, that 
consulting them all adequately has become an illusion. Upshur (2014) documented the 
increase in the number of clinical guidelines over 25 years: from 73 clinical guidelines 
published in PubMed in 1990, to more than 7500 in 2012. Boyd et al. (2005) showed, 
describing the case of a 79-year old patient, that an accumulation of guidelines can lead to 
damaging care, and that regulations in an individual case, can be incompatible. Olde Rikkert 
(2017) demonstrates that following guidelines practically rules out realizing integral care for 
patients with multi-morbidity. Therefore, Gawande (2010, p. 19) notes: “Medicine has 
become the art of managing extreme complexity – and a test of whether such complexity can, 
in fact, be humanly mastered.” 
Medical professionals, practicing in institutions, need an answer to the question how 
to deal with this complex reality. Indeed, as Anderson and McDaniel (2000) have stated, we 
need a new mental model of healthcare organizations, of healthcare policy, and of hospital 
management. Various authors (Anderson & McDaniel, 2000; Dekker, 2011; Hollnagel, Wears 
& Braithwaite, 2015; Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001) criticize the still prevailing mode of causal-
linear, bimodal and reductionist thinking that dominates healthcare and medicine. As this 
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linear thinking mode is regarded to be inadequate in a complex reality, they propose to 
embrace complexity theory and to approach health care (organizations) as Complex-Adaptive 
Systems (CAS). According to Plsek and Greenhalgh (2001, p. 625) a CAS is “a collection of 
individual agents with freedom to act in ways that are not always totally predictable, and 
whose actions are interconnected so that one agent’s actions changes the context for other 
agents.” Anderson and McDaniel (2000) sum up the distinctive characteristics of a CAS: it is 
defined in terms of connections and patterns of relationships among agents, it shows an 
emergent development over time, and the system trajectory over time is fundamentally 
unknowable (unpredictable). The authors mentioned, make useful propositions for adequately 
dealing with complexity in care practices, and with this, they partly answer Gawande’s 
question, about humanly mastering complexity. For instance, they indicate “intuition and 
muddling through” (Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001); flexibility, creativity an improvisation, 
summed up as ‘resilience’ (Hollnagel, Wears & Braithwaite, 2015). However, neither these 
propositions, nor complexity theory, will help healthcare professionals, managers and policy-
makers sufficiently with the moral question, we have raised, because they ignore the moral 
purpose of medical practices. This telos was mentioned by Viafora (1999, p. 288) “the clinical 
paradigm: the ends which constitute and define practice itself.” Neither do they help in 
critically examining the ethical implications of work structures and interactions, as pointed 
out by Chambliss (1996) and by Vriens, Achterbergh and Gulpers (2018). Cilliers (2013, p. 
20) reflecting on the ethics of complexity theory, poses it like this: “complexity tells us that 
ethics will be involved” (he bases this on the fact that in a complex reality interpretations, 
evaluations and making not fully-objectifiable choices are unavoidable), “but does not tell us 
what that ethics actually entails”. 
Therefore, we repeat the question, complexity theory does not have a good answer to: 
how medical practices, embedded in complexity, can stay focused on the moral dimension of 
healthcare: the good that has to be processed for every patient in an appropriate way and that 
emerges in the professional relationship with the patient (Kunneman, 2010; Van Heijst, 2005; 
Vosman & Baart, 2011). The question is even more pressing, because today, the one-to-one 
professional relationship between caregiver and patient is rather exception than rule. 
Herewith, the traditional care relationship, which prevailed as the constituting element for 
good care, cannot be taken for granted any longer. Today’s practices present constantly 
changing teams of professionals providing care for pluralistic groups of patients, who, in their 
turn, more often have multiple than simple questions or problems (Baart & Vosman, 2015a, 
2015b; Mesman, 2002; Reeve et al. 2013). 
 
An apt ethical stance 
Raising the question on the morality of practices requires that we define our place in the 
ethical discourse of healthcare. By linking ethics to the telos of a practice and also to the 
excellent way in which this goal needs to be realized, we endorse the insights of the Greek 
philosopher Aristotle (Aristotle, 2009). Aristotle recognized that ethics starts from everyday 
issues, that ethics is linked to virtues, and that ethics can guide actions by “identifying and 
respecting the scope of actions on a goal” (Vosman & Baart, 2008, p. 29). With this, Vosman 
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emphasizes that in late modernity, it is no longer self-evident, that goals of professional 
actions are predetermined. They should be derived from caring as an intrinsically moral 
activity, using the insights of experienced healthcare workers (Mol, 2006; Van Heijst, 2005). 
With Vosman and Baart (2008. p. 29) we define virtues as: “long-term attitudes people 
establish in themselves by steadily . . . continuing to act well and striving for excellence.” 
This always involves searching for the balance between two extremes: for example, courage 
is halfway between cowardice and recklessness. With this point of view, we move away from 
the premise that ethics in healthcare can be confined to extreme situations, in which solutions 
need to be found in ‘dilemmas’. This common view abstracts from the everyday medical 
acting, where constantly decisions are made, but not all the time the ‘either-or choices’ of a 
binary logic. We also take distance from deontological ethics, which judges practices on the 
basis of principles, rights, duties and rules; moreover, from Beauchamp and Childress’s 
principles-based bioethics and its four principles: non-maleficence, beneficence, autonomy 
and justice (1985). Deontological ethics as well as principles-based ethics abstract from, and 
hence reduce reality, so that morally relevant, concrete details, essential for patients and 
healthcare professionals, disappear from view. Therefore, these approaches do offer moral 
orientation, but at a too high aggregation level; more oriented to accounting for actions 
externally, than to the moral question par excellence: what is the good for this sick, wounded 
or dying person? 
Rather, we choose a care ethical perspective on care and care practices. From this 
perspective, we regard care to be a relationship between two or more people, one of whom is 
the patient – together with her relatives and friends – and the others are the professional 
healthcare workers. In this relationship, the patient’s distinctive characteristic is to be ill or 
suffering; that is precisely why vulnerability and dependence are at least as important as 
autonomy (Tronto, 1993; Van Heijst, 2005; Vosman & Baart, 2008). In addition, care ethics 
will look for a moral solution-path in the ability of caregivers to switch between the patient’s 
and the professional’s perspective in a constant iterative movement. Practicing like this, 
enables professionals to determine what is the good to be reached in a specific situation and 
context (Mol, 2006; Van Heijst, 2005; Vosman & Baart, 2008). Herewith, care ethics appears 
to be a contextual ethics, specifically focusing on each new situation: its third characteristic 
(Klaver, Van Elst & Baart, 2014; Nortvedt & Vosman, 2014). Furthermore, care ethics is a 
political ethics (Baart & Vosman, 2015; Held, 2006; Laugier, 2015; Tronto, 1993, 2013; 
Vosman & Baart, 2008). Its guiding principle is, that by caring, human relations are actually 
structured; this does not apply to human relations in medical practices, but also in the 
institutional practice of the hospital and in the world beyond. In 1993, Tronto already 
formulated the political character of care ethics with her definition of care: “a species of 
activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we 
can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves and our 
environment” (Tronto, 1993, p. 103). With this definition, Tronto positioned care as a practice 
indeed. Finally, care ethics is empirically grounded; for if care always takes place within a 
specific context, in which it becomes meaningful, then it is necessary to study in detail these 
specific situations, these practices in their contexts. 
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Re-inventing morality in complexity; a proposal 
We return to our statement, that the complexity of modern healthcare, has turned practicing 
well into a problem. We realize, that ‘tools’ have been recommended by professional 
organizations and healthcare institutions, to facilitate acting morally well, such as principles-
based bioethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 1985), codes of conduct (Kinghorn, 2010), general 
values after the idea of ‘Value Based Health Care’ (Porter & Teisberg, 2006), and many 
guidelines and procedures (Kotzee, Paton & Conroy, 2016). However, these tools are 
apparently inadequate to support professionals with practicing morally well in everyday 
complexity. On the contrary, the means, offered to be helpful, indeed regularly cloud the clear 
view on the good to be achieved in a specific situation, because they have been formulated in 
too general a way or have only been directed at a specific target (Dunne, 1993; Kinghorn, 
2010; Pitman, 2012; Sellman, 2012; Vosman & Baart, 2008). Also, clinicians report that these 
principles and rules are not helpful to them in defining what good care is about in specific 
situations for individual patients. “The abstract principles of autonomy, beneficence and 
justice that order the practices of standard bioethics are only tangentially relevant to the more 
concrete goods that order the practice of surgery” (Hall, 2011, p. 124). Judkins (2015, p. 236) 
describes that, at the Emergency Department (ED), he suspects a patient who presented with 
broken ribs after a fall, that he must have an alcohol addiction. Then, he decides in seconds, 
that he has to do “what I swore that I would do: look after those in need.” However, doing this 
also means, he has to break the agreed rules for the ED (short waiting times, short throughput 
times) and spend hours on deliberating and making appointments. Here, doing what is 
morally well, is frustrated by rules, habits, achievement directions and management decisions. 
Brothers (2011) describes that in medical practices, because of necessary and meaningful 
relationships with patients, it is inevitable that conflicts occur daily from moral, but also from 
professional commitments. For instance, a patients demands antibiotics, while the physician 
has diagnosed a viral common cold, for which antibiotics as a therapy is senseless. The rules 
and protocols do not provide for dealing well with such common conflicts. Obviously, 
medical professionals regularly make these choices: whether or not, or partly, to apply 
existing rules and directives. Why are they making these choices and what helps them to 
make good choices? 
We propose to look for an appropriate capability which enables professionals, 
managers and policymakers, working together in medical care in a complex reality, to choose 
the right direction; and accordingly making choices and giving care which can, time and 
again, be directed toward what proves to be good for the individual patient: right in the 
professional sense and also experienced as good and fitting for the patient’s life. We regard 
this tool as a capacity and we will use the compass as a metaphor for this ability. We are 
looking for a built-in compass that can guide practices in everyday clinical work. Our 
proposition is to work out, not only the flexibility, adaptability, improvisation and intuition, 
recommended by complexity theory – elements related to the nature of practicing, but also 
practical wisdom, which refers to the purpose of the practice. For that reason, however, 
Aristotelian phronesis (practical wisdom) has to be reconsidered critically. 
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Practical wisdom indispensable when navigating complexity 
The moral compass, mentioned above, should equip practices with the capacity to maneuver 
and navigate efficiently in the daily, complex reality; in other words: to remain focused on 
assisting each individual patient in her context, in a medical competent way. One could 
imagine that the medical profession, besides the above mentioned principles and rules, has 
intended Competence Based Education (CBE) to this end. CBE has internationally been 
embraced by the medical profession from the end of the twentieth century on and has been 
implemented for instance, in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. The question is whether CBE, precisely because reality has changed drastically, 
indeed can be useful for moral orientation in a complex reality. Following Dunne (1993), 
Kinghorn (2010, p. 94) describes CBE as the “technical project of modern medicine.” CBE 
discerns seven competencies, which all appear to represent specific kinds of knowledge, skills 
and behaviors. For instance, the capacity to deal critically with academic knowledge, to be 
able to build up an effective treatment relationship with a patient and to organize work 
efficiently. Morality is regarded to belong to one of the competences, namely 
‘professionalism’, but it is described in vague, general terms. Kinghorn (2010) and Lombarts 
(2015) doubt whether Competence Based Education of physicians can indeed lead to the right 
professionalism in a moral sense. Lombarts argues that “competence schemes . . . are not 
sufficient to educate or train excellent performing physicians” (p. 327). With Kinghorn, we 
expect that, on the other hand “the mode of practical reason known as phronesis or ‘practical 
wisdom’ ” will make it possible to guarantee the morality of a complex practice. 
It is no surprise that in medical-ethical publications of the last decades – together with 
the observable increase of complexity in healthcare – phronesis or practical wisdom is 
frequently mentioned as the intended moral compass. Kristjánsson (2015, p. 300) even speaks 
of a “buzzword in contemporary medical ethics”, at least insofar as the academic world is 
concerned. He describes phronesis as “the intellectual capacity to adapt moral virtues wisely 
to particular . . . situations” (2015, p. 300). However, Kristjánsson also indicates, that 
traditional rules-governed duty ethics still dominates the medical-professional workplace. 
Kinghorn (2010) observes that, in professional training, attention for practical wisdom is still 
failing. So, these authors suggest that modern physicians have not adequately been equipped 
to safeguard the intrinsic moral goals of their complex practices. Moreover, according to 
several publications, the institutional contexts of these practices should rather limit than 
promote the desired moral excellency (Hafferty & Levinson, 2008; Kinghorn, 2010; Kinsella 
& Pitman, 2012; MacIntyre, 1985; Vosman & Baart, 2008).  
Even though we want to point out that practical wisdom is indispensable in modern 
practices, we do not plead for an uncritical adoption of phronesis after Aristotle, i.e. not for a 
neo-Aristotelian version of phronesis. Phronesis has to be modified, precisely because of the 
changing context we live in, which we, following Giddens (1990), Rosa (2013) and Vosman 
and Niemeijer (2017), indicate as late modern. Herewith, our more specific question becomes: 
which concept of phronesis is adequate in relation to the complexity characterized by late 
modernity? Then specific questions arise, for instance, can phronesis direct late modern 
conduct in complex medical professional practices? How would that be feasible? What does 
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practical wisdom look like, which, in complex circumstances, enables practices to define 
meaningful and also feasible goals for every patient, (in agreement with the good life for this 
patient)? Furthermore, does practical wisdom enable practices to distinguish, estimate, weigh 
and judge which means are most suitable to reach that goal, in an appropriate time-path, in 
each case adapting to intervening changes? To illustrate the impact of these questions, we will 
first reflect on the Aristotelian view of practical wisdom. In that way, the Aristotelian 
phronesis will function as a contrast foil for phronesis in late modern complex practices and 
not as its final definition. 
In his Ethica Nicomachea, Aristotle describes phronesis as knowledge of the proper 
ends of life. He classifies it as one of the intellectual, practical virtues: these are virtues, on 
the one hand, based on knowledge, but on the other hand on praxis, on acting morally in a 
specific situation. Aristotle saw this phronesis related to and depending on two other 
intellectual virtues, namely episteme (theoretical knowledge) and techne (product oriented 
knowledge). Kinsella and Pitman (2012, p. 2) explain episteme as scientific, universal, 
context-independent knowledge. In addition, there are the abilities and professional skills, 
being able to manufacture a product – techne. Vosman and Baart (2008) emphasize, following 
Aristotle, that phronesis (practical wisdom) emerges from praxis: it arises in acting together in 
practices. Kemmis (2012), interpreting Aristotle as well, pays attention to the reciprocal 
relationship between praxis and phronesis: on the one hand, phronesis leads to a praxis, which 
is morally desirable and can be endorsed; on the other hand, the insight connected with the 
moral good, emerges from the praxis, so that good actions on their turn inform knowledge. 
Practitioners learn to assess a situation better and better, through this intermittent movement 
between praxis and knowledge (Montgomery, 2006). In this way, they also build up 
experiential knowledge in their practices. However, with Kinghorn, Vosman and Baart, in this 
regard still following Aristotle fully, we emphasize that practical wisdom does not emerge 
automatically from experience. Indeed, experience is indispensable for the development of 
phronesis – practical wisdom is only learned by acting practically wise – but practitioners 
have to store their experiences and to reflect and deliberate on them, preferably from a 
practice with colleagues who face the same problems. Only reflection and deliberation on the 
praxis will bring about practical wisdom. 
In recent publications: (Kaldjian, 2010, 2014; Kinghorn, 2010; Kinsella & Pitman, 
2012; Kotzee, Paton & Conroy, 2016; Kristjánsson, 2015; Montgomery, 2006; Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1993) practical wisdom, as with Aristotle, has been described as an individual 
virtue of excellent professionals, gained by long-term experience, reflected and deliberated on 
with colleagues, leading to virtuousness and sound judgement. Yet, like we do, others have 
already argued (Hafferty & Levinson, 2008; Moore, 2005; Vosman & Baart 2008, 2011, 
2015; Vosman et al., 2016; Vriens et al., 2018) that in late modernity, the emphasis on the 
individual role of professionals has to be put into perspective by the radically changed work 
situation and work context these professionals practice in. The concept of phronesis – 
practical wisdom – needs to be adapted to these changes. 
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Practical wisdom: from individual actors to practices 
We mentioned complexity as an overarching feature of late modernity and of late modern, 
professional work. What does this complexity mean in relationship to practical wisdom? 
Complexity in healthcare institutions in the late modern period, according to Vosman, 
drawing on Ricoeur, is characterized by a trio of unavoidable tensions: firstly, a tension 
between finding the appropriate means for a goal, and identifying whatever that goal is. 
Secondly, between establishing issues and situations and creating moral excellency in 
connections and conduct within a community. Finally, between the urgency to act and the 
non-transparency (opaqueness) of the professionals acting, the situation and the patients 
(Vosman & Baart, 2008). Such tensions, linked to late modernity, which Aristotle did not 
know as such, may lead to confusions in practices, but they may also make practical wisdom 
emerge, according to Vosman. In order to make this happen, these tensions have to be 
exploited, however, for generating the right actions. The ability to create, in this way, the 
desired praxis from the tensions linked to complexity, verges on art, on astute craftsmanship. 
Vosman, considering this subject, arrives at a new definition of practical wisdom: “practical 
wisdom is the virtuosic capacity to discover what is morally relevant, to know how to decide 
and how to act, as well as learning to learn from what has not been done well, in the tension 
raised in and persisting within an institution, between obscured targets for actions and the 
refining of means” (Vosman & Baart, 2008, p. 32). 
The late modern, complex healthcare practice we are talking about has, as a second 
distinctive feature, that it is fully interrelated with the institutional surroundings of, for 
instance, a hospital and also with a wider social context. Care institutions and social contexts 
highly influence medical care practices, while they are not in the first place oriented toward 
the moral goals inherent to these professional practices. They concentrate on goals, which are 
of a managerial nature, aimed at efficiency or making profit. MacIntyre contrasts the “internal 
goods” or the “goods of excellence” of a practice with the “external goods” or the “goods of 
effectiveness” of an institution, “such as fame, power, profit or success” (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 
187). The pursuit of external goods does not necessarily make institutions amoral, but it is 
definitively not supportive for the morality, intrinsic to the medical practice. The objectives of 
the market, (gaining a better competitiveness and protecting ‘business secrets’), the one of 
free choice (giving information on options to consumers/patients), the one of management or 
bureaucracy (efficiency, accountability, control) are leading for these institutions (Freidson, 
2001; Mol, 2006; Moore, 2005; Moore & Beadle, 2006; Tonkens, 2008; Vriens et al., 2018). 
Therefore, Pitman (in Kinsella & Pitman, 2012, p. 131) speaks about “hostile ground for 
growing phronesis”. In his definition, Vosman calls the specific, but disregarded, internal 
objectives for medical practices “obscured goals” without, herewith, explicitly disqualifying 
the goals imported from outside, morally.  
A third characteristic of complex, late modern practices which makes it necessary to 
put the concept of phronesis in a really different perspective from personal virtue, is, that not 
any longer, the individual professional as an actor exclusively determines actions within a 
practice. Aristotle and neo-Aristotelianism concentrate on practical wisdom as the virtue of a 
citizen living in a polis, so on a politically framed virtue. Later, this political-ethical frame 
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was replaced by the ‘me-you approach’ of an individual physician toward an individual 
patient. Nowadays, the role of the individual professional as a director and decision maker on 
the one side, is put into perspective by the large number of colleagues co-acting in relation to 
the patient and each other, and on the other side, by material and immaterial influences of 
technique, built environment, management, regulations and culture within an institution. We 
will give an example of the first: in a publication of a five-year empirical investigation in a 
general hospital, Baart and Vosman described a case which was anything but exceptional 
(2015, pp. 181-206). The network of professionals actively concerned with one single patient 
during a 75-day hospitalization appeared to consist of 150 different people: physicians, 
nurses, dieticians, physiotherapists etc. following each other up in shifts. Complexity science 
emphasizes, that, apart from people, also material, influential agents should be distinguished: 
such as a variety of technologies, arrangements and rules, work structures, management and 
the interactions among all those actors (Anderson & McDaniel, 2000; Hollnagel, Wears & 
Braithwaite, 2015; Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001). In addition, Moore mentions the mode of an 
institution and the management style (Moore, 2005). Finally, Vosman and Niemeijer (2017) 
demand attention for the specific role the patient plays in the network, as being the one who 
has to endure, not only the illness and suffering, but also all these influencing agents of care 
and its surroundings, which are partly self-referential. 
When we assume that professionals and patients form part of such complex 
configurations of interdependent factors, this whole context, including processes and 
interactions taking place within it, should not only enable practical wisdom to emerge, but it 
should also manifest practical wisdom. For its emergence and manifestation, it is insufficient, 
but necessary indeed, that individual actors have embraced the virtue of practical wisdom. 
However, virtue foremost needs to be translated into the structures, the material and 
economical elements, the power relations, the culture and the habits of the individual actor’s 
surroundings (Nicolini & Monteiro, 2017; Vriens et al., 2018). Moore emphasizes the 
importance of a virtuous “corporate character” (Moore, 2005). Vriens et al. (2018) use the 
terms “virtuous structures” and “virtuous organizations”, and they mention “supportive 
infrastructures, (comprising for instance supportive structures, culture, leadership, technology 
or incentive systems)” (2018, p. 688). Virtuousness needs to be regarded spread over various 
‘actors’. That is the implication for ethical theories of the findings in practice theory – we will 
discuss this below – that not individuals, but participants in a practice, like players on a rough 
field, are central, while, in addition, material matters like building, systems and technology 
are co-acting. Thus, in our opinion, the concept of practical wisdom needs to be redefined 
from a sheer individual capacity, to a capacity of individuals, practices and institutions. That 
was partly introduced in Vosman’s definition of practical wisdom above. However, 
formulating the definition, preceded empirical research of concrete medical practices. 
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Practical wisdom: from theoretical to empirically grounded reflection 
It is important to think about the fact that virtue ethics and the neo-Aristotelean interpretation 
of phronesis have been developed as moral and philosophical theories from outside, without 
empirical research. (Baart & Vosman, 2015; Kotzee et al., 2016). Conversely, Kotzee et al. 
argue: “Indeed, because virtue ethics insists that virtuous action can only be understood 
properly in the context of real decisions (and not in the abstract), there are good grounds for 
thinking that understanding phronesis must involve attention to real-world particulars.” In 
this, they subscribe Kristjánsson’s definition of phronesis: “the wisdom to judge the right 
action to be performed in a particular situation when different goals would call for different 
actions” (Kristjánsson, 2015, p. 344). With Vosman and Baart (2015, p. 43-54) we advocate, 
with arguments borrowed from care ethics, the “thinking of care out of care” and also 
“thinking from inside to outside” when studying practices. Eikeland and Nicolini (2011) bring 
to the fore, the importance of developing theory or acquiring insights from inside a practice, 
through a research position embedded in the practice to be examined.  
We see the first epistemological reason for empirical research in the need to visualize 
and bring forward the perspective of the first people in care, namely that of the vulnerable 
being who needs care, and that of the caregiving professional (Nortvedt & Vosman, 2014). 
Here, with Eikeland and Nicolini (2011), Fricker (2007) and Heuts and Mol (2013) we refer 
to the perspective of the “knowers” in healthcare practices.  
The second epistemological reason for empirical research follows from the fact that 
practical wisdom is an emergent phenomenon, it emerges from practices, and thus can be 
‘caught’ in those practices only. That is also true for ‘the good’ that manifests itself in a 
practice, embedded in a specific context. Klaver et al. (2014, p. 759) argue: “good is what 
turns out to be good. This implies a revolution of the epistemological process. It is not just 
about rational approaches and decontextualized abstract knowledge; rather emotions and tacit 
knowing are also valued as important epistemological sources, which therefore have to be 
critically cultivated.” Heuts and Mol (2013) write about the ‘plurality’ of the good, and 
Vosman et al. (2016) mention its ‘fluidity’. Moore (2015) sees practical wisdom in the ability 
of institutions and managers to reach the right balance between focusing on the internal goods 
of their core practices and the pursuit of external goods, necessary for the sustainment of the 
organization. 
Finally, the non-transparency, the pluralism and the dynamics, characteristic of our 
complex, late modern society, make it necessary to develop and clarify the concept of 
practical wisdom by empirical research in practices and not from theoretical thinking created 
apart from those practices. Therefore, in our view, it is essential to achieve a better 
understanding of practical wisdom through qualitative-empirical research from inside 
practices. This implies developing theory, seen as ‘theoria’ after Aristotle “as a kind of 
grammar” (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011. P. 11). Nicolini and Monteiro (2017, p. 15) point out 
that rich representations (in the form of detailed descriptions) of practices may help 
practitioners “to see through conventional ways of doing and saying”, and because of these 
insights, they may question their own activities and may explore new ways of “doing and 
saying and being” (2017, p. 16). Abductive analysis and abductive learning (Timmermans & 
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Tavory, 2012) in a continued iterative movement between moral-theoretical insights and 
empiricism, suit this empirical approach best according to Nicolini & Monteiro.  
We have argued why we propose a decisively different approach to practical wisdom. 
We will now sketch out what such an approach looks like. 
A practice, its embedded morality and the empirical inquiry into it 
Our proposal is: to approach professional medical care as a practice, and thus, to approach it 
as “orderly materially mediated doings and sayings (‘practices’) and their aggregations.” 
(Nicolini & Monteiro, 2017, p. 2) and not as mere individual actions. In this, we follow the 
broad and fluid concept of practice in specific practice theories (Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 
1996; Schmidt, 2012), that contrasts with MacIntyre’s oft-quoted, solidified definition: “any 
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which 
goods internal to that form of activity are realized . . .” etc. (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 187).We 
choose practice theory, not complexity theory; both theories recognize the interdependency 
and actorship of various factors in situations, not of only human actors; both theories 
recognize the complexity which characterizes late modern societies. However, practice theory 
offers, different from complexity theory, possibilities for the moral scope and focus of 
professional care in real hospital practices. Where complexity theory is primarily descriptive 
(also see Cilliers, 2013), practice theory is action oriented: its object of research being 
“meaning-making, order-producing and reality-shaping activities” (Nicolini & Monteiro, 
2017, p. 6). Nicolini and Monteiro also see the purpose and the normative as intrinsically 
linked to practices, in contrast to complexity theory. “Practices only acquire sense when 
organized around an end” (2017, p. 3). Vosman et al. (2016, p. 118) argue that practice theory 
“could help to dig up matters of concern to those working and being ill in the hospital 
organization and which is also capable of capturing issues of complexity and normativity.” 
The unity of research of the practice theory is practice, described by Schatzki as 
“temporary unfolding and spatially dispersed sets (or nexuses) of doings and sayings” (1996, 
p. 29). Nicolini and Monteiro mention: “orderly sets of materially mediated doings and 
sayings aimed at identifiable ends. We call such regimes of activity practices when they have 
a history, a constituency, and a normative dimension” (2017, p. 6). To explain the concept of 
practice, Schmidt (2012) uses the comparison with a game on a pitch as for instance a football 
game. The comparison is not with the competition involved, but merely with its operation. 
Moving, competent actors and their antagonists influence each other constantly, but the 
material factors such as the condition of the pitch and the ball also have influence. Rules, 
routines and habits are important as well. The game has a goal and a meaning and new players 
enter a history already developed. Baart and Vosman approach (medical but also adjacent) 
care as a practice: “the most complex interplay of people, actions, artefacts, but also of the 
physical surroundings of (natural) modes of knowledge and of habits . . . of professionalism 
and appropriate organizations” (2015, p. 12). 
Practice theory, which, as Nicolini worked out thoroughly, contains a school of 
theories, and offers an excellent framework for the empirical study of medical practices in 
complex circumstances and for the interpretation of what has been observed. For instance, it 
PRACTICAL WISDOM IN COMPLEX MEDICAL PRACTICES: A CRITICAL PROPOSAL 37
2
offers leads for our vision on the moral actorship of the individual physician, surrounded by 
other acting factors. It criticizes the Kantian idea that morality can only be found in the 
individual who acts on the base of a free will and general principles. On the contrary, Nicolini 
(2012), Schatzki (1996), Schmidt (2012), and Vosman et al. (2016) emphasize that individual 
actions and actors are part of practices, where customs, goals, habits, a certain culture and 
structure already have a history. Thus, individual actors are far from sovereign in their 
actions. Nicolini (2012, p. 5) poses: “becoming part of an existing practice thus involves 
learning how to act, how to speak (and what to say), but also how to feel, what to expect and 
what things mean.” He adds: “absorbing, or being absorbed in a practice also implies 
accepting certain norms of correctness (what is right and wrong)”. Also, Vosman et al. (2016, 
p. 122), quoting Schmidt (2012), illustrate: “nobody acts in isolation, we always ground our 
doings on what others did before us”. Hall (2011) for instance, describes in what way 
surgeons in training are initiated into the traditions of the profession and how the profession, 
in collaboration, maintains and also modifies its own traditions. 
Practice theory is based on the assumption: there is morality in a practice, which is 
specified in the history of that practice and in its rich tacit and explicitly agreed goals. Human 
actors determine their moral playground within it, in teamwork with and influenced by other 
social and material agents. 
 
Practical wisdom in complex medical practices 
Practice theory offers us many starting points for empirical research of practical wisdom in 
practices. However, practical wisdom as such, is not directly observable, but has to be 
inferred from, for instance, observed behavior, from situations and events. This makes the 
choice of a research method crucial. Nicolini (2012) describes that practice theories make use 
of a ‘toolkit’ of different methods, which have in common that they are qualitative-empirical 
by nature and that, by the direct research of the praxis, they also involve implicit or ‘tacit’ 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1969). Nicolini defines these methods as ‘slow’ and ‘in-depth’ and 
underlines that it is inherent to those methods to concentrate on relevant details of a situation, 
instead of abstracting from them. For instance, this refers to participatory observation, to 
types of ethnographic research, but also to discourse analysis, and not in the first place to 
interview techniques, which will only be able to bring up explicit knowledge. By choosing 
this toolkit, we think we will enable an essential extension of empirical research into practical 
wisdom against the methods proposed by Kotzee et al. (2016): interviews and narrative 
research, which tend to investigate only explicit knowledge. By contrast, network analyses, 
recommended by complexity science (Braithwaite & Plumb, 2015), do fit the said toolkit. 
Vosman et al. (2016) and Schmidt (2012) point out the importance of using an open 
concept of practical wisdom in such empirical research, a ‘heuristic’ concept (Schmidt uses 
the term ‘Sehhilfe’) enabling researchers to observe differently and because of that, to 
disclose other perspectives. Nicolini and Monteiro also emphasize the importance of the 
heuristic use of theoretical concepts. Heuts and Mol (2013, p. 127) advocate a heuristic 
approach too: “crafting a rich theoretical repertoire . . . does not work by laying out solid 
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abstracting generalizations but rather by adding together ever shifting cases and learning from 
their specifities”. In addition, we choose an abductive analysis method to obtain theoretical 
insights, based on such careful observations of practical wisdom in practices. Timmermans 
and Tavory (2012, p. 180) specify this method of analysis as: “a qualitative data analysis 
approach aimed at generating creative and novel theoretical insights through a dialectic of 
cultivated theoretical sensitivity and methodological heuristics”. Abduction from actually 
performed practical wisdom in medical practices can help to restore practical wisdom in such 
a way that it is resistant to complexity. This may seem a circular argument. It is not. Firstly, 
because we use a heuristic, open concept of practical wisdom while empirically looking into 
medical practices. We do not use a definitive concept at that stage of the inquiry. Secondly, 
we identify if and how complexity is navigated in a satisfactory way, satisfactory in the sense 
that the wellbeing of the individual patient remains to be the beacon of the practice. 
 
Conclusions 
We argued that late modern medical practices, characterized by complexity, need practical 
wisdom to make morality, “the practice-known good” (Kinghorn, 2010, p. 95) emerge in that 
complexity. The “practice-known good” is the good that is accomplished in changing 
situations, for every patient individually, agreed with the patient and her next-of-kin, and also 
appropriate to the professional telos of the practice. The participants in that practice, 
professionals and patients can usually only report afterwards if they have experienced the 
good as such (Vosman & Baart, 2011; Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017). The good appears to be 
fluid, it is rarely quantifiable, and it cannot easily be generalized. In addition, what a specific 
patient experiences as good, may change, for it is linked to the patient’s situation at a certain 
time. The same applies to the appearance of practical wisdom: it is strongly linked to specific 
relations, situation and context. Therefore, it can only be clarified through detailed case 
observations and case descriptions. 
Further, we have argued that practical wisdom should not any longer be seen as a 
purely individual characteristic, a virtue of people, but also as a characteristic, a virtue of 
practices and institutions (MacIntyre, 1985; Moore, 2005; Moore & Beadle, 2006; Vriens et 
al., 2018). Following Moore, Beadle, and Vriens et al., we advocate the necessity of virtuous 
practices within virtuous organizations, characterized by both a balanced corporate character, 
given their internal and external goods and a virtuous management. 
Now, at the end of our argument, it is possible to give a new – heuristic – definition of 
practical wisdom in medical practices, that accounts for the complexity of those practices: 
practical wisdom is the capability which emerges in acting jointly within medical practices, of 
knowing how to remain focused on achieving the good for every individual patient, in ever-
changing situations, within the context of the practice and its telos, and of how to accomplish 
this by the most appropriate means, while dealing with complexity and institutional and 
systemic pressure. 
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In this article, we have also argued that the research of practical wisdom should be 
approached empirically, in a back-and-forth movement with theoretical insights, and with the 
methods and the conceptual framework of practice theory. We propose to use practical 
wisdom as a heuristic concept, that is a concept which enables to make new and different 
observations in which it is also possible to adapt the heuristic concept. The method of 
abductive analysis (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012) should enable researchers and practitioners 
to obtain practice-related insights from empirical observations. In this way, qualitative-
empirical research may be conducive to develop the practical wisdom of medical practices 

























You can’t stay in your corner of the Forest
waiting for others to come to you.





An Introduction to the Empirical Research 
This chapter is on the one hand based on the theoretical discussion in the previous two 
chapters, on the other it offers an introduction to the following four empirical studies. Its aim 
is to clarify, substantiate, and organize the research methodology that is used in the empirical 
studies. We do not mean ‘theoretical’ and ‘empirical’ as denoting two separate approaches. 
Instead, we assume that there is a continuous movement back and forth between reflection on 
conceptual approaches on the one hand and the performance of empirical research – based on 
theoretical reflection – on the other. Following Vosman, Timmerman and Baart (2018, p. 406) 
we call this “an oscillating movement between empirical work and theory development, 
committing both to each other.” In other words: “a qualitative empirical research process that 




We will first outline the background of the empirical studies. The period around the turn of 
the millennium, which Giddens (1990) has called late modern, is characterized, in the medical 
domain as elsewhere, by constantly increasing complexity (Cilliers, 2013; Hollnagel, Wairs & 
Braithwaite, 2015; Braithwaite, 2018), increasing acceleration of developments (Rosa 2013), 
pluralism (Jenkins, Kinsella & DeLuca, 2018), social inequality, with connected health care 
disparities (Nelson, 2002; Wasserman et al., 2019), and numerous uncertainties (Kinsella & 
Pitman, 2012; Kemmis, 2012; Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017). In the run-up to late modernity, 
from the 1970s onwards, medical specialists faced charges of paternalism, the elitist and 
closed nature of their profession, the pursuit of status and profit at the expense of the moral 
task of serving patients, and the renouncement of the ‘do no harm’ principle (e.g. Van den 
Berg, 1969; Illich, 1976; Schön, 1983; Reed & Evans, 1987; Berwick, 2016). 
Partly in reaction to late modern developments, the 1990s saw the rise of the new 
professionalism movement, which turned out to be ‘contaminated’ with the ideas of the neo-
liberal New Public Management approach (Evetts, 2009, 2011; Minzberg, 2012; Noordegraaf, 
2015; Reid, 2018; Gerard, 2019; Viens, 2019). At first, new professionalism was reflected in 
guidelines development and peer auditing; later it gave rise to Evidence-Based Medicine 
(EBM) (Greenhalgh, Howick, & Maskrey, 2014; Bolt, 2015) and Competence-Based Medical 
Education (CBE) (Whitcomb, 2016; Ross, Hauer & Van Melle, 2018). Moreover, the 
professional-medical domain became increasingly dominated by relentless 
(sub)specialization, technologization, standardization, assessment against all kinds of 
measurable performance indicators; administrative commitments aimed at control and 
accountability, and efficiency requirements (Tonkens, 2008; Visser & Den Bakker, 2018). In 
addition, medical specialists became unavoidably embedded in care institutions, mostly 
hospitals, which are mainly focused on ‘external goods’, such as status, reputation and 
financial results, not primarily on the ‘internal goods’ of the profession (MacIntyre, 1985; 
Moore & Beadle, 2006; Vriens, Achterbergh & Gulpers, 2016; Jenkins et al., 2018). 
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Several authors, like Schön (1983,1991); Dunne (1993); Evetts (2011); Van Heijst 
(2011); Kinsella & Pitman (2012); Minzberg (2012); and Gerard (2019), have wondered what 
the profession, public health care and care organizations stand to lose on account of the 
increasing technologization and systemization of the medical professional domain. 
Professionals themselves have also addressed this question on the basis of their everyday 
practices (Hall, 2011; Gawande, 2014; Mukherjee, 2016). 
Vosman and Baart (2008) as well as Eikeland (2006); Kinghorn (2010); Kinsella and Pitman 
(2012), and Kotzee, Paton and Conroy (2016) have emphasized the danger that moral 
capabilities will be eliminated from professional practices – Baart (2018, p.128) has even 
referred to ‘moralicide’: “the destruction of moral thinking (by incorporating it into technique 
and rules)”. They expect that it will be possible to counteract this by promoting phronesis or 
practical wisdom in practices. This implies, for the practices of medical specialists and for the 
hospitals in which these practices are embedded, that more attention should be paid 
structurally to the strains involved in realizing morally good care in professional, daily work. 
Also, greater emphasis should be placed on the role that practical wisdom can play in 
neutralizing these strains, and finally, on how practical wisdom can be facilitated, acquired 
and developed in daily practices. 
Now, what is practical wisdom? In chapter two we have proposed the following 
working definition of practical wisdom: practical wisdom is the capability, which emerges in 
acting jointly within medical practices, of knowing how to remain focused on achieving the 
good for every individual patient, in ever-changing situations, within the context of the 
practice and its telos, and of how to accomplish this by the most appropriate means, while 
dealing with complexity and institutional and systemic pressure. 
We regard this definition as a tentative one, which can be used heuristically to observe 
and study the emergence of practical wisdom in everyday practices. Our empirical research of 
practical wisdom therefore always has a second objective: to evaluate and possibly adjust the 
definition and, linked with this, theories of practical wisdom, in order to ensure that this 
definition and these theories more adequately represent the observed practices.  
Against this background of controversial medical professionalism, the threat of the 
elimination of (professional) morality and the potential of practical wisdom to sustain and 
develop the internal morality of professional practices, we have observed a pressing problem 
that calls for further investigation. 
 
The problem 
In summary: several authors have argued that practical wisdom (which they consider to be 
indispensable to realizing morally good care), is under threat of being neglected in or 
extruded from late-modern health care practices. This danger, they believe, results from the 
systemic environment of modern health care institutions such as hospitals, with their 
orientation on efficiency, control, and business reputation (MacIntyre, 1985; Moore & 
Beadle, 2006; Vosman & Baart, 2008; Evetts, 2011). In addition, from the preoccupation of 
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professional organizations with “the technical project of modern medicine” (Dunne, 1993; 
Kinghorn, 2010) or “instrumentalizing of professional work” (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; 
Saraga, Boudreau & Fuks, 2019). 
However, various authors who see practical wisdom as a solution to the imminent 
elimination of morality from professional practices think from a segregated position outside, 
not from within actual practices of medical specialists in hospitals, as Eikeland, 2006; 
Eikeland and Nicolini, 2011; Baart and Vosman, 2015, and Stenersen Hovdenak and Wiese, 
2018 have observed. This means a reflexive deficit has arisen. Yet, in accordance with 
Eikeland (2006), Vosman and Baart (2008), Eikeland and Nicolini (2011) and Vosman et al. 
(2018), we want to emphasize the importance of thinking from within practices. Specific 
empirical research and close cooperation between ‘knowers’ of practices and researchers are 
needed to dig out ‘the internal logic’ (Mol, 2008) of those practices. This specific research is 
aimed at generating a different kind of theory, which Eikeland and Nicolini (2011, p. 8) have 
compared to grammar. Grammar, “understood not as a collection of explicit rules (…) but as 
the contextually sensitive articulation of (…) language-in-use.” This is the “new mode of 
knowledge production” or the “different social organization of knowledge management and 
knowledge generation” Eikeland has mentioned in an earlier publication (Eikeland, 2006, p. 
48). Thus, we propose to conduct empirical research from within clinical practices, taking 
advantage of theoretical concepts and insights of practical wisdom and at the same time 
developing a new, grammatical type of theory. The externalization (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Nonaka & Toyama, 2007) or articulation (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011, p. 9) of 
knowledge that had been implicit or tacit before, is, moreover, a “tool for seeing i.e. for 
insight” for practitioners that will enable them “to see beyond the current horizon of their own 
practice”.  
Regrettably, recent publications on practical wisdom have concentrated exclusively on 
individual physicians supposedly acting autonomously (Kinghorn, 2010; Kaldjian, 2014; 
Kotzee et al., 2015; Conroy et al., 2018; Tyson, 2018). By contrast, the empirical research 
envisaged here, will have to take into account the current reality of physicians, who no longer 
act as autonomous and independent individuals. In fact, professionals nowadays (inter)act in 
complex networks of mutually interdependent colleagues and of many material and 
immaterial agents in practices. (Anderson & McDaniel, 2000; Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001; 
Hafferty & Levinson, 2008; Mantel, 2013; Sturmberg, 2018; Widmer, Swanson, Zink & 
Pines, 2018). Giving care in complex practices also means changes in the nature of 
professional relationships, the importance of which has been emphasized by care ethicists. In 
current practices professional relationships are distributed across various people, mediators, 
and structures. For this reason, an approach to relationality has to be adopted that is broader 
than a merely empathic relationship of trust between an individual professional and an 
individual patient (Baart, 2018; Den Bakker, 2018). 
Thus, practical wisdom and the associated relationality, which must be regarded as 
essential to enacting morally good patient care in medical practices, should be practiced and 
developed in the face of opposition, and notwithstanding the existing theoretical and reflexive 
deficit. This deficit is due to an exclusively theoretical approach to practical wisdom, an 
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approach that is insulated from concrete practices, and that is, moreover, focused merely on 
individuals rather than complex practices. In contrast, the concept of practical wisdom will 
have to be completed and made manageable on the basis of everyday practices. More 
specifically, the actual ways in which practical wisdom is performed will constantly have to 
influence the theoretical development of practical wisdom, and vice versa. This outline of the 
problem at hand leads to the following research questions broken down into sub-questions. 
 
Research questions 
Our main question comprises two elements, which are logically the result from the above: a) 
How is practical wisdom actually enacted in everyday medical practices? This question 
implies some associated interests, which we will elaborate on in this study – see the sub-
questions. b) Does the research into concrete performances of practical wisdom show that our 
tentative definition of practical wisdom can be maintained, or does it have to be adapted? And 
what does this mean for the existing theories on practical wisdom? 
We have divided the main question into several sub-questions, each of them 
constituting the basis of a separate empirical study. Every sub-question has the double 
structure described under the main question, because we wanted to pay attention to the said 
‘oscillating movement’ in every empirical study. 
The first sub-question is: a) if practical wisdom emerges, which manifestations of 
practical wisdom do we discern during the observation of concrete medical practices? b) Is 
the working definition adequate on the basis of these observations or does it have to be 
adapted? 
Second sub-question: a) can practical wisdom be learnt in everyday work in hospital 
practices by means of structural, multi-disciplinary case discussions? b) Do the results of this 
study have an impact on the working definition of practical wisdom? 
Third sub-question: a) is practical wisdom verifiably repressed in daily practice by 
the dominant professional discourse and/or by the actual organization of care? b) Can the 
working definition be maintained, based on the results, or does it have to be adapted? 
Fourth sub-question: a) how does practical wisdom emerge in using guidelines for 
the benefit of the individual patient and her context? b) What do the results of this study mean 
for the working definition? 
Here, we have not literally presented the research questions, which have been 
concretely developed in each sub-study, but paraphrased them, aimed at highlighting clearly 
the essence of the question. Furthermore, we want to show here clearly, that the studies 
always have this dual purpose: on the one hand, they are the empirical research from within 
existing practices and on the other hand, we use the results for a critical approach to our own 
definition and then to question the existing theories of practical wisdom. In chapter eight we 
will summarize the research outcomes of the sub-questions, mentioned under a), as well as the 
ones of the b) questions: the critical comments on concept, and theories of practical wisdom, 
and we will reflect on them. 
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Qualitative-empirical, explorative research 
So, to answer the questions above, it is necessary to observe practices directly or indirectly, 
by means of a mediating database. This immediately gives rise to a difficulty, because 
practical wisdom is not directly observable and certainly not quantifiable. It has probably 
been insufficiently themed and operationalized through a primarily theoretical approach. But, 
it can be inferred from the observations in empirical studies. Besides, assessing the meaning 
of practical wisdom for enacting morality within a practice demands an interpretive step. As 
the empirical study we want to perform, cannot be about counting and measuring/quantifying 
but about estimating and interpreting, it must be of a qualitative-empirical nature (Patton, 
2002; Kristjánsson, 2016). 
Moreover, owing to the research questions, the study needs to have an explorative character 
(Patton, 2002); after all, practical wisdom has hardly been investigated empirically from the 
viewpoint of medical practices up till now, neither the complex nature of these practices has 
been taken into account, nor their institutional embedding. The studies of, for instance, 
Iedema, Mesman and Carroll (2013), Vosman and Baart (2015), Timmerman and Baart 
(2016) and Saraga et al. (2019) are exceptions. In this respect, we are dealing with relatively 
new research interests, which we have investigated further by means of our research 
questions. That is why we use the concepts of relationality and practical wisdom, as already 
indicated, as heuristic concepts, i.e. concepts which function as ‘conceptual lenses’ (Nicolini, 
2012) or as ‘Sehhilfe’ (Schmidt, 2012). By using conceptual lenses, practical wisdom can be 
observed more sharply in this study, but therefore, we will inevitably see other aspects of the 
situation – in which we are also less interested – less sharp or not at all. Consequently, due to 
the observations, the concept will change in an unpredictable way, and that interplay of 
theoretical notion and practical modification will proceed in an ongoing oscillating 
movement. 
 
The generic methodological characteristics of the four studies 
In each of the four studies we used a research method, that was tailored to the specific 
research question and to the data to examine. This method has been described accurately in 
each particular study; therefore, we do not elaborate on it here. In this chapter, we will 
describe what the methods have in common, so that the unity of the integral study becomes 
clear. At the end of this chapter, we will summarize these common aspects in a table, which 
we will ‘build up’ in components from here on. The columns of the table represent the four 
empirical studies, numbered from 1 to 4, corresponding respectively with the chapters 4 to 7 
of this dissertation. Each of the lines represents a generic aspect which has been interpreted in 
a specific way in the four separate studies. Per cluster of several related aspects, we will now 






Title, theme, interest and research question 
The specific research question of each of the four empirical studies has been based on the 
theme -the issue- we intended to investigate further, and on our research interest in a certain 
aspect of practical wisdom. The themes have partly been generated from problematizing the 
said aspects in literature (learning practical wisdom in the second study; the possible 
suppression of practical wisdom in de third study). Partly, from our own supposition of a 
specific deficit in theories on practical wisdom, because, up till now practices have 
insufficiently been studied from within practices (faces of practical wisdom in the first study; 
individualizing patient care as ‘compromising-to-keep-on-course’ when adhering to 
guidelines in the fourth study). We have already indicated that the exact question will be 
paraphrased here; the paraphrase serves the clarity, the cohesion and the comparability of the 
sub-studies. 
Titel 1 The multiple faces of 
practical wisdom in 
complex clinical 
practices. An empirical 
exploration 
2 Professional 
workplace learning. Can 
practical wisdom be 
learned? 
3 Professional medical 
discourse and the 
emergence of practical 
wisdom in everyday 
practices. Analysis of a 
keyhole case 
4 Making the best of it; 
practical wisdom in 
professional care for 
adolescents with type 
1 diabetes mellitus 
Theme Manifestations of 
practical wisdom in 
concrete medical 
practices in a general 
hospital 
The learnability of 
practical wisdom in 
everyday practices 
within a general hospital 
The suppression of 
practical wisdom in 
everyday practice 
within a training 
hospital 
Practical wisdom as 
carefully navigating to 
keep course in guiding 
adolescents with 
diabetes in an 
ambulatory care 
practice 
Interest The actual faces of 
practical wisdom in 
medical practices 
Problematizing the 
learning of practical 
wisdom in everyday 
work through case 
discussions 
The influence of the 
dominant discourse 
and of the care 
organization on the 
emergence of practical 
wisdom 
The role of practical 
wisdom in attuning 










In what manifestations 
does practical wisdom 
emerge in actual 
practices and can 
patterns be distinguished 
in these manifestation? 
 
What does it mean for the 
work definition? 
Do practitioners learn 
practical wisdom 
through case 
discussions and if so 
how does that happen? 
 
 
What does it mean for 
the work definition? 
 
What influence do the 
dominant professional 
discourse and the care 
organization have on 
the possible 
emergence of practical 
wisdom in the 
practice? 
What does it mean for 
the work definition? 
How do professionals 
in a diabetes practice 
attune guidelines to 
individual patients and 
to what extent does it 
happen through the 
enactment of practical 
wisdom? 
What does it mean for 






Frames: care ethics, research of practices, from inside 
In chapter two, we have substantiated our choice for a care ethical perspective on care and 
care practices. In chapter two, we have also summarized its characteristics. In empirical 
studies into clinical practices, especially the characteristics of relationality and situatedness or 
contextuality emerge, to a lesser degree the political-ethical aspect of care ethics, although, 
this always constitutes the overarching framework. This is the case, insofar the ordering of 
and the relationships between cooperating professionals have been raised and insofar the 
relationships of professionals with their patients-and-relatives have been studied. (e.g. to what 
extent were these relationships hierarchically predefined? Who is in a position to determine 
what is relevant or not in the practices studied?) We will clarify these aspects below. Which 
aspects will recur in the separate studies has been indicated in the table. 
In care ethics care is regarded as “relational interaction (…..) both a locus of knowing 
(….) and a locus of recognition and attention” (Timmerman, Baart & Vosman, 2019). 
However, we do not consider relationality as “medium of good communication, treatment and 
reciprocity” (Baart, 2018, p. 74) in the first place. We take relationality in a broader sense: the 
patient, in her network of relatives and friends, the care providing professionals in their own 
networks of peers and other caregivers, managers, institutional infrastructural factors, are all 
interconnected and interdependent. It is manifested in the way care is structured and in what is 
judged as relevant; in a learning culture of care; in dealing respectfully with those involved 
and more (Baart, 2018; Den Bakker, 2018). 
The second characteristic of care ethics which will recur in the studies, is the 
contextual and situational specificity. That implies for our research, that we are always 
looking for those things which proved to be good in that specific situation and context and 
which are validated locally by the persons who received care (Klaver, Van Elst & Baart, 
2014; Nortvedt & Vosman, 2014; Baart & Vosman 2015). 
The third characteristic is, that care ethics is political ethics; this means that it regards 
care and caring as a daily practice, that enables living together and also has an impact on the 
way and organization of living and working together. Tronto and Fisher (1991) have 
formulated this as follows: “Care is a species of activity that includes everything we do to 
maintain, continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That 
world includes our bodies, ourselves and our environment” (p. 40). In the ‘world’ referred to, 
we explicitly include the institutional surroundings, in which care practices are embedded 
(Vosman et al., 2018; Timmerman et al., 2019). Particularly, in the studies three and four, we 
have paid attention to the influence of the observed structure of care on living and working 
together within the hospital: as an association of equal partners or in some hierarchy in which 
dominance and power may be exercised, similarly on patients and their relatives. 
In the previous chapter, we have worked out that, by studying practices and not 
individuals or individual actions, we follow specific practice theories, as described by among 
others Nicolini (2012) and Schmidt (2012). Nicolini and Monteiro (2017, p. 2) have described 
practices as “… orderly materially mediated doings and sayings (‘practices’) and their 
aggregations.” For the empirical research, this practice approach means that we study what is 
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going on within the setting examined as completely as possible: being its social (the 
interactions and interaction patterns) and physical elements (being ill and vulnerable for 
patients; the legitimized invasion of a patient’s physical integrity by practitioners); besides, 
material elements (the patient’s file in the third study; the electronic information and 
exchange of information in the fourth study), institutional, structural elements (whether or not 
there is regular multi-disciplinary consultation in the second and third study; recording the 
lessons learned in the second study; structural preparation and subsequent discussion after a 
consultation in the fourth study) and the culture of work and cooperation (hierarchical, top-
down, supportive, sharing and exchanging, respectful etc.). Besides that, we have tried to 
elucidate the influence of the practice, which has been studied as completely as possible, on 
the emergence of practical wisdom. 
In the same chapter, we have also indicated that we studied practices from within or 
bottom-up. We have done this through observation in the fourth study, but direct observation 
was not possible in all studies. In three out of four studies, we have chosen for observation 
through a ‘window’ (in the form of detailed mediating data), which in retrospective, enabled a 
very detailed and specific insight in the practices studied. The specificity has enabled us to 
look in the same direction as the professionals we studied, and thus, we could take up their 
perspectives, Furthermore, our expectation, that this view from inside would illuminate other 
aspects of practical wisdom than the features highlighted through theoretical viewpoints from 
outside, proved to be right (Baart & Vosman, 2015; Timmerman et al., 2019). 
Substudy 1 2 3 4 
Care ethics Relationality patient-
professional; 























The ‘doings and 
sayings’ during the 
integral and situated 
multidisciplinary, 
clinical treatment of 
patients  
Multidisciplinary 
discussions of actual 
patients, treated 
multidisciplinary, with 
the aim to learn from it 
together 
The ‘doings and 
sayings’ during the 
integral, long-lasting 
clinical treatment of a 
patient and in the 
contacts with the 
relatives 
The ‘doings and 
sayings’, the 
organization, the team 
and the infrastructure 




‘Thick descriptions’ of 
the course of the 
treatment act as a 
window on the practice 
The lessons from the 
discussions and the 
participant researcher 
act as a window on the 
practice 
The complete medical 
and nursing files and 
the diary of the 
patient’s daughter act 
as a window on the 
practice 
Direct observation of 
consultation hours, 
team consultations and 
group meetings; 
interviews; consulting 





Case studies; the first researcher’s position 
Nicolini (2012), Eikeland and Nicolini (2011), and Nicolini and Monteiro (2017), as well as 
Flyvbjerg (2006) and Anderson, Crabtree, Steele and McDaniel Jr. (2005) emphasize that 
research from within practices (with the help of a toolkit of research methods according to 
Nicolini, 2012) implies that the researcher concentrates on (the description of) relevant details 
of situations and not at all abstracts from these details. Herewith, they rehabilitate the case 
study in a specific sense. Also Timmerman et al. (2019), who speak out for the study of 
practices, argue for the same reason: “our empirical material typically consists of extensive 
and comprehensive case descriptions ( … ) case studies.” Case research is related to narrative 
research, that has been promoted by Kotzee et al. (2016) and Tyson (2018). 
A case may refer to a single patient; when it refers to several patients, we speak of a 
multiple-case study; this applies to the first study. However, a case may also refer to a rolling 
program, e.g. the structural, multidisciplinary patient discussions, aimed at learning from 
them, in which the lessons learned were recorded and shared, as in the second study. In the 
third study, we call the case (one single patient) critical because the meaning of practical 
wisdom might precisely become clear by the problems arisen in combination with their 
presumed regular occurrence. Finally, in the fourth study, the case is a diabetes practice for 
adolescents. We call this case exemplary, because we expect, that in the case concerned, 
practical wisdom might emerge in a pronounced and consistent form (Bronk, 2012; 
Timmerman et al., 2019). 
 
The first researcher’s position; extent of participation 
Initially, all observations were performed by the first researcher, who worked as a pediatrician 
and part of the time, as a member or chair of the board in the hospital studied. As a colleague-
medical specialist, she took part in the case discussions which constitute the basis of the data 
collection in the first and second study. As a pediatrician, she was affiliated with the same 
pediatric practice as the pediatricians who were members of the diabetes team in the fourth 
study. So, there was a different degree of participation in these three studies, with their own, 
but related advantages. Due, to having a lot of information from inside, to knowing the 
specific medical language, the habits and culture of both the professional group and the 
hospital concerned, she has been able to discern meanings rooted in practices. During the 
whole research process she was supervised by two other researchers, both care ethicists and 
also experienced in carrying out qualitative-heuristic research in hospital settings. They 
brought in a critical view, because they observed from a non-medical frame of references. 
Due to the triangulated deliberations on the descriptions, the analyses and the conclusions of 
the studies, it appears that a balance has been struck between knowledge and judgement ‘from 
the inside’ and ‘from the outside’ of practices. The third study is different from the other 
investigations regarding the first researcher’s position; she was not involved with this case nor 
with the practice and so in this study there was no participation. The exact ins and outs of the 
researcher’s position and the tests of validity and reliability will be presented in the chapters 
four to seven, in which the studies concerned are presented. 
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Patton (2002, p. 262) described participatory observation as: “Being in or around an 
on-going social setting for the purpose of making a qualitative analysis of that setting.” He 
indicated that the degree of participation constitutes a continuum, varying from total 
submersion in a setting to being completely separated from it and only looking-on from the 
outside. Patton mentioned as advantages of participatory observation: researchers are better 
able to act in an open and inductive way, directed to exploration. They are also able to 
observe matters, which those involved are not aware of or which they have not paid attention 
to before. Researchers can observe matters, which those involved are not willing to talk about 
in interviews, e.g. because they are sensitive issues; in interpreting the observations, 
researchers can make use of the knowledge about the situation, which they personally 
acquired. 
However, there is a risk of ‘going native’ in such research (Timmerman et al., 2019): 
failing to keep sufficient distance to the practice studied, and, subsequently, adopting without 
question, the perspective of the parties in the practice studied, including their blind spots. 
Nicolini and Monteiro (2017, p. 11) indicate e.g. that “practitioners tend to take for granted 
artificial aspects of their activity.” We chose, in order to keep this risk under control, for a 
continuous change of perspective, guarded by the co-researchers, in which we tried to 
understand and evaluate from inside the scope of what happened, as well as, to bear the 
purpose of the study in mind and to clarify the ‘doings and sayings’ of the practice to 
outsiders. 
Eikeland and Nicolini (2011) have advocated a specific form of participatory research. 
Firstly, they distinguish the areas of interest and the starting point for the research. The first 
can be mainly practical or mainly theoretical, the second from outside and top-down or from 
inside and bottom-up. They conclude that research with a theoretical interest (so, aimed at 
developing concepts or theories) and which is carried out from within practices, is 
exceptionally scarce. It is, however, really necessary, precisely, to give concepts and theories 
an adequate foundation. They call it ‘practice based theorizing’. In addition, they discuss the 
potential of such research “to support development through reflecting back practices to the 
practitioners” (p. 1). In this way, research can become more relevant for practitioners, 
because ‘actionable knowledge’ (Argyris, 1996) is produced, according to Eikeland and 
Nicolini, with the aim to develop a new type of theory, that is founded in the practices of 
‘knowers’. In the practices we studied, ‘knowers’ are the professionals on the one side and the 
patients on the other side. As an analogue of such a new type of theory, they refer to grammar 
in languages “as the contextually sensitive articulation of language games and language-in-
use” (Wittgenstein, 1953). So, similar to grammar in linguistics, we are looking for practical 
wisdom in the form of more or less stable patterns which are in more or less the same forms 
repeated in performances within the observed practices. In the first study, these patterns were 
seen in specific manifestations or faces of practical wisdom, which the people involved 
regarded as ‘normal’ or natural, but had never been mentioned in theoretical studies (for 
instance, ‘getting the time right for the patient’s sake). In the second study, patterns could be 
distinguished in the complicated learning of practical wisdom from discussing collective 
experiences and practical examples. In the third study, patterns of good and also of 
insufficient multidisciplinary cooperation emerged as examples of practical wisdom (for 
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example, losing crucial patient-information with patient-transfers), and in the fourth study 
characteristic patterns emerged in the patient centered way of varying on a guideline (e.g. by 
determining the individual bandwidth – and its boundaries – within which deviation of a 
guideline is judged to be acceptable). 
 
Sub-study  1 2 3 4 
Case 
study 
Multiple case research 
of 10 ‘maximum 
variation cases’ 
accumulated over a 
period of 12 years  
Unique case: lessons 
learned from 100, 
multidisciplinary case 
discussions during 12 
years  
Critical case: one 
single case of a 




Exemplary case: the 
practice of 42 
adolescents with 
diabetes mellitus type 
1, followed during 3 
years  














research from a 




observation from a 
distance, by 
colleague-specialist 




Data, analysis technique, validation technique 
The criterion for the selection of the research data, as far as they did not consist of 
descriptions of direct observations, was, whether the data represented (as complete and as true 
to reality as possible) the practice to be studied. In the first study, ”thick descriptions” 
(Geertz, 1973) of the ten cases studied had been produced for that reason, by means of all 
available files, other documents such as protocols and guidelines , and conversations with 
doctors and nurses concerned. Thick descriptions are descriptions in which many details and 
the context of the case have been worked up, in order to enable the reader to form a vivid 
image of what is described. In the fourth study, too, we have worked with thick descriptions 
of the observation data, in which, besides the recordings, the field notes were used. In the 
second study, especially the first researcher’s participation, (her role was to prepare, moderate 
and evaluate the discussions) , was a guarantee for a detailed representation of the 
discussions. Moreover, the first researcher’s interpretation was tested in a ‘peer-debriefing’ 
(Janesick, 2015) with six physicians who had participated in the deliberations and had been 
on the staff of the hospital from the outset of the project. In the third study, the complete 
medical file was made available, with all its documents, as well as the daughter’s complete 
diary concerning the patient’s hospitalization. Furthermore, in this case, the two co-
researchers were informed in detail about the procedures during the admission through 
interviews with doctors and nurses concerned and a long-term interview with the patient’s 
relatives. The results of this study were tested during a feedback-meeting with the involved 




The applied analysis methods are qualitative heuristics (Kleining & Witt, 2000, 2001) 
in chapter four; thematic analysis of the practice and dominant discourse (Braun & Clarke, 
2006, 2012) in chapter five; content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) and direct observation 
(with ‘Sehhilfe’ of sensitizing concepts) (Nicolini, 2012) followed by abductive analysis 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2016) in chapter seven. These methods of analysis have been 
worked out more precisely in the chapters concerned. 
 
Concept development 
The focus of all studies was also – it has been indicated as the b) questions – on critically 
judging the heuristic concept of practical wisdom, that had been based on theoretical-
philosophical publications. In order to be able to evaluate these concepts and theories, we 
have derived analysis techniques from grounded theory. Historically, grounded theory was 
defined by Glaser & Strauss (1967) and pursued the development of theoretical understanding 
based on gathering, organizing and analyzing empirical data. Such research always has more 
cycles of gathering data, data analysis and reflection. We applied elements from the 
constructivist approach, developed by Charmaz (Charmaz, 2006; De Boer, 2011). According 
to Charmaz, researchers have to discover and reconstruct processes from actions for which an 
interpretation framework is constructed. In Charmaz’ approach, as in almost all forms of 
grounded theory, sensitizing concepts, which draw the researcher’s interest to aspects that are 
relevant for the research, and which direct the collection of data are important. She considers 
the coding of material follow various stages: from initial coding (open coding), through 
focused coding (coding directly or selectively) to theoretical coding (coding theoretically to 
indicate relationships between categories). The coding is supported by memoing (writing 
memos which capture and account for the researcher’s line of thought), and constant 
comparison (to examine the consistency of concepts and interpretations and to test whether 
saturation has been reached). Saturation is the stage in which the process of loading new data 
seems to be finished, because no new findings are made. Charmaz also advocates to evaluate 
the resonance of a research by asking: “does your analysis offer (your participants or people 
who share their circumstances) deeper insights about their lives and worlds?” (Charmaz 
2006, p. 183). 
Initially, the founders of the grounded theory Glaser and Strauss, defined their method 
of analysis as inductive, that means that researchers were supposed to interpret and analyze 
freely from their observations, independent from theoretical notions. Since then, adherents of 
the theory, like Timmerman and Tavory (2016), following the pragmatist Peirce, have stated 
that the analysis method should be called abductive (also see Timmerman et al., 2019). In 
their eyes, researchers should not enter the field of research as if they were a theoretical tabula 
rasa. On the contrary, they should do so with a cultivated theoretical sensitiveness, in which, 
due to the explorative character of a study, theoretical notions can be fine-tuned, modified or 
completed. They also advocate the use of heuristic methods; in that way, researchers would be 
able to develop their theoretical repertoire in an inventive and creative way during the 
research process. They mention three additional methodical steps to complete the abduction 
process in such an inventive way, namely: revisiting ( repeatedly reviewing the same 
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material), de-familiarizing of the known ‘world’ (seeing as new or unfamiliar what is 
familiar) and alternative casing (regard the observations from alternative frameworks). They 
call the plausibility of theoretical conceptualizations to be an important quality criterion for 
research. We used this abductive analysis in the four studies, but especially in the fourth. 
In the four empirical studies, validity has been safeguarded by repeated discussions 
between the first researcher and the co-researchers, who separately studied (part of) the 
material and analyses: researcher triangulation. Besides, using concepts consistently, and to 
contemplate them critically, was safeguarded by the process of constant comparison. 
In addition, an audit procedure has been conducted in the second study, in which the 
research was assessed by an external auditor according to a structure that had been pre-
designed on the basis of literature. In it, three quality criteria were used: visibility (a research 
decision must be made explicit and communicated), comprehensibility (a decision must be 
substantiated) and acceptability (substantiation has to be according to the standards, norms 
and values in the particular field of study) (Akkerman, Admiraal, Brekelmans & Oost, 2006 p. 
259). The auditor checked with the help of these criteria and structures, whether the 
researcher’s interpretations were based on and were consistent with demonstrable data 
(confirmability or visibility) on the one side, and on the other side, whether the analysis and 
interpretation processes complied with generally accepted criteria (reliability or 
acceptability). The outcome of the audit was positive. 
Finally, the validity has been safeguarded by testing the results against participating 
professionals: peer-debriefing in the second (see above) and a focus group in the fourth study. 
Sub-study  1 2 3 4 
Data.  Thick descriptions of 
ten complex patient 
cases and related 
documentation 
The self-reported 
lessons learned from 
100 multidisciplinary 
case discussions 
The patient’s complete 
medical file and her 
daughter’s diary about 
this hospitalization 
Observation data, field 
notes and documents of 








and elements based on 
the Grounded Theory 
Content Analysis; via 
the Directed Approach 
i.e. using predetermined 
codes 
Thematic analysis of 
the dominant 
professional discourse 
and the diary 












Testing against focus 








Generalizability or transferability 
Anderson et al. (2005, p. 681) stated that “a case study approach moves us one step closer to 
being able to study a phenomenon as an integrated whole.” To give a description of the 
observed reality as integral as possible, not a reductionist depiction, actually enables the 
practitioners’ resonance. An integral description can spell out insights which are valuable for 
practitioners. However, generalizing from such case studies is difficult. That is why, in all 
these studies, we only pursue communicative generalizability ( Smaling, 2009a) or 
transferability (Timmerman et al., 2019). This implies that the reader herself must judge to 
what extent the results are relevant for the own practice. 
 
Relevance  
So far, we do not know any research in which practical wisdom has been studied through 
observations of daily medical practices and from inside and where various aspects of practical 
wisdom have been highlighted, such as the different manifestations in which practical wisdom 
emerges in practices and the learning of practical wisdom in daily practice by joint reflection 
on experiences in the workplace. 
The relevance of this research is, on the one hand, a relevance for practitioners, 
because a, to this date, rather abstract concept, has been described more concrete as a 
specified, and manageable capability. So now, practitioners can try to acquire and develop 
this capability intentionally and jointly. The relevance of the study is also reflected in the 
researchers’ acquired ability to question the merely theoretical approach of practical wisdom 
critically, with the help of the new knowledge obtained from inside practices. This is the “new 
mode of knowledge production” that Eikeland has mentioned in his 2006 publication. 
We will elaborate on this relevance in the concluding section 8, reaching integrating 
and concluding remarks and putting forward propositions for further investigations into 
practical wisdom from inside practices.  
In summary, we conclude this chapter with the complete table which has been built in 
the previous paragraphs. 
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and the emergence 
of practical wisdom 
in everyday 
practices. Analysis 
of a keyhole case 
4 Making the best of 
it; practical wisdom 
in professional care 
for adolescents with 
type 1 diabetes 
mellitus 
Theme Manifestations of 
practical wisdom in 
concrete medical 
practices in a general 
hospital 
The learnability of 
practical wisdom in 
everyday practices 
within a general 
hospital 
The suppression of 
practical wisdom in 
everyday practice 
within a training 
hospital 
Practical wisdom as 
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ambulatory care 
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Interest The actual faces of 
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medical practices 
Problematizing the 
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wisdom through case 
discussions in everyday 
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The influence of the 
dominant discourse 
and of the care 
organization on the 
emergence of 
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a)In what manifestations 
does practical wisdom 
emerge in actual 
practices and can 
patterns be distinguished 
in these manifestation? 
 
 
b)What does it mean for 
the work definition? 
Do practitioners learn 
practical wisdom 
through case 
discussions and if so 
how does that happen? 
 
 
What does it mean for 
the work definition? 
 
What influence do the 
dominant professional 
discourse and the 
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have on the possible 
emergence of 
practical wisdom in 
the practice? 
What does it mean for 
the work definition? 
How do professionals 
in a diabetes practice 
attune guidelines to 
individual patients and 
to what extent does it 
happen through the 
enactment of practical 
wisdom? 
 
What does it mean for 
the work definition? 
Care ethics Relationality patient-
professional; 

























The ‘doings and sayings’ 
during the integral and 
situated multidisciplinary, 
clinical treatment of 
patients  
Multidisciplinary 
discussions of actual 
patients, who had 
multidisciplinary 
treatment, as a means 
to learn from it together 
The ‘doings and 
sayings’ during the 
integral, long-lasting 
clinical treatment of a 
patient and in the 
contacts with the 
relatives 
The ‘doings and 
sayings’, the 
organization, the team 
and the infrastructure 
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“There was a sign: ROAD TO THE EDGE.
That’s where I want to go! thought the squirrel.
But sadly, he soon encountered another side road that he couldn’t ignore,
no matter how badly he wanted to.”
Toon Tellegen, Misschien wisten zij alles [Maybe they knew everything]
The multiple faces of practical wisdom in 
complex clinical practices: An empirical 
exploration
Chapter 4
Marij C.M.L. Bontemps-Hommen, Frans J.H. Vosman, Andries J. Baart. (2020). 
Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 26(3), 1034-1041.
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Abstract 
Rationale, aims, and objectives: In recent publications attention has been drawn to the 
importance of practical wisdom in order to ensure good, individually attuned care in complex 
clinical practices. However, what remains insufficiently elucidated, is how practical wisdom 
emerges in the workplace. This study aims to describe manifestations of practical wisdom in 
medical practices within a general hospital. It also seeks to clarify the interruptions that can be 
considered as triggers for the emergence of practical wisdom. Furthermore, we searched for 
figurations, which possibly elicit or constrain the emergence of practical wisdom. 
Methods: We used 10 thick descriptions of very distinct patient cases to carry out an 
explorative qualitative heuristic in-depth analysis. 
Results: These varied cases enabled us to describe diverse manifestations of practical wisdom; 
in addition, we were able to discern10 different ‘interruptions’ that triggered practical 
wisdom, and finally, we hypothesize that certain infrastructural figurations might facilitate the 
manifestation of practical wisdom. 
Conclusions: We found that practical wisdom frequently emerged in unexpected and diverse 
guises in these clinical practices, although the ‘interruptions’ that we discovered, did not 
automatically trigger practical wisdom. We have investigated the figurations mentioned only 
to a limited degree. More empirical research is needed to make the philosophical concept of 
practical wisdom better manageable for clinical practices and to gain better understanding of 
the figurations that elicit or obstruct its manifestation. 
 
Introduction 
The moral purpose of medicine under pressure. In everyday medical practices, 
physicians have a duty to give care that is good in the moral sense. This means: to help each 
individual patient in an appropriate way, to alleviate her suffering, and to promote her health 
in a manner that is attuned to her individual situation and context (Frank, 2012). This has also 
been enshrined in the medical oath. It is the intrinsic goal of every medical practice, which is 
always situated in a particular healthcare institution and in a particular society. However, both 
healthcare institutions and society are currently oriented to external objectives that strongly 
diverge from the intrinsic medical goal, such as reputation, financial results, and power 
(MacIntyre, 1985; Moore, 2008; Moore & Beadle, 2006). At the same time, medical practices 
depend on these institutions for appraisal, assessment, and maintenance (MacIntyre, 1985; 
Moore, 2008; Moore & Beadle, 2006). Thus, inevitably, medical practices are forced into an 
impossible divergence of objectives.  
Another field of tension is that between the clinical need to individualize care, and the view of 
professional medical organizations, shared by external supervisory authorities, who 
emphasize the application of comprehensible standards and guidelines in practices, and carry 
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on audits on this (Frank, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2015; Wyer & Alves da Silva, 2015). These 
standards and guidelines adhere to a “Newtonian/mechanistic paradigm of ‘predictable cause 
and effect’ relationships” (Sturmberg, 2018), even though daily reality is characterized by 
complexity (De Bock, Willems & Weinstein, 2018; Dekker, 2011; Van Wietmarschen, 
Wortelboer & Van der Greef, 2018) and, is therefore consistent with a very different 
paradigm. Consequently, the guidelines seem to refer to a reality that is different from the one 
in which practitioners must attempt to act. 
Practical wisdom: the way out? Various authors have shown that medical 
practitioners are successful in giving their patients individualized and morally good care 
despite these tensions. Practitioners are seemingly doing so by making use of resolution 
strategies or frameworks which offer guidance. Thus Brennan, Greenhalgh and Pawson 
(2018) have mentioned ‘muddling through’ as a strategy; Miles (2018) has discussed Person-
centered care (PCC) as a useful framework. However, like Frank (2012) and Kinghorn (2010), 
our expectation is that practical wisdom is able to support medical practitioners when dealing 
with complexity in a professional and goal-oriented way, because it safeguards the orientation 
to a moral purpose. At the same time, it must be emphasized, that the professional use of 
expert knowledge and skills, competences and available evidence are just as important for 
giving good medical care.  
First we must ask what practical wisdom is. Various authors (Kaldjian, 2014; 
Kinghorn, 2010; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993) have drawn on Aristotelian phronesis to 
provide a definition, but, this does not sufficiently take into account the context of late 
modern, complex practice. For instance, medical professionals currently no longer act 
individually as the neo-Aristotelians assume. Rather, they function in complex networks 
consisting of co-acting professionals, as well as various material and immaterial agents (De 
Bock, 2018; Dekker, 2011; Van Wietmarschen et al., 2018). Furthermore, current medical 
practices are pervaded by institutional and societal influences and directives (Hafferty & 
Levinson, 2008; Moore, 2008; Moore & Beadle, 2006). Late modern contexts should 
therefore be included in any definition of practical wisdom.  
Accordingly, we are proposing the following definition: practical wisdom is: the 
capability, which emerges in acting jointly within medical practices, of knowing how to 
remain focused on achieving the good for each individual patient, within the context of the 
practice and its telos, in ever changing situations, and of how to accomplish this by the most 
appropriate means, while dealing with complexity and institutional and systemic pressure. 
This definition refers to the complex nature of medical practices, i.e. to “a paradigm of 
interconnectedness and adaptive dynamics” (Sturmberg, 2018). Moreover, it describes 
practical wisdom as an emergent phenomenon that becomes visible in the actions within 
practices. We regard practices as they are defined in specific practice theories. Nicolini and 
Monteiro (2017, p. 1) have defined them as “orderly mediated doings and sayings (‘practices’) 
and their aggregations.” This is a broader definition than MacIntyre’s, to which Tyson’s 2018 
publication refers. ‘The good’ is intended to mean: in accordance with the good life as 
experienced by the (contextualized) patient in the short and long term. Furthermore, the good 
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has to be accomplished in a way that is compliant with professional standards, is appropriate 
to the telos of the practice, and tailored to the particular patient (Bontemps, Baart & Vosman, 
2018; Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011; Klaver, Van Elst & Baart, 2014). With regard to the moral 
goodness of an action, we follow practice theory in not prioritizing the intent of the actor, but 
locating it in what is revealed to be good for the patient in the professional relationship.  
This article will not elaborate further on Aristotelian virtue-ethics. With regard to the 
relationship between practical wisdom, - one of the intellectual virtues, alongside ‘episteme’ 
(theoretical knowledge) and ‘techne’ (technical knowledge) – and the moral virtues, we 
endorse the position taken by Kemmis, 2012. That stance implies that praxis and phronesis are 
intertwined and reciprocally influence each other: practical wisdom generates a morally 
desirable practice, while morally good practices bring about practical wisdom. 
Interruptions and figurations. Kinsella (2012) drawing on Schön (1983, 1991) has 
stated that practical wisdom is generated and fostered by reflection. “Whatever else phronesis 
might be, we can safely say that it involves reflection.” Frank (2012) has mentioned: 
“Reflective practice begins with interruption.” Kinsella has spoken of disruptions, Baecker 
(2011) of ‘Verstörungen’ [disturbances] in current professionalized work. According to 
Frank, what is interrupted is “the temporal flow in which what is supposed to happen next 
dominates the present”, as well as “what sociologists call typifications.” Kinsella has 
mentioned disturbances of habits and routines. In this article we will look for interruptions 
that occur in daily medical practice. 
We will, lastly, also define the concept ‘figurations’ in line with the aforementioned 
practice theories. Figurations are networks of human and material, interrelated and 
interdependent factors, which constantly adapt in dynamic processes (Elias, 1971; Schmidt, 
2012; Wilterdink, 2011). With regard to social practices, Schmidt (2012) has related 
figurations to the heuristic metaphor of the game. It must be emphasized, that connections 
within figurations are very unlike cause-effect relationships or correlations. 
Our research questions. Our first research question is whether practical wisdom can 
be observed in concrete, everyday medical practices in a general hospital. The second is: what 
manifestations of practical wisdom can be discerned? And the third: how do the interruptions 
mentioned above occur in these medical practices and do they in fact lead to practical 
wisdom? The fourth is, whether it is possible to distinguish specific figurations which 
constrain or facilitate the manifestation of practical wisdom in medical practices.  
Our research questions have arisen from the observation that, although publications on 
practical wisdom have become more numerous (Kristjánsson, 2015), until now, they have so 
far remained mainly philosophical-theoretical in nature (Kaldjian, 2014; Kinghorn, 2010; 
Kristjánsson, 2015). Conversely, our intention is to investigate these questions empirically, so 
as to approximate the actual practices as closely as possible, and to take into account the 
‘muddiness’ and complexity of practices, things which are often overlooked elsewhere. We 
therefore needed a form of explorative qualitative-empirical research, since practical wisdom 
is not quantifiable or measurable. What can be observed, however, is “what people actually 
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do” (Nicolini, 2012). Schmidt (2012) has spoken of “Die Öffentlichkeit der Praktiken” 
[practices in full view]. For that reason, we have chosen a qualitative-heuristic in-depth 
analysis of thick descriptions of ten patient cases, in which many details, including 
characteristics of the patients’ contexts, are reflected (Geertz, 1973). 
Methods 
Qualitative heuristics. As the set-up of this study is explorative, we have chosen 
qualitative heuristics (QH), a method, geared to exploration and discovery, developed by 
Kleining (Kleining & Witt, 2000, 2001). Kleining has recommended using of four basic rules: 
that 1) the researcher is open to new concepts and to change of perception; 2) the research 
object is transparent: to be initially preliminary defined and to be adapted during the research 
process; 3) there should be maximum variation in data collection, by introducing a structural 
and systemic variety of perspectives; 4) data analysis is oriented to integration by focusing 
on similarities, and ultimately by identifying patterns. We will indicate how we complied with 
these rules, below. In qualitative heuristics, ‘inner’ validity will be achieved during the 
research process through continually changing observation data until saturation is reached, i.e. 
no new data appear. Therefore, maximum variation of data is demanded. Reliability is 
safeguarded in the same way: by demonstrating that new perspectives or examples show the 
same similarities and can thus be integrated in the same way. Generalizability should be 
tested by the readers of the research by investigating whether the results are also valid outside 
the study: communicative generalizability (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011; Smaling, 2009a). 
A multi-case study of complex patients. The research consists of a multi-case study 
of 10 patients, selected by theoretical sampling (a method derived from grounded theory (GT) 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). From 100 patient cases which were subsequently discussed in the 
monthly medical staff meeting at a general hospital, over the course of twelve years (2005-
2016). According to theoretical considerations the cases had to be complex in nature and the 
moral purpose of the treatment should be a problem. In selecting the cases, we looked for 
maximum variation (QH) and for saturation (QH and GT). The case studies show a wide 
variety in patients’ ages (7 to 89 years) and gender (5 female and 5 male); the medical 
specialties involved (surgery of all kinds, pediatrics, internal medicine, anesthesiology, 
cardiology, pulmonary medicine, geriatrics, emergency and intensive care medicine); the 
nature and severity of the problems presented (somatic, psychological, social, psychiatric, 
trauma, minor or lethal); the manner and urgency of the presentation (from minimization to 
exaggeration of complaints, from relatively healthy to critically ill); the patient’s living 
situation before presentation (from independent living, to living in an institution); the duration 
of the treatment (27 hours to 4 years); the treatment setting (Emergency Department, 
Outpatient Ward, a Clinical Ward, Intensive Care Unit). This ensured that there was a wide 
variety of cases. (this is the third basic rule of QH) 
The patient cases selected are all characterized by complexity i.e. the patients suffer 
from multiple, intertwined physical diseases; they may have psychological and social 
problems as well; moreover, the treatment situations, in which different disciplines have to 
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work together intensively, are complex. Furthermore, it was possible only in very few of these 
cases to make a prima vista diagnosis, nor was a straightforward treatment strategy according 
to a protocol or guideline generally possible. Physicians were often confronted with 
unexpected findings, or cooperation or communication difficulties, especially when they had 
to collaborate with partners in a treatment chain. 
Procedure. The first researcher started with a ‘thick description’ of four selected 
cases, i.e. a thorough description which includes many details that illustrate the patient’s 
problem, the situation and the context. The description was based on the available documents 
(medical, nursing and para-medical files, including correspondence and meeting reports). The 
issues, discussed in the medical staff’s deliberative meetings, have also been included. In a 
sense, the study involves participatory research, because the first researcher herself practiced 
in the hospital involved and took part in the case discussions (Eikeland, 2001; Smaling, 
2009b). Our aim was not to carry out a text analysis of the various documents, but to study the 
medical actions as they are presented in the files: to study the practice. The research was also 
focused on the institutional context of the actions (i.e. the hospital organization; peculiarities 
of the ward; of place and time). In this manner, the cases were clearly contextualized 
(Judkins, 2015; Upshur, 2014).  
First reflections, which occurred during the description, were immediately recorded. 
The leading question was: where can practical wisdom be observed: discernment of what is 
‘the good’ for the patient and the right way to accomplish this. Our aim here was to identify, 
not to code practical wisdom. The manifestations of practical wisdom that were observed 
appeared to be very diverse and situated (first basic rule QH). Additionally, we searched for 
the ‘interruptions’ mentioned above, which could have brought about practical wisdom. The 
findings were revised and developed by critically discussing the descriptions of the first four 
cases with both co-researchers, who are both ethicists, not medically trained, but experienced 
in research in hospital practices. After that, in order to achieve a greater degree of variation 
(third basic rule QH) and saturation, two new cases were selected, described, reflected upon 
and discussed in the same way. Subsequently, the first researcher selected four other cases, 
one at a time, until theoretical saturation was reached, and a heuristic research process again 
took place. In that process, the manifestations of practical wisdom, that had been gathered 
thus far, were reviewed and it was possible to supplement them (second basic rule QH). 
Finally, we were able to distinguish several characteristic similarities and patterns in these 
manifestations of practical wisdom (fourth rule QH). Similarly, the first search yielded four 
different ‘interruptions’; in the second and third search we found six additional ones. 
Results 
First, we will depict the interruptions which we observed that can possibly permit practical 
wisdom to emerge (third research question), and after that, we will give examples of practical 
wisdom that we found in relation to the interruptions (first and second question). 
Subsequently, we will indicate what similarities and patterns we have distinguished in the 
examples, and finally, (fourth question) we will discuss the figurations mentioned. 





Types of interruption Examples 
 
Work context 
Disturbance of work flow/schedule  Patient is unexpectedly referred urgently (pt 7)  
Imperfections in the work situation that 
pose risks for patients 
Bad moment for referral: night; weekend; 
holidays (pt 2) 
There are no appropriate guidelines; 
need to improvise 
Multi-morbidity (pt 1) 
Vague complaints (pt 4) 
Patient in the wrong place; 
professional in the wrong position 
Patient with chronical psychiatric complaints at 
the E.D. (pt 8) 
Doctor-patient 
relationship 
Relationship is or becomes disturbed 
Language barrier (pt 9); functional illiteracy (pt 
6); physician’s language incomprehensible (pt 
6) 
Perspective-distorting emotions lead to 
incorrect judgement 
Disgust (pt 8); irritation (pt 5); anger (pt 2); 
despair (pt 2) 
Patient’s 
characteristics  Patient’s behavior creates problems 
Patient runs away (pt 10); patient refuses 
treatment (pt 5) 
Physician’s 
(work)characteristics  
Uncertain knowledge, yet pressure to 
act Unknown history patient (pt 2) 
Intuition does not match objectifiable 
facts 
Intuitive assumption of lung cancer does not 
match X-ray (pt 3) 
Awareness: interference has started, 
but it seems medically futile 
Continued check-ups without medical need (pt 
5) 
  
Table 1: Outline of the different types of interruptions.  
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 Interruptions. We found 10 interruptions which varied in nature, and which 
illustrated the complexity of everyday work: see table 1. We do not claim that this list is 
exhaustive. The classification has been chosen because of its usefulness in medical practices. 
The interruptions appear as specific hiccups in the work situation, and, moreover, as 
disturbances in the practitioners’ perceptions (of patient’s concerns, of the treatment 
relationship and of uncertain knowledge).  
 
Manifestations of practical wisdom. We will now give examples of practical 
wisdom as observed in the context of each interruption that we found. We discovered that the 
interruptions sometimes, but not always, initiated practical wisdom. We will address this 
question under ‘reflection.’ 
For the sake of clarity, in describing examples of practical wisdom, we have 
highlighted the extremities of a bandwidth, but there are certainly patches of wisdom 
elsewhere within that bandwidth. 
1. Interruption of the workflow: patient 7, a seven-year-old boy who has been limping 
for some weeks, is urgently referred to an overbooked pediatric surgery by his General 
Practitioner (GP). The pediatrician interrupts her consultations to examine the boy, 
and to have a conversation with him and his parents. She orders the necessary 
additional tests and asks her assistants to inform the waiting patients and to adjust the 
schedule of the consultation hours. We see this as a manifestation of practical wisdom, 
because the physician does what proves to be good: breaking a binding schedule 
because of the urgency of the reference and of the concern raised. She thus also builds 
a strong professional relationship. 
By contrast, no practical wisdom can be discerned in the following example: 
patient 2, an 80-year-old male who has fallen off the basement stairs at home, is 
admitted via the Emergency Department (ED) with light traumatic cranial-brain 
damage as a preliminary diagnosis. The following morning, during the doctor’s round, 
for which only limited time is available, it appears from the nurses’ observations that 
the patient’s symptoms do not fit the diagnosis made on admission, and, moreover, 
that the patient has a long, insufficiently documented medical history . The physician 
nevertheless maintains the preliminary diagnosis. The absence of practical wisdom 
appears from the failure to recognize that the diagnosis is wrong and also to not 
bridge the unacceptable knowledge hiatus; this means that the good of the patient is 
neglected. 
2. Imperfections in the working environment: after more than two weeks, on a Friday 
evening, patient 2 is referred from the neurological ward to the surgery department. 
There are fewer nurses available during evenings, nights and weekends; doctors on 
duty only do necessary and urgent work. Referring the patient on a Friday evening 
without accompanying arrangements, i.e. denying systemic obstacles to a patient- 
oriented cooperation among professionals, evidences the absence of practical wisdom. 
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3. Inappropriate rules, appointments, and guidelines: patient 10, a single, 50-year-old 
woman, a nonconformist artist, turns out to have lung cancer with brain metastases 
resulting in epileptic seizures. During her recovery, while the seizures are still 
occasionally occurring, the nurses find out that she secretly drinks whiskey. She has 
been advised against consuming alcoholic drinks, because of the seizures and her anti-
epileptic medication; moreover it is hospital policy that hospitalized patients may not 
take alcoholic drinks. Nevertheless the neurologist decides to allow her to consume 
alcohol in moderation and even instructs the nurses to facilitate this, against 
professional and hospital rules. Particularizing the rules for this patient in the 
terminal stage can be called acting wisely. 
By contrast, the GP who treated patient 3, a 60-year-old man, according to the 
standard for ‘shoulder complaints’ did not show practical wisdom. The standard did 
not fit the patient’s symptoms well, and applying it caused unnecessary delay in 
diagnosis and treatment. It did not, therefore, serve the good of the patient. 
 
4. The patient has been referred to the wrong place; the professional is in the wrong 
role: patient 8 is a 65-year-old male with a chronic psychiatric condition, who is being 
treated as an outpatient in a mental health institution. Over a short period of time, he 
checks in at the ED several times, on his own initiative, with physical complaints, for 
which no physical cause can be found. The ED physicians are unable to prevent the 
ED consultations or to set the patient’s mind at ease. Finally, an ED nurse decides to 
contact the patient’s GP directly, and she recommends referring this patient to a 
geriatrician in order to find a solution for him. In doing so, the nurse goes beyond her 
role. She acts wisely, because she recommends a more appropriate way to achieve the 
good of the patient. 
 
5. Disturbance of the doctor-patient relationship: patient 5, a 14-year-old boy is 
referred to a pediatrician by his GP. The boy has walking problems and experiences 
pain alternately, in his right or left hip. After many examinations and consultations, it 
is evident that there is no somatic base for the complaints. The patient appears to react 
with a postural adjustment to situations that are stressful to him, and which occur 
frequently because of his specific coping behavior. However, at first, the boy and his 
parents reject psychological treatment. The pediatrician realizes that it is her task to 
guide the boy to healthy adulthood. Therefore, she offers to be available for 
consultation, whenever new problems occur. Despite the difference of interpretation 
she succeeds in maintaining the relationship and communication, and in preventing 
medical shopping. Eventually, the boy accepts the real cause of his pain and decides to 
accept treatment aimed at changing his coping behavior. The perseverance, and the 
physician’s long-term guidance, carried out in order to maintain a professional 
relationship, must be called wise, because in doing so she makes a healthy future for 
her patient possible. 
Practical wisdom is lacking in the care for patient 4: a mentally disabled 
woman, 39 years old, resident of a home for mentally disabled people, is referred to 
the ED because she is seriously ill. The junior-physician writes “no communication 
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possible” in the patient’s file. What she means is: no verbal communication possible. 
As she neglects the patient’s numerous nonverbal signals, she is indeed unable to 
communicate with her disabled patient. Moreover, the caregiver, whom the referring 
doctor purposely asked to accompany the patient, is not sufficiently included for the 
physician to obtain a clear image of the patient. This leads to an incomplete diagnosis. 
Furthermore, the young doctor’s actions are not corrected by the supervising 
specialists. Practical wisdom is missing, because the doctors responsible were not 
sufficiently aware of their incomplete knowledge and skills and did nothing to 
overcome these issues.  
 
6. Emotions, that obscure professional judgement: in the case of patient 5, the 
pediatrician observes that she is becoming irritated, because the patient and his parents 
obstinately cling to the idea of a somatic etiology of the symptoms, despite lengthy 
explanation to the contrary. She discusses the irritation with her colleagues and thus 
succeeds in controlling this emotion, which in turn enables her to continue her 
professional relationship with the patient. We define controlling one’s own emotions in 
order to save a proper professional judgement, as practical wisdom. 
In the case of patient 8, doctors develop feelings of disgust for him as an 
unkempt, demanding man. But these feelings remain below the surface and as a result 
they distort professional judgement and the professional relationship. Not investigating 
negative emotions and not controlling them illustrate a lack of practical wisdom. 
 
7. A patient’s problematic behavior: patient 6 is a 59-year-old woman with chronical 
multiple sclerosis and a mild mental disability, strange behavior, and poor 
communication skills. Her complaints are an aching knee and thigh. The orthopedic 
surgeon (one of the many specialists who see her) describes the patient’s odd 
presentation. Afterwards, various other physicians equally indicate that they think the 
patient’s behavior is unusual. In the meantime, the treatment that was begun does not 
appear to be successful and the patient’s condition deteriorates. Finally, a 
rheumatologist is consulted. After a thorough study of the medical file, the 
rheumatologist decides to sit down quietly with the patient and just talk with her to go 
over the progress of the illness from the beginning. This approach finally leads to the 
correct diagnosis. The rheumatologist shows practical wisdom by taking time for 
reflection, making effective contact with the patient and going back to the beginning of 
the complaints, in order to obtain a correct judgement. 
Patient 10 ran away from the hospital on the last day of treatment and could 
not be located for some time. Before this, she had already done things that are unusual 
for patients: she made coffee in the ward kitchen at 4.30 a.m. and secretly drank 
whiskey. To judge this kind of behavior as merely problematic, troublesome or 
recalcitrant, i.e. not being able to take on the patient’s perspective, illustrates a lack 
of practical wisdom. 
 
8. Uncertainty of knowledge: patient 9 is a refugee from the Middle East who has been 
granted permanent residency in the Netherlands. Not long before fleeing, she had an 
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operation in her home country because of a mamma carcinoma, but documentation is 
missing. Chemotherapeutic treatment has taken place elsewhere in the Netherlands. 
She has received regular check-ups by the oncologists in this hospital. There appears 
to be a language barrier, although her children act as interpreters. The internist-
oncologist perceives the communication difficulties, and decides to make a number of 
arrangements to compensate for them, including frequent check-ups and regular 
consultations with the GP. The fact that the physician recognizes communication 
difficulties, articulates this, and involves others in remedying them, reflects practical 
wisdom. 
Patient 1 is an 89-year-old widow who, after having been relatively healthy for 
years, is admitted to hospital for the fourth time in four months. This time “because it’ 
s not going well at home” and the GP is asking for “analysis”. Both the GP and the 
patient herself, who is described on several occasions as “remarkably lucid of mind”, 
want to discuss the possibilities for her last stage of life. However, in hospital, the 
attending doctor fails to have a good conversation with the patient, which would have 
been necessary to get an impression of her capabilities, her suffering and her wishes. 
Not recognizing shortage of knowledge (about the precise reason for the referral) and 
therefore doing nothing to remedy, illustrate a lack of practical wisdom, because it 
makes goal-oriented actions impossible. 
 
9. Intuitive signals: in the case of patient 3, we saw that the GP’s intuition (her patient 
had been a heavy smoker for years) caused her to rule out a lung tumor, investigating 
complaints of a painful shoulder via an X-ray of the lungs. The GP’s actions, trying to 
underpin her medical intuition, based on knowledge of context, and aimed at a proper 
medical judgement, can be called practical wisdom. 
 
10. Medically meaningful/meaningless for the patient: patient 9 is, at a terminal stage of 
her illness, and is released from hospital at her own request to die at home. There is no 
medical benefit to administering tube feeding. On the contrary, this would induce a 
great deal of discomfort. Yet, the attending oncologist decides to prescribe tube 
feeding, because he knows, that this woman is waiting for a son she has not seen for 
years. This son is currently on his way to his mother to take his leave of her. In doing 
so, the attending physician is showing practical wisdom, because tube feeding, by 
prolonging the woman’s life, serves a purpose, which is very dear to this patient, even 
though it also causes physical discomfort (suffering).  
 
Table 2 is a summary of the examples of practical wisdom we observed: it illustrates 
the application of basic rule 4 (QH): we have listed the analogies we found in the examples of 
practical wisdom in the first column. The second column shows the overarching patterns we 
discerned in these similarities. 
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Deciding to diverge from schedule (sometimes in a split 
second) (pt 7) 
Going back to the beginning of complaints (pt 6) 
Meandering work routine 
Improvising, varying on existing themes (pt 5) 
Repairing or compensating actions in case of observed 
imperfections in the work situation (pt 2) 
Putting aside (non)fitting rules/guidelines or adapting them, 
on the basis of arguments (pt 10) 
Attuning to the patient and the situation, by 
modifying available means (improvising) 
Properly using the factor of time: take time, accelerate; 
delay; time accurately, sometimes going against binding 
schedules (pt 9; pt7) 
Getting the timing right for the patient’s sake 
Inventively calling on additional, sometimes alternative 
sources of information: intuition/knowledge of relatives and 
people involved (pt 1; pt 3; pt 4) 
Controlling emotions and investigating them for their 
epistemic possibilities (pt 8; pt 5) 
Taking advantage of different sources of 
information as well as objectifiable 
knowledge/evidence 
Discerning disturbances of the professional relationship and 
actively looking for solutions (pt 9; pt 6; pt 4) 
Actively inquiring the “logic” behind deviant behavior of 
patients or co-professionals (pt 10; pt 8) 
Maintaining or consolidating professional 
relationships 
Table 2: Similarities and patterns in the manifestations of practical wisdom 
As the reader may have noticed, we have used words to describe the examples of 
practical wisdom that are different from those we used in our definition. That is because of 
the plurality and the fluidity of “the good”, we were able to detect in these concrete situations. 
These particularizations of the definition illustrate the first two basic rules of QH.  
Reflection 
Practical wisdom has many faces. We will now reflect on our findings, on the basis of our 
four research questions. We were indeed able to discern practical wisdom in everyday 
medical practices, and we have distinguished many aspects of it.  
In addition, as outlined in table 2, we have found five patterns of practical wisdom: a 
meandering work routine; attuning to the patient and the situation by modifying available 
means (improvising); getting the timing right for the patient’s sake; taking advantage of 
different sources of information; and looking for ways to maintain or consolidate professional 
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relationships. This multi-case study has thus enabled us to particularize and complement the 
theoretical definition of practical wisdom. It appears to be the capability, even the art, to 
secure what is good for the patient, both in the short and the long term, in agile and inventive 
ways, using very diverse, sometimes unconventional means and opportunities, for every 
patient separately and time and again, in varying situations. This art has to be practiced in 
surroundings, which contain “contextual constraints” (Sturmberg, 2018) on the emergence of 
practical wisdom, such as the imposition of general and binding rules, appointments and 
routines (Chambliss, 1996; Judkins, 2015; Upshur, 2014). We have observed these constraints 
for instance with patients 2 (limited time for the doctor’s round), 7 (mandatory schedule) and 
10 (‘no alcoholic drinks for hospitalized patients’). Time and again, the reference point of 
practical wisdom appeared to be the ‘telos’: the good that has to be achieved for the patient 
and that is also in accordance with the goal of the professional practice (Bontemps et al., 
2019). This was illustrated by patients 1 (how to honor her last wishes) and 9 (to prescribe 
tube feeding to enable a farewell). In these ways, practical wisdom appears to be ‘wisdom-in-
action’ in daily practice, i.e. ‘doing’ practical wisdom (Schmidt, 2012). It appears to take 
seemingly trivial and commonplace forms, which is different from what is suggested in 
theoretical publications. The examples we saw included consciously disrupting an orderly 
consultation schedule with patient 7; improvising with role boundaries with patient 8; and 
going over the full history of complaints with patient 6. The practical interpretations as we 
have described them, have not led to a change in our definition of practical wisdom. However, 
the particular instances did induce a deeper understanding of how practical wisdom unfolds in 
everyday practices. 
Interruptions and figurations. Our study has mentioned multiple interruptions (see table 1) 
in daily medical practices: from missing appropriate guidelines, to emotions, to pressure to act 
in uncertain situations. We found that these interruptions can certainly be the prelude to 
reflection that leads to practical wisdom, but, that reflection and practical wisdom do not 
automatically result from interruptions. Probably, the presence of facilitating or restraining 
factors is important here: these are the figurations we mentioned before. Moreover, the 
interruptions appear to be very different from the serious dilemmas which are traditionally 
seen as the main occasion to manifest practical wisdom (Kaldjian, 2014; Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1993). 
This research has allowed us to formulate the hypothesis that explicitly focusing on 
practical wisdom in practices and institutions could facilitate its emergence. For instance, by 
constructively engaging intuition and by talking about controlling one’s emotions. Moreover, 
we assume that incorporating certain figurations in the work infrastructure, such as 
introducing structural moments of reflection, could promote the emergence of practical 
wisdom. For instance, in the case of patient 10 “care provider huddles (informal meetings) at 
the beginning of every shift” (Widmer, Swanson, Zink & Pines, 2018) could have brought 
about a better relationship with the patient, as a result of which she would not have felt the 
urge to run away. We did not, however, have the opportunity to investigate these hypotheses 
any further in the present study. 
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Conclusions 
The current explorative, qualitative-heuristic research of 10 patient cases has demonstrated 
that practical wisdom occurs in various ways in real-life medical practices. We have also 
found 10 ‘interruptions’ of varying nature, which can provoke the emergence of practical 
wisdom, but which do not seem to do so automatically. Regrettably, we were only able to 
investigate the assumed facilitating or constraining influence of concrete figurations on this 
emergence of practical wisdom, to a limited degree. 
The numerous manifestations of practical wisdom that we described, and in which we 
have recognized five patterns, are represented in table 2. Wisdom-in-action appears to consist 
of apparently small, meaningless actions, which, nevertheless manifest the true capacity to 
give good, appropriate care and to maintain the professional relationship (Fricker, 2007; Mol, 
2006; Stolper et al., 2011; Van Heijst, 2005; Vosman & Baart, 2011).  
More empirical research is needed to correct and complete the conceptualization of 
practical wisdom so that it becomes more useful for medical practitioners in their practices to 
achieve the moral goal of their work: to assist patients professionally, in order to ensure the 
good of the patients. Moreover, more empirical research should be devoted to exploring the 
figurations which facilitate the emergence of practical wisdom. We were only able to indicate 









































“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”
“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to”, said the Cat.
“I don’t much care where . .” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go”, said the Cat.
Lewis Carrol, Alice in Wonderland
Professional workplace-learning.  
Can professional wisdom be learned?
Chapter 5
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Abstract  
This article aims at investigating whether physicians can acquire and develop practical 
wisdom in their practices through structural case discussions focused on learning. Our starting 
point is that practical wisdom is essential to realize the moral purpose of professional care: to 
help each individual patient to alleviate her suffering and to promote her health in a way that 
is attuned to her individual personality and situation.  
In recent publications on learning practical wisdom after the formal curriculum, we 
have found two different opinions. Some authors claimed that practical wisdom can only be 
learned implicitly from experiences in the workplace; others that learning practical wisdom 
can also be accomplished intentionally in peer groups reflecting on their work. 
We have analyzed the lessons learned from 100 case reviews, recorded by the 
participating physicians themselves. The discussions had been organized in a Dutch general 
hospital during a twelve-year period. We have found that the joint practitioners really did 
acquire practical wisdom through reflection and deliberation, partly implicitly, partly 
explicitly. We have also discovered that they managed to translate practical wisdom into the 
infrastructure and the culture of collaborating groups, practices and the institutional work 
context. 
The results of this investigation have led us to formulate proposals to stimulate the 
learning of practical wisdom through reflection on everyday work in hospitals. Practical 
wisdom will foster the realization of the moral purpose of professional medical practices. 
 
Introduction 
Recent publications have underlined the indispensability of practical wisdom to realize the 
moral purpose of professional care, especially in late modern medical practices which are 
dominated by complexity, uncertainty and changeability (Bontemps, Vosman & Baart, 2019; 
Kaldjian, 2014; Kinghorn, 2010; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; Montgomery, 2006; Vosman & 
Baart, 2008). At the same time, however, the acquisition and development of practical 
wisdom have been called problematic. Some authors doubt whether it can be taught at all, 
either within the framework of a training curriculum, or through formal learning in the 
workplace. Thus, Kemmis has argued “I believe that phronesis is not something that can be 
taught; it can only be learned, and then only by experience” (Kemmis, 2012, pp. 148/149). 
Kinghorn has emphasized that this ‘learning by experience’ is a challenging, long-term and 
vulnerable process. By contrast, Iedema, Mesman and Carroll (2013) have contended that, in 
the complex reality of daily practice, professionals will be able to learn practical wisdom as 
“knowing how to act” through conscious processes: by transferring practical wisdom from the 
domain of the tacit and the implicit to the domain of the conscious and the controllable 
through collective reflection on visualized practical cases. Kinsella (2012, p. 167) has also 
stated that “a means of cultivating phronesis in professional education and practice may well 
be to encourage professionals to talk about, share, and document the aporias (unsolvable 
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problems and contradictions) of practice with one another”. In addition, authors of theoretical 
and empirical, psychological studies of wisdom, that have been conducted during the last two 
decades, aimed at defining and measuring wisdom, also have promoted the teaching of 
wisdom in schools and universities (Ardelt, 2003; Ardelt, 2020; Bangen, Meeks & Jeste, 
2012; Grossmann, 2017; Jeste et al., 2010; Sternberg, 2001). 
Learning practical wisdom in the workplace? The fact that the learning of practical 
wisdom has been problematized in scholarly literature has deepened our interest in the 
problem how experienced physicians acquire practical wisdom in the hectic everyday context 
of institutionalized patient care. Does this happen, as Kemmis (2012) and Kinghorn (2010) 
have argued, exclusively by practicing itself? So, is it limited to implicit, individual learning 
resulting in tacit knowledge (Eraut, 2004; Vosman & Baart, 2008)? Or, does it also happen 
through intentional learning processes in groups, resulting in explicit, distributed knowledge, 
as Kinsella (2012) and Iedema et al. (2013) have stated, mainly in deliberative meetings 
focused on learning? Do these learning meetings need to have the acquisition of practical 
wisdom as a specific goal? Or, is it possible to acquire practical wisdom through case 
discussions with a general learning-aim?  
Studies into the learning of practical wisdom have so far mainly been conducted 
within the official medical curriculum (Iedema et al.’s 2013, and Timmerman and Baart’s 
2016 studies are an exception). Mostly, students have been asked to report and reflect on 
cases or stories from their internships in tutor groups, led by a supervisor or mentor (Kaldjian, 
2010; Kotzee, Patton & Conroy, 2016; Myopoulos, Kulasegaram & Woods, 2017; Reynolds, 
Sarriot, Chad Swanson & Rusoja, 2016; Tyson, 2018). However, our interest is in learning 
after the official curriculum has been completed. We therefore decided to empirically 
investigate the problem depicted above in an ordinary clinical setting. 
Before we describe the research data and research methods we will at first define the 
key concepts that we have used in this study. 
Key concepts: practical wisdom. Our definition of practical wisdom is based on the 
Aristotelian phronesis, and also on the recognition of the complex, rapidly changing, and 
plural, late-modern context of medical work (Giddens, 1990; Rosa, 2013; Vosman & 
Niemeijer, 2017). Aristotle sees phronesis as an intellectual virtue alongside other intellectual 
virtues, especially episteme (theoretical, scientific knowledge) and techne (skill in making 
things – instrumental knowledge), and the moral virtues. He has named it ‘the meta-virtue’, 
because it integrates, guides and overarches the other virtues and it determines their context-
related value. (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; Kotzee et al., 2016; Kristjánsson, 2015). Eikeland 
(2006, p. 23) has emphasized that Aristotle’s philosophy is a practical philosophy i.e. that 
“phronesis is assigned to praxis or “doing”, i.e. to activities having their ends and objectives 
within themselves”. Kemmis (2012, p. 150) has described praxis as a particular kind of action 
that is morally committed, morally oriented and informed by traditions in a field. Moreover, 
he has pointed to the complex interconnectedness of praxis and phronesis: phronesis is the 
disposition guiding and informing praxis, while at the same time, praxis brings about 
phronesis. Throughout this article we will use the term ‘practical wisdom’ to differentiate 
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from the Aristotelian phronesis. We also see practical wisdom as practical reasoning, 
regarding knowing of the good – moral knowing – that is enacted in the ‘doing’ action. 
However, we have adjusted several aspects of the Aristotelian concept to the late-modern 
conditions of current professional practices: firstly, we consider it a feature of practices, not 
only of individuals; secondly, we see the necessity to radically individualize the good that has 
to be achieved for a patient in the here and now, and that differs from the Aristotelian 
universal good; thirdly, we have learnt that the institutional embeddedness of practices has to 
be taken into account. Moreover, we want to emphasize the difference between ‘practice’ and 
the Aristotelian ‘praxis’. We are going to use both concepts, but we define practice, according 
to certain practice theories as “orderly materially mediated doings and sayings . . . and their 
aggregations” (Nicolini & Monteiro 2017, p. 2). 
Our heuristic definition of practical wisdom is: “the capability, which emerges in 
acting jointly within medical practices, of knowing how to remain focused on achieving the 
good for each individual patient, within the context of the practice and its telos, in ever 
changing situations, and of how to accomplish this by the most appropriate means, while 
dealing with complexity and situational and systemic pressure” (Bontemps et al., 2019). 
We have studied a number of publications in order to identify the distinctive 
characteristics – indicators – of practical wisdom. (Aristotle, 2009; Eikeland, 2006; Iedema, 
2011; Iedema et al., 2013; Jeste et al., 2010; Kaldjian, 2010, 2014; Kinghorn, 2010; Kinsella 
& Pitman, 2012; Kotzee et al., 2016; Kristjánsson, 2015; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; 
Schön, 1987; Schwarz, 2011; Sternberg, 2001; Tyson, 2018; Vosman & Baart, 2008). We 
chose the following four characteristics:  
1. To determine the near and remote purpose of the medical involvement appropriate for 
the situated patient (the good for the patient), a purpose that also corresponds with 
the telos of the medical practice: professionally supporting that patient. Furthermore, 
to focus professional actions on that purpose: goal-orientation/telos. Aristotle (2009); 
Iedema et al. (2013); Kaldjian (2010, 2014); Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993); and 
Vosman and Baart (2008) have emphasized that goal-orientation is essential for the 
enactment of practical wisdom. Our indicator for this characteristic is an explicit or 
implicit reference to purpose or goal in the texts. 
2. To find and realize the appropriate equilibrium, the balance, in the medical process: 
balance (Aristotle, 2009; Eikeland, 2006; Schwarz, 2011). Kinsella (2012, p. 47) has 
described “the balancing act in which professionals continually engage.” Eikeland has 
mentioned that the capability “to hit the mean” is essential for praxis. The indicator is 
any explicit or implicit indication of balance, equilibrium, proportionality. 
3. To achieve an adequate judgment, a correct interpretation or assessment of a patient, 
her context, situation, diagnosis, the appropriate treatment with the most promising 
prognosis: judgment (Kaldjian, 2010, 2014; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; Montgomery, 
2006; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Schön, 1987; Tyson, 2018; Vosman & Baart, 
2011). Kaldjian (2014, p. 72) has even stated “clinical judgment simply is practical 
wisdom applied to the practice of medicine. For clinical judgment is a matter of 
looking at the reality of the patient . . . and then deciding how best to respond, based 
PROFESSIONAL WORKPLACE-LEARNING. CAN PRACTICAL WISDOM BE LEARNED? 79
5
on the ends in view, the means best suited to achieve those ends, and an appreciation 
for the moral principles and virtues necessary to guide and motivate diagnostic and 
therapeutic decisions.” The indicator is any implicit or explicit indication of judgment. 
4. To reflect on the practice; trying to see backgrounds and connections, to understand 
participants’ perspectives, underlying values and intentions, to unravel dependencies 
and coherencies (Baart & Vosman, 2015; Eikeland, 2006; Iedema et al., 2019; 
Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; Schön, 1987). Here, we have to distinguish reflectivity from 
reflexivity. Joint reflection or deliberation is characterized by an open exchange of 
opinions, during which the attendants listen carefully, try to understand each other’s 
perspectives, balancing options, and critically reconsidering morality while thinking 
about a case. Following Iedema (2011) and Kinsella (2012), we see reflexivity as the 
capability to critically review the taken-for-granted, habits, routines and hidden beliefs 
of practices; that is why reflexivity provides a strong basis for transformation. The 
indicator is any implicit or explicit reference to reflection or reflexivity in the recorded 
lessons. 
 
The four characteristics have this in common, that they have to be fully focused both 
on the individual patient in her context and at the same time on the telos of the medical 
practice: to alleviate the suffering and to promote the health of each individual patient.  
Key concepts: Learning from case discussions. In this section we will firstly delineate those 
learning modes – within the huge range of learning types that are distinguished in literature – 
that concern learning from case discussions, and that seem relevant to learning practical 
wisdom in the workplace. We define learning here as acquiring knowledge, capabilities and 
understanding from experiences, through interaction with others: as social learning (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991). Also as situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991): learning linked to a 
specific context of place and time. Social learning may result in ‘distributed intelligence’ 
(Iedema et al., 2013, p. 183) within groups of actors: “It is an intelligence that manifests in 
how practitioners perform in their moment-to-moment interactions”, for instance in “how 
clinicians enact relationships with patients” (p. 183). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) have 
mentioned organizational learning as acquiring, sharing and transforming knowledge (for 
instance, from implicit or tacit to explicit) throughout organizations. The learning of medical 
specialists in a hospital, as learning from and by practicing professionally, occurs after 
completing formal education; we call this workplace learning (Eraut, 2000, 2004). Eraut, who 
has studied workplace learning extensively, has stated that the majority of the learning in the 
workplace is informal learning, within which he has distinguished three levels of intention: 1) 
Implicit learning: “the acquisition of knowledge independently of conscious attempts to learn 
and in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was learned” (Eraut, 2004, p. 250). 2) 
Reactive learning: intentional learning, “that occurs in the middle of the action, where there is 
little time to think” (Eraut, 2004, p. 250). 3) Deliberative learning is a form of intentional 
learning for which time is allocated in which participants reflect more or less systematically 
on actions and occurrences, usually together with colleagues. (see also Ericsson, 2004; Van de 
Wiel & Van den Bossche, 2013). It seems to be plausible that learning from case discussions 
will largely emerge as implicit learning and deliberative learning.  
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Argyris and Schön (1978) have distinguished different depths in learning, i.e. first-
loop learning, this is learning new conduct from observing the results of action; second-loop 
learning, in which the observation of results leads to greater understanding of and changes in 
the material and cognitive schemes which determine the actions; third-loop learning enables 
clarifying and changing the logic of discourses which determine actions.  
In the results and discussion sections (see below) we will conclude that learning has 
occurred, when the recorded lessons learned show a plausible increase in ‘knowing what’, 
‘knowing how to’ or ‘understanding’ regarding an indicator of practical wisdom. 
Furthermore, we will use the distinctions between explicit and implicit learning; first-, 
second-, and third-loop learning; social learning and organizational learning while analyzing 
the research data. 
Research questions. We have translated the research problem, outlined above, into the 
following research questions:  
• Can we demonstrate that physicians learn practical wisdom through these case 
discussions which are focused on a general learning objective? And how can we 
recognize the development of practical wisdom? This is a descriptive-explorative 
investigation. 
• Can we demonstrate the impact of the practical wisdom learned on the individual 






Research data. We had access to an extensive, complete and original data collection, 
gathered over a 12-year period, through the first researcher. It consisted of lessons learned 
from 100 multidisciplinary case reviews, recorded by participating physicians, who 
represented multiple specialisms. The discussions were organized with the aim of learning 
from what went well and what did not, and also of retaining the lessons learned. 
This unique collection of existing data offered an excellent opportunity to explore the 
problem described above through a secondary analysis (Heaton, 2008; Irwin, 2013; Doolan, 
Winters & Nouredini, 2017). This means, that we have used the unchanged data for a new 
research aim, which was different from the initial purpose of the collection. As the data set 
was complete, it offered an insight into the longitudinal learning processes of the participating 
medical practitioners; as a result, it should also be capable of demonstrating whether practical 
wisdom had been acquired or not. We received permission to research the data from the 
Institutional Ethical Committee on behalf of the medical staff and the hospital board.  
The discussions were evaluated four times, at irregular intervals; we have chosen the 
evaluation moments to mark a period closure, thus distinguishing four periods. One or more 
cases were discussed each time; collective data about groups of patients were presented on 
five occasions. One example was the mortality analysis of deceased patients in a certain year.  
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As one of the initiators of the case discussions – she was chair of the committee that 
coordinated the meetings and was also the moderator – the first researcher had been directly 
involved. Moreover, she was involved both as a medical specialist and as a member of the 
hospital board. She can therefore be regarded as a ‘knower’ of the practices (Eikeland & 
Nicolini, 2011) and could hence be expected to be able to achieve rich interpretation of the 
data. A possible disadvantage of the involvement is that bias, blind spots and the researcher’s 
different roles might influence the interpretation process (Patton, 2002; Iedema, et al., 2013). 
This potential risk was reduced from the outset by applying an audit procedure and also 
through critical co-assessment by the co-authors, who are ethicists and who had no connection 
to the hospital.  
Content analysis. In this study, the challenge was to make the invisible visible, i.e. it is not 
possible to observe or measure practical wisdom as such. We assume however, that it must be 
possible to derive qualitative, yet adequate interpretations from the recorded lessons, using 
them as a window for indirect observations of underlying practices. Therefore, we needed a 
qualitative analysis method, for which we have selected content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005), more precisely, the directed approach. We worked with a system of pre-determined 
codes (the four indicators of practical wisdom, and the above mentioned learning types) to 
analyze both manifest and latent content. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) have defined content 
analysis as “a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data 
through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (p. 
1278). The distinguishing feature of the directed approach is that it is based on the use of key 
concepts derived from existing theories. In manifest content, a code is literally mentioned in 
the text, and thus, references can be quantified. When addressing latent content, an 
interpretative step is necessary. According to Hsieh and Shannon, the challenges of the 
directed approach are that researchers can be biased by a system of pre-determined codes, or 
can be single-mindedly focused on finding the supporting data. Furthermore, researchers 
could be blind to contextual aspects of research objects. For these reasons, they have proposed 
to perform an audit procedure in order to assure the trustworthiness of the results.  
Audit procedure. We have relied on Akkerman, Admiraal, Brekelmans and Oost’s 
publication (2006) in designing the audit. These authors argued that the quality of a study is 
characterized by the criteria of visibility (a research decision must be made explicit and 
communicated), comprehensibility (a decision must be substantiated) and acceptability (the 
substantiation must be according to the standards, norms and values in the particular field of 
study) (p. 259). As visibility and acceptability in particular cannot be obtained through 
standardized procedures in research processes like the present, the researcher has to be 
resourceful in coding and interpreting correctly. This implies a risk, according to Akkerman et 
al., because it is difficult to be engaged in reflection and quality assurance at the same time. 
Therefore, for such research processes, they have recommended a complex quality check, in 
the form of an external audit procedure. The external auditor will check, whether the 
researcher’s interpretations are based on and are consistent with demonstrable data 
(confirmability) on the one hand, and whether analysis and interpretation processes meet 
generally accepted criteria (reliability) on the other. It is the researcher’s task to prepare an 
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audit trail in advance, in which the whole procedure of collecting data and categorizing, 
interpreting, coding and analyzing is documented. After that, the auditor and auditee negotiate 
a contract in which arrangements for the procedure are formally laid down. Then the auditor 
assesses the research process using the three quality criteria, after which the auditor and the 
auditee discuss the outcome, followed by a re-design and a re-audit, if necessary. Finally, the 
auditor writes a report in which the trustworthiness of the research is assessed. To carry out 
this audit procedure, we approached an external researcher-ethicist, who had not been 
involved in the set-up of the research project. The first researcher and the auditor then 
completed the seven steps Akkerman et al. (2006) described in their article. 
Procedure. The first researcher coded the recorded lessons learned of all separate case 
discussions per period by using the four indicators in order to answer the first research 
question. After that, she repeated this process in which she substantiated the codes with 
explanations. She then drew up a first research grid which she completed per discussion. The 
four indicators formed four rows; the first column consisted of a description of the indicator, 
if possible a quotation; the second column contained the elucidation. At the end of this sub-
process, 100 primary analyses were completed. This in effect formed the foundation of the 
analysis. She subsequently drew up and completed a second matrix per period and per 
indicator for the report to the auditor. Per indicator, the rows of this grid included the numbers 
of the meetings; the columns contained the following: 1) what did physicians learn? 2) a 
quotation from the recorded lessons learned and 3) interpretation and analysis. Furthermore, 
she indicated when no learning point about (the indicator of) practical wisdom had been found 
and also specified whether the indicator was latent (implicit) or manifest (explicit). At the end 
of the second sub-process 4 analyses (one per period) were completed. After the data had 
been revised in this way, the auditor indicated which sample of the data she wanted to inspect 
meticulously (a random selection of five from every period, of which she examined the 
underlying data and codings). The auditor assessed the quality of the interpretations and 
analysis of this sample using the criteria of visibility, comprehensibility and acceptability. 
After the first two meetings, auditor and auditee decided that, based on the remarks made with 
regard to reliability, the interpretation and analysis had to be adapted. This implied that the 
auditee had to repeat the interpretation process of 100 cases and complete it with a more 
extensive substantiation, in which she also more precisely outlined the relationship with 
publications on practical wisdom. The auditor gave a positive assessment of the second result. 
She also considered the sample to be sufficiently representative of the whole material. She 
then wrote a final report in which she rated the quality of the interpretations and analysis as 
good. In this way validation of the research outcomes was achieved. 
For the second research question, on the impact analysis, the first researcher again drew up a 
grid, with the numbers of the meetings as rows and with the following columns: ‘proposal for 
change of structure’, ‘proposal for modification of culture’, and ‘realization of structural 
adjustment’, and ‘realization of cultural change’. She then analyzed the data again and marked 
the lessons, where an initiative for structural change or cultural modification had been 
mentioned explicitly. Wherever she found this kind of initiative in three or more different 
reports, she added these to a list. She subsequently verified whether, and if so, when the 
initiatives of this list had been realized, using available documents and annual reports, and  by 
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checking this with physicians and management. She also made an evaluation of the relative 
influence that patient discussions had on the realization in addition to other influences. To 
judge the content and the quality of this impact analysis, which is an individual interpretation 
again, she used the tool of ‘peer debriefing’ (Janesick, 2015): six medical specialists, who had 
all been members of the medical staff for years and had taken part in the discussions, 
critically discussed the preliminary analysis results with the researcher in a focus group and 
proposed changes. The outcomes were then adjusted according to these recommendations. 
We will now describe the results of the two analyses in the section below; we will reflect on 
these outcomes in the next section.  
 
Results 
First research question; lessons about practical wisdom. Some quantitative results of the 
question: ‘can we demonstrate that practical wisdom has been acquired through case 
discussions in medical practices?’ are given in table 1. It shows the time frame per period, the 
number of discussions in the four periods, and the lessons learned about an indicator of 
practical wisdom per period. We distinguished the following possible results: no learning 
point; implicit (latent content) or explicit (manifest content) learning point. Although lessons 
were learned from every meeting, this did not always involve the learning of practical 
wisdom. For example: in case 1 the only outcome that was recorded were arrangements to 
improve requests for and communication about X-rays. We assigned the code ‘implicit 
learning’ if ‘awareness’ of any of the indicators of practical wisdom was perceived (the 
accuracy of the interpretation was assessed by the auditor), but the indicator as such had not 
been mentioned. For example: the record of case 25 indicates: “All medical specialists need to 
be alert to the nutritional condition of their patients.” This means that the practitioners have 
become aware that the nutritional condition of the patient has to be part of their professional 
judgment. We assigned the code ‘explicit learning’ whenever the indicator (for instance 
finding a balance) had literally been mentioned in the recorded lessons learned. For example: 
the records for case 22 contained the following comment: “We also have to be aware that, 
mainly for a vulnerable elderly person, balances can be very easily upset. Therefore, they 




Period No. Telos Balance Judgement Reflection 
  yes exp imp yes exp imp yes exp imp yes exp imp 
1: 01/2005 to 10/2006 17 7 4 3 11 2 9 10 4 6 14 9 5 
2: 11/2006 to 06/2010 33 25 19 6 13 13 0 24 10 14 25 18 7 
3: 09/2010 to 10/2013 25 16 10 6 13 4 9 16 8 8 24 14 10 
4: 11/2013 to 06/2016 25 13 12 1 13 4 9 16 6 10 20 15 5 
01/2005 to 06/2016           100 61 45 16 50 23 27 66 28 38 83 56 27 
 
Table 1: Learning practical wisdom; numbers. 
What did the physicians learn about telos? From the content analysis of the lessons 
specified it appears that the physicians learned about three aspects of telos. 
1. They pointed out distinctive characteristics of the patient telos in their daily practices: 
In period 1: that goals are not static, but change; furthermore, that there are always a 
number of different perspectives on the goal that was to be achieved; besides, that 
good patient care requires determining an integrated purpose (to treat the patient, not 
the disease), so that sub goals have to be adjusted to that integrated goal when a 
number of disciplines are involved. 
In period 2: that in addition to the treatment goal, the telos also involves determining 
what kind of care the patient needs after leaving hospital. 
In period 3: that the telos also concerns care for the patient’s next of kin. Furthermore, 
that ‘doing no harm’ means that physicians are co-responsible for the prevention of 
risk, e.g. of delirium, falling, malnutrition. Finally, that meaningful treatment will 
sometimes imply that the aim has to be restricted, or that a palliative instead of a 
curative goal has to be agreed. 
In period 4: that the purpose must always be determined for the patient as a person 
and not only with regard to the disease. 
2. The physicians also learned about the conditions which enable them to act 
purposively.  
In period 1: that it is a condition to consult with colleagues and with patients and their 
relatives. 
In period 2: that it is a condition to determine the scope of the purpose in time: 
curative (aimed at healing) or palliative (when healing is not possible, to live as best as 
possible with the illness, in hospital or elsewhere). Furthermore, that instrumental sub 
goals have to be related to the overall aim of the interventions. 
In period 3: that caregivers must always agree with patients and their next of kin on 
treatment constraints, as well as on the decision to start palliative care. 
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In period 4: that caregivers were able to prevent a breach of trust by allowing their 
patient to experience that she is not left alone when healing is no longer believed to be 
possible. Finally, that building a professional relationship with the patient is a 
condition to ensure that aims are well attuned to the patient. 
3. The physicians have gave each other tips and advice about acting purposively: 
In period 1: none. 
In period 2: on how the goal of an examination, treatment or admission to hospital can 
be coordinated for patients who suffer from dementia.  
In period 3: on how to discuss the transition from curative to palliative care. 
In period 4: again tips determining the objective for specific difficulties, for instance 
patients who are not approachable, or patients with complaints for which no somatic 
cause can be found. 
 
Lessons about balance. What did the physicians learn about balance? 
1. The content analysis shows that awareness about the need for balance, equilibrium, 
proportionality in giving medical care arose in the discussions as well as awareness of 
characteristics of the art of balancing linked to many examples. It is often a matter of 
specific issues, which also involve good craftsmanship.  
In period 1, the concept of proportionality was discussed in a case in which the 
diagnosis required for treatment could not initially be made. Other examples that were 
discussed included: the balance between optimal treatment (to remove a kidney) and 
its harmful consequences (dialysis for a vulnerable patient); the balance between heart 
decompensation by fluid overload (in an elderly patient with symptoms of dehydration 
and heart failure) and dehydration due to shortage of fluid; the balance between the 
application of legal rules (discuss all possible complications of an intervention 
beforehand) and what is feasible (available time and the patient’s understanding).  
In period 2: balance was discussed using further examples: anti-coagulation 
medication for immobilized patients who have to undergo surgery where there is a risk 
of great loss of blood; the patient’s autonomy (what does the patient want?) versus the 
physician’s expert advice (what is feasible and beneficial); the balance between 
professional (what is good care here and now?) and institutional responsibility 
(prevention of hospital infections); between specialist and general care.  
In period 3: the right balance between too quick and too slow came up (timing); 
between confidentiality (on account of the patient’s privacy) and a public interest 
(security); between a feasible curative treatment and its side effects; between a 
palliative goal and diagnostics or treatment still meaningful. A quote from the lessons 
of case 59 can illustrate this: “When patients are at a palliative stage of their illness. . 
it must be ensured that care does not result in over-diagnosis and over- treatment.” 
In period 4: the following examples were addressed: finding a balance between using 
(perhaps superfluous) diagnostics for a persistent patient and the time-consuming 
work of reassuring the patient (and time is always short); looking for balance between 
increasing patient-complexity and further specialization of medical care, i.e. between 
an integral goal and specialist sub goals; the balance between measures that constrain 
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freedom of movement, which limit the risk of falling, and omitting them out, allowing 
the patient to move freely, accepting an increased risk of falling with possibly serious 
consequences. 
2. The physicians also gave each other tips on how to practice the art of balancing, for 
instance: 
In period 3: how to find the middle ground between too much and too little diagnostics 
for patients with physical-complaints-that-supposedly-have-no-physical-basis; or how 
to prevent over-diagnosis in the palliative stage. 
In period 4: how to involve patients and relatives when taking measures to limit 
freedom or not (see above). 
 
Learning to judge well. What did the physicians learn about judging well? 
1. The physicians learned what good medical judgement involves. 
In period 1: that judging is often plural: for instance, the evaluation of the need and 
feasibility of an operation (surgery on medical grounds) alongside assessment of the 
patient’s operability (determining the risks of surgery). 
In period 2: they learned that judging medically also means to evaluate the risks that a 
patient runs and how to prevent them; that judgement should be comprehensive 
(multiple): it is not only diagnosis and suitable treatment, but also the patient’s 
nutritional condition; her legal capacity; the quality of the communication; subtle 
signs of improvement or deterioration; the organizational situation (are there enough 
intensive care beds? Is an operation theatre available? Are there sufficient qualified 
nurses?) 
In period 3, the physicians discussed that they need to evaluate what is (still) 
meaningful to do. 
2. The physicians learned what the conditions are for reaching good judgement. 
In period 1: that co-operation with other disciplines is essential to arrive at a balanced 
judgement. To give an example from case 8: “An acute abdomen in children often 
presents minor symptoms. To prevent diagnostic failures, it is advisable to have a 
child with acute abdomen examined by a pediatrician and surgeon jointly.” 
In period 2: that it is necessary for a good diagnosis to involve a multitude of epistemic 
sources: i.e. scientific knowledge, the knowledge of other professionals, the patient’s 
knowledge and that of her relatives or caregivers, knowledge from observations with 
all senses, medical intuition. 
In period 3: that multidisciplinary work is necessary for good judgement, e.g. when 
judging the operability of complex patients; furthermore, that it is necessary to call for 
an expert when physicians notice a certain lack of expertise. In case 59, the 
importance of observation of the patient by the consultant in person was emphasized 
(after admission by an emergency physician): “The medical specialist who is 
ultimately responsible has to make her own judgement about the patient by seeing the 
patient herself, preferably within twelve hours, but no later than sixteen hours after 
admission.” 
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In period 4: the following conditions were identified: adequate knowledge of facts 
(evidence); interpreting guidelines situationally; involving experts and/or organizing 
training for new or unknown techniques so as to be able to estimate risks; to engage 
intuition; to discern prejudices; to know the patient’s competence in emergency 
situations.  
3. Finally, the physicians gave each other tips and advice about ways to reach a good 
judgement. 
In period 1: they discussed how to avoid various pitfalls in forming medical 
judgement (for instance deciding too soon that there is an obvious pattern). 
In period 2: about what to do when judging is difficult; how to manage emotions, 
because fierce emotions can obscure correct judgement; that, when patients are 
difficult to ‘read’, more experienced colleagues can be called for assistance, e.g. a 
geriatrician or a specialist for mentally disabled patients. They warned each other 
against the pitfall of incorrect assumptions or interpretation of the facts. 
In period 3: the doctors discussed the advice to unfold the concept of medical 
meaninglessness into three sub concepts: without medical prospects (no or little 
chance of success), disproportional (the advantages of the treatment are outweighed 
by the cost, the risks or the investments) and undesirable (the result that can be 
achieved, is desired neither by the patient nor by the physician). 
In period 4: the following advices were given: to engage in dialog with the patient 
repeatedly and peacefully; to examine the patient several times at intervals; to 
communicate structurally (through an acknowledged method) with other caregivers; to 
step out of existing routines; to engage the patient’s relatives. To give a quotation from 
case 96: “For a realistic medical judgement of the physical condition of a confused 
patient who is suffering from dementia or of a disabled patient with loss of 
consciousness and to be able to compare it with the patient’s condition before she 
became ill, engage with the relatives!” 
Learning to reflect. The largest number of learning points concerned the issue of learning to 
reflect. Although the discussions were aimed at learning by joint reflection, reflection did not 
always occur. We noted ‘implicit learning’ when the physicians had learned to reflect by 
practicing reflection according to the features ‘careful listening, balancing options, sharing 
perspectives, critically reconsidering the morality of actions’ were met, but without naming it 
explicitly in the recorded lessons. Again, the accuracy of the interpretation was assessed in the 
audit. Below, we will use three questions to address reflection that was explicitly mentioned. 
We discuss ‘reflexivity’ under 3 below. 
1. The physicians gave the following answers to the question as to what the 
characteristics of good reflection are. 
In period 1: good reflection leads to new and broader understanding, it helps to 
distinguish pitfalls in thinking. 
Period 2: good reflection is characterized by an open exchange of opinions, during 
which the attendants listen carefully and try to understand other approaches; the 
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participants in the discussion complement each other and find the tranquility to 
deliberate on the best treatment options. 
Period 3: the physicians learned that reflection does not always produce solutions, but 
instead that it can bring problems into focus; reflection is helpful to judge one’s own 
actions and those of colleagues in a positively critical way, because this can reveal 
weak points; reflection has to be goal-oriented, i.e. aimed at what needs to be 
achieved for and with the patient. To give a quotation from case 74: “The valuable 
thing about the consultations is the exchange of approaches between a number of 
disciplines. . . . Its value consists, among other things, in ‘taking time to think about 
the patient together.” 
Period 4: A new lesson was that good reflection consists of ‘thinking beyond the 
surface.’ 
2. When is reflection especially required during work?  
Period 1: for complex patients, i.e. patients with multi-morbidity. 
Period 2: When the work situation is disrupted, for instance by unexpected findings; 
when unusual situations occur, e.g. when treating a colleague; when the professional 
relationship of trust is harmed; when something out of the ordinary is observed, for 
instance a strangely high dose of medicine; when serious or constantly increasing 
concerns are expressed by relatives or nurses. 
Period 3: the physicians realized that reflection is required during transitions of care, 
for instance the transfer of a complex patient to another department, to the 
responsibility of another medical specialist or to another institution, as well as the 
transition from a curative to a palliative plan. 
Period 4: the physicians indicated that reflection is necessary when patients in the 
final stage of life are referred to hospital. 
3. We have looked for examples of reflexivity according to Kinsella (2012) and Iedema 
(2011, p. i83): “ a more broad-ranging attention to everyday behaviours that are taken 
as given” so that these behaviors (and underlying assumptions), as well as ingrained 
habits and routines can be criticized and changed.  
In period 1: things that are taken for granted, ingrained habits, discursive assumptions 
were named eight times and on one occasion a proposition for change was presented: 
for patients with light cranial damage and using anti-coagulant medication. 
In period 2: reflexivity was observed on 20 occasions. Thus, the insight arose that the 
established practice of making rounds was unable to assure continuity of care. Case 
36: “Continuity in making rounds is of great importance. Continuity can be reached in 
various ways”. In addition, on several occasions attention was asked for the 
importance of discussing and registering treatment-restrictions. 
In period 3: the practitioners themselves achieved reflexivity on eleven occasions, for 
instance by giving the concept of ‘the specialist who bears ultimate responsibility’ a 
broader meaning, by discussing the risks of extreme specialization (and how to 
compensate for these), and finally, by critically inspecting the standard practice for 
patients in their final stage. For example case 72: “a peaceful conversation with the 
patient is necessary to take a well-considered decision at the palliative, terminal 
stage.” 
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In period 4: the physicians achieved reflexivity on nine occasions, which led to the 
insight that almost all patients are surrounded by a large group of caregivers, and that 
this requires regular multidisciplinary consultations as well as the creation of 
structures for this process.  
Most of the time, reflexivity means triple-loop learning and it has had a 
significant impact on the practices and on hospital organization. We will discuss this 
in the answers to the second research question. 
 
 
The second research question 
The question, ‘can we demonstrate the impact of the practical wisdom acquired on physicians, 
on medical practices, and on hospital organization’, implies an evaluation study, or more 
precisely, an impact study. This kind of evaluation study aims to assess the effects resulting 
from the case discussions in the long term (Patton 2002). The effects in question are both 
objectifiable, structural changes and qualitative, cultural changes. As there are many other 
influencing factors at play in this complex work environment, it is difficult to determine the 
isolated influence of this special factor (the practical wisdom acquired through the case 
discussions). It was nevertheless possible to identify occasions, where case discussions 
exerted an important or decisive influence. 
As we did not observe individual practitioners, we were not able to verify the impact 
of the discussions on individual professionals. By contrast, we were able to identify the 
impact on practices and on hospital organization. 
Impact on the structure of practices and organization. Table 2 illustrates the work-up of 
one of the results of the impact analysis. In the same way, nine initiatives for structural 





Initiative structure Realizing structure 
1.03 Organize pre-operative multi-disciplinary consultations 
(MDCs) about complex operation patients 
 
1.06 Communicate the outcome of the MDC with patients and their 
families 
Pre-operative MDC begun in 
2007 
2.37 For complex surgery patients discuss a) indication for 
operation and b) operability of the patient in the MDC 
 
2.41 Fine-tuning of the registration criteria for MDC is necessary Evaluation and adjustment of 
MDC structure in 2013 
2.46 Sign up the right patients for the pre-operative MDC: defining 
criteria 
 
3.55 What information is required when a case is submitted for 
discussion in the MDC? 
Evaluation and adjustment of 
MDC procedure in 2016 
3.62 All patients for whom the physician expects pre-operative 
problems, can be discussed 
 
 
Table 2: The impact of the case discussions on practical wisdom, translated into the structure of 
practices. Example: the pre-operative multi-disciplinary consultation (MDC) about complex patients. 
We have distinguished nine initiatives for structural changes and have validated them 
in the focus group: 
1. Establish a pre-operative multi-disciplinary consultation to make it possible to balance 
the risks of an operation for complex surgery patients compared with the surgery 
indication and to look together for opportunities to reduce the risks, or to find a 
feasible alternative for the operation (1.03; 1.06; 2.37; 2.41; 2.46; 3.55; 3.62). 
2. Define who is a vulnerable elderly person, and make more adequate provisions for 
care for vulnerable elderly people (1.05; 3.74; 4.94). 
3. Organize regular consultations between clinicians and radiologists and develop 
structural agreements about mutual communication (2.21; 2.23; 2.28; 4.82). 
4. Organize routine deliberations about treatment limitations for certain categories of 
patients (2.22; 2.46; 2.48; 3.70; 3.74). 
5. Improve internal and external transfers: preferably, both oral and written; warm (oral 
and including subjective factors) and cold (written, concentrated on objectifiable 
data); including information from all disciplines involved; punctual and complete 
(1.06; 2.26; 3.52; 3.53; 3.67; 4.92; 4.94; 4.98). 
6. Discuss, at least with the patient and her relatives, the transition from curative to 
palliative care, providing reasons, and record this in the patient’s file. (2.32; 3.59; 
3.60; 3.71). 
PROFESSIONAL WORKPLACE-LEARNING. CAN PRACTICAL WISDOM BE LEARNED? 91
5
7. Record what is regarded as medically meaningless, and provide reasons for this in the 
patient’s file (2.40; 2.44; 3.70). 
8. Appoint a so-called doctor-case manager for complex patients and describe her tasks 
(2.32; 2.38; 3.72; 3.75; 4.81); moreover, define a broader job description for the 
medical specialist who bears final responsibility (1.07; 1.17; 2.25; 2.38; 3.54). 
9. Always establish a differential diagnosis for every patient and make a problem list 
(3.52; 3.59; 3.68; 3.69; 4.9). 
 
Realization of propositions for structural change. The following propositions for structural 
changes were realized; this has been validated in the focus group. 
1. In 2007, the multidisciplinary pre-operative consultations started. They were 
evaluated by the medical staff in 2013 and 2016, after several interim adaptations. The 
conclusion of these evaluations was that the consultations had led to decisions which 
had improved the patients’ safety and wellbeing. (Operations were sometimes 
postponed to limit risks, on other occasions additional pre-operative measures were 
taken, and occasionally the operation was replaced by a less stressful non-operative 
treatment). It has been acknowledged that the motivation and culture which enabled 
these effective consultations arose as a result of the case discussions. However, there 
were also several local and national initiatives which led to bilateral pre-operative 
consultations. 
2. Care for vulnerable elderly persons has improved in this hospital, especially because 
the group-specific risks that apply to elderly people are now structurally evaluated and 
reduced, a major focus for all physicians involved. This was also due to the presence 
of clinical geriatricians, the formation of a regional work group on ‘vulnerable elderly 
people’, and national developments. The case discussions made a clear contribution. 
3. In 2008, nearly all professional groups of clinicians organized periodical consultations 
with the radiology group and this has since been continued. There have since also 
been daily consultations between radiologists, emergency physicians, and trauma 
specialists. In addition, many complementary agreements were effectuated to assure 
better contact between clinicians and radiologists about imaging investigations. Case 
discussions as well as other factors played a role in this development. 
4. In 2010, a procedure for structural discussion about treatment limits was introduced 
which has since been evaluated and adapted on several occasions. The influence of the 
case discussions was substantial. 
5. The improvement of the structure and content of transfers was successful in several 
parts of the hospital (for example in the Emergency Department), because of the 
constant attention given to this subject during the case discussions, although its 
influence was limited here. 
6. Discussion and marking of the transition from curative to palliative care is improving, 
but it does not always take place when it is needed. The discussions are certainly 
having some influence, but other influences are also at play here. 
7. The same is true for defining, on the basis of arguments what is regarded as medically 
pointless, especially in medical files. 
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8. The emphasis on the need for a single doctor to have overall control in complex cases 
who need to be approached from both a specialist and generalist perspective has 
resulted in establishing a training program for ‘hospital specialists’ in this hospital. 
9. The inclusion of the problem list in the design of a new electronic patient record 
(introduction October 2016) was partly due to the case discussions. 
 
Seven initiatives for cultural modifications were distinguished. 
1. Regard the use of medical intuition or gut feeling as acceptable and meaningful (2.37; 
2.38; 2.49; 4.77). 
2. Doctors of different specialisms should help and support each other to overcome 
difficulties they experience when practicing (1.12; 2.24; 2.28; 2.42; 3.63; 3.65). 
3. Take steps to better identify and prevent the pitfalls of medical work, such as the 
inclination to develop ‘tunnel vision’, or to start from assumptions that are taken for 
granted (3.51; 3.53; 3.68; 4.90; 4.91; 4.99). 
4. Medical specialists must ensure proper care, especially with complex patients, not 
only in a specialist sense, but also in a general sense (2.43; 3.56;3.69). They should 
not only treat the illness of an organ, but the person as a whole (1.15; 2.18; 2.43; 
3.56).  
5. Physicians’ responsibility does not only include informing and supporting the patient, 
but also her next-of-kin (1.06; 2.32; 2.35; 2.49; 4.88; 4.96). It also includes care after 
leaving hospital (1.7; 2.41; 2.43). 
6. Determine the goal, sense, and limits of the treatment for every patient (2.22; 2.35; 
2.46). 
7. Promote good cooperation in teams, especially in complex cases (2.27; 2.38; 3.59; 
3.75; 4.81; 4.97). Transparency and safety, which are essential for good co-operation, 
have to be created actively and mutually (1.11; 2.21; 2.50; 4.83). 
 
Table 3 reflects the second initiative for cultural modification. 
Discussion no. Initiative culture Result for the culture 
1.12 Clinicians have to help each other to find the 
right diagnosis 
 
2.24 ED-specialists need feedback, supervision 
and support from other professionals 
 
2.28 Give each other tips and cooperate with each 
other, also with the GP, in particular for 
patients with unexplained complaints 
 
2.42 In case of unexpected and large problems: 
take a time out and ask colleagues for help 
A culture of assistance in working together 
gradually developed, replacing an 
indifferent  or competitive culture 
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3.63 A physician used this meeting to ask his 
colleagues for advice 
 
3.65 Help each other when someone has to 
engage in a difficult conversation; if 
appropriate, prepare or have the 
conversation together 
 
4.88 When a case has been traumatic, take care 
of the patient/family and of your colleagues 
and listen … 
 
 
Table 3: The impact of case discussions on a culture of co-operation 
 
Realization of cultural modifications. Cultural shifts are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, 
the focus group stated that precisely cultural modifications facilitated structural changes. As a 
result of the case discussions, physicians were able to achieve a culture which makes it safe 
for them to openly deliberate about mistakes and uncertainties. Due to the discussions, greater 
awareness has arisen of medical pitfalls and of the “uncertainty of aporia . . . the unresolvable 
problematics of practice” (Pitman, 2012, p. 141), in which physicians have to ensure that they 
support each other, including exchanging advice and tips. They have practiced and learned 
how to reflect together during the deliberations. It has become accepted to mention medical 
intuition. Physicians have realized that they have to involve the patient’s next of kin in 
diagnostics, treatment and care. Fueled by the case discussions, the awareness that specialized 
health care cannot offer general care has led to the decision to train hospital specialists in this 
hospital (realized in 2015). In addition, the physicians have become more aware of sensitive 
issues, which they have learned to discuss tactfully on a regular basis. These conclusions have 
been confirmed by the focus group. 
 
Discussion 
We will now return to the problem outlined in the introduction: do practicing medical 
professionals only learn practical wisdom individually through practicing, which results in 
tacit knowledge as Kemmis (2012) and Kinghorn (2010) have argued? Or, conversely, do 
they also learn practical wisdom through case discussions in groups that pursue joint 
reflection on patient cases, resulting in explicit, distributed knowledge? Hence, is social 
learning as well as individual learning involved? (Iedema et al., 2013; Kinsella & Pitman, 
2012; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka & Toyama, 2007). 
We have translated this problem in our research questions, of which the first is: can we 
demonstrate that physicians learn practical wisdom through case discussions which are 
focused on a general learning objective? We may ask as two separate questions: does the 
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development of practical wisdom occur, and how can we demonstrate the development of 
practical wisdom? 
We have already indicated that no individual learning effects can be deduced from the 
research data. We will therefore discuss the results regarding the social learning of practical 
wisdom, i.e. the accumulation of knowledge, understanding and capabilities as distributed 
intelligence, shared by the group of physicians. 
Even though the discussions were never explicitly focused on learning practical 
wisdom, yet it is clear from the results that social learning of practical wisdom, as examined 
using the four indicators, occurred, partly implicitly, partly explicitly. Below, we will 
demonstrate that practical wisdom has developed. 
Firstly, the research data show an increased and shared awareness of purposes linked 
to individual patients-in-their-situation, as well as to the moral aim (the telos) of medical 
practice. We recognized the increase by the more frequent, more critical, more thorough 
approximation of patient purposes related to the telos of the practice in the recorded lessons 
learned. The validity of our interpretations was assessed in the audit procedure. The 
awareness also concerns the fact that patient goals are pluralistic and time dependent. 
Examples are: “the goal ‘doing no harm’ also means that physicians are co-responsible for the 
prevention of numerous risks, e.g. of delirium, falling and malnutrition”; also, that “there is a 
time for curative and a time for palliative goals”. The ‘social’ of knowledge and capabilities 
was evidenced by the physicians giving each other tips and advice; in this way they facilitated 
that colleagues learned ‘doing the telos’ (praxis). Examples are: tips on how to discuss the 
transition from curative to palliative care, or how to determine goals for patients suffering 
from dementia. 
Secondly, and in the same way, we recognized that awareness has increased of the art 
of balancing physicians practice in a continuous search for a feasible balance between 
apparently incompatible, very specific interests and for proportionality in their interventions. 
These results were also assessed by the auditor. Also the ‘doing of balance’ was facilitated 
through the discussions and the lessons retained from them, by the tips physicians shared. For 
instance: how to involve patients and relatives when taking measures to limit freedom or not. 
Thirdly, an increased awareness emerged of the art and necessity of judging amid the 
many daily uncertainties of practicing (insufficient knowledge, unsuitable guidelines, 
impossibility of verbal communication with the patient) while more often than not urgent 
action is needed. We saw that in the first periods physicians presupposed that diagnostic and 
treatment decisions had to be based on objectifiable criteria and guidelines. Later on, they 
recognized that daily uncertainties were ubiquitous and unavoidable. Then they started to use 
and discuss numerous other knowledge sources, like medical intuition. Again, we see here an 
example of distributed intelligence. Furthermore, they gave each other advice about 
improving judgments. For example: how to avoid various pitfalls (deciding too soon that there 
is an obvious pattern). These are examples of first and second loop learning: learning new 
conduct from the observation of others; learning to understand material and cognitive 
schemes which determine actions. 
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Finally, the physicians learned to practice the art of reflection, especially by 
repeatedly practicing reflecting together, thus realizing a deliberative practice according to 
Van de Wiel and Van den Bossche , (2013). We concluded that reflection occurred and 
improved, by using criteria like: carefully listening, balancing options, sharing perspectives 
and critically reconsidering the morality (the good) of actions. This was referred from the 
recorded lessons, confirmed by the experiences of the first researcher and affirmed by the 
members of the focus group. Moreover, the practitioners learned to practice reflexivity, i.e. 
they became able to make explicit, and to criticize their own hidden convictions and 
assumptions, the taken for granted, routines. For instance, the assumption that professional 
care is only meant for the patient and not for her next of kin; or, that physicians have no 
further role to play when all treatment options for a patient have been ‘exhausted’. This is an 
example of triple-loop learning, which resulted in physicians’ increased capability to actively 
reflect together. 
In addition to increased awareness of the components of practical wisdom and 
increased reflexive capability, the case discussions resulted in the acknowledgement that the 
components of practical wisdom are all very concrete and therefore manageable. Balancing 
and judging, determining goals and reflecting appeared to occur in various daily and situation-
dependent forms. The discussions led to recognition of the four components in these mundane 
forms, so that the morality of the practices could also emerge in multiform, seemingly trivial 
shapes: postponing an operation to help the patient prepare better for the risks she was likely 
to run; deciding not to apply freedom constraints to prevent falling, because the disadvantages 
of constraints for a specific patient are disproportionate to that risk. 
The second research question: can we demonstrate the impact of the practical wisdom 
learned on the individual physician’s actions, on the practices an on the context of the practice 
has been answered through the impact analysis. Again, it was not possible to observe 
individual learning effects. The social learning has partly been discussed above; furthermore, 
it appeared from the impact analysis. Practical wisdom turned out to have ‘crystallized’ in the 
physicians’ mores (Bontemps et al., 2019). To clarify this, we refer to the practice of 
supporting each other to overcome difficulties experienced while practicing (initiative culture 
2); also shared actions to prevent pitfalls of medical thinking (initiative culture 3) illustrate 
social learning. However, we recognize that the impact of the case discussions predominantly 
reveals organizational learning (Schwarz, 2011; Vriens, Achterbergh & Gulpers, 2016). 
Structures and culture of the hospital changed as a result of the case discussions, but these 
changes were also initiated or supported by other, internal-institutional and external factors. 
Examples are: the structural pre-operative multi-disciplinary consultations for complex 
patients, and a procedure for structural discussion about treatment limitations. In addition, its 
impact also applies to the organizational culture where opportunities develop, difficulties can 
be faced and made the subject of discussion, like flaws in cooperation and organization. 
We recognize several forms of social and organizational learning, mentioned by 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) in this study: socialization – acquiring tacit knowledge from 
tacit knowledge of a colleague, (physicians reflecting during case discussions act as role 
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models for their colleagues) and externalization – transforming tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge (how to discuss incompatible goals with patients, thus preventing a conflict).  
We have been able to demonstrate that learning practical wisdom in practices can 
really be promoted through case discussions aimed at learning-in-general. Our assumption is 
that this learning is likely to produce even better results if discussions are explicitly aimed at 
learning practical wisdom. This assumption is based on the publications of Iedema et al., 
(2013) and of Nonaka and Toyama (2007). These authors have proven that practical wisdom 
is learned mainly through the promotion of reflection and reflexivity by practitioners 
throughout organizations. In that way, they have argued, practical wisdom can be transferred 
from the tacit to the explicit domain. This means, that organizations should create ‘spaces’ 
and time for shared reflections on all details of real and actual actions and experiences. Also, 
Eikeland (2006) has argued for the introduction of ‘free space’ for practitioners to share their 
practical knowledge and to create shared practical wisdom.  
This also means that health care organizations like hospitals, as Eikeland (2006); 
Eikeland and Nicolini (2011); Kinsella and Pitman (2012) and Nonaka and Toyama (2007) 
have stated, would have to rely on kinds of knowledge that are different from those they 
adhere to currently. That means: they will have to trust knowledge from within professional 
practices, experiential and tacit knowledge instead of exclusively codifiable, measurable, or 
explicit knowledge. During our research, we perceived that learning practical wisdom is a 
fragile type of learning that can be easily disturbed. That is not only because of the hectic and 
complexity of the professional work-environment; also the disqualification of experiential and 
tacit knowledge plays a role here.  
Finally, a remark is in order about the generalizability of the results. Our aspiration in 
carrying out this qualitative, descriptive-explorative study was only to realize communicative 
generalizability or transferability (Smaling, 2009a; Timmerman, Vosman & Baart, 2019). 
This means that the reader herself has to determine whether the results can be transferred to 
her situation. A supplementary question regards the transferability to other professional 
domains. Kristjánsson (2015) has pointed to the scientific and the professional realms in 
which practical wisdom is studied extensively nowadays. He mentions philosophy, socio-
political theory and psychology, and in addition nursing, law, business/management, social 
work, teaching and medicine. We don’t feel able to estimate the possible impact of this study 
on some of those other professions. However, we assume that developing practical wisdom 
through the facilitation of joint reflection on everyday problems and situations by 
practitioners, would apply for other professions too. 
Conclusions 
Our study has proven that it is in fact possible for medical professionals to learn practical 
wisdom, mainly implicitly, through collective case discussions aimed at learning in general. 
We have been able to demonstrate this for social learning and for organizational learning. The 
primary effect is greater awareness of the constituent components of the practical wisdom that 
we have studied: to recognize purpose/morality, finding balance, judging sensibly, reflection 
and reflexivity. In addition, the acquired knowledge and understanding may establish an 
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increased capability to enact (the elements of) practical wisdom in everyday work; in this way 
the intrinsic morality of practices can increase: enacting what is good for each patient. This 
outcome underlines the point of view of scholars who have emphasized the importance of 
professionals’ joint reflection for learning practical wisdom (Iedema et al., 2013; Kinsella & 
Pitman, 2012). Based on the remark in the discussion section, we expect that the learning 
effect would be even greater, if practical wisdom is agreed on as the goal of case discussions. 
This latter point would need further research. In the same way, further study is required of the 
practitioners’ individual learning through discussions like these. Finally, it has proven to be 
important to further investigate the conditions for this type of learning in organizations. 
We have succeeded in identifying the impact of the lessons learned on the structure 
and the culture of practices and organization. The impact identified has been validated in a 
focus group of participating physicians and was considered significant. 
The relevance of this research for everyday medical practices results from the fact, 
that it was the first time that an empirical investigation into learning practical wisdom in 
medical practices was performed in one organization and over such a long period. As a 
consequence, we were able to determine that (the aspects of) practical wisdom in these daily 
practices emerges in very concrete, seemingly commonplace and situation-specific forms. In 
addition, we saw morality emerge in multiple details and in unexpected, strongly 
individualized and clearly localized facts. These commonplace particularities should influence 
current theories on practical wisdom. For physicians in medical practices understanding of 
these everyday forms is vital to making practical wisdom and morality manageable, and to 
make it the subject of discussions and reflections. This can stimulate the development of 
practical wisdom, which can in turn enable the realization of increasingly better care for 











“I must endure the presence of a few caterpillars
if I wish to become acquainted with the butterflies”.
Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, The Little Prince
Chapter 6
Marij C. Bontemps-Hommen, Andries J. Baart, Frans J.H. Vosman. (2020). Health 
Care Analysis, 28(2), 137-157.
Professional medical discourse and 
the emergence of practical wisdom in 




In recent publications has been argued that practical wisdom is increasingly important for 
medical practices, particularly in complex contexts, to stay focused on giving good care in a 
moral sense to each individual patient. Our empirical investigation into an ordinary medical 
practice was aimed at exploring whether the practice would reveal practical wisdom, or, 
instead, adherence to conventional frames such as guidelines, routines and the dominant 
professional discourse. We performed a thematic analysis both of the medical files of a 
complex patient and her daughter’s diary. We did find practical wisdom, but only 
sporadically, whereas it has proved to be essential for professional care. This deficit appeared 
to result from several factors like the organization of the practice; established routines; a 
hierarchical culture; and a traditional medical discourse. Moreover, we discerned various 
negative consequences. More empirical research into practical wisdom in everyday medical 
practices is needed for the benefit of professional and morally good care for every patient. 
 
Introduction  
Crucial yet invisible. Interest in practical wisdom - our translation of the Aristotelian 
phronesis - in medical practices and within the medical profession has increased over the past 
decades (Jordens & Little, 2004; Kaldjian, 2014; Kinghorn, 2010; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; 
Kotzee, Paton & Conroy, 2016; Kristjánsson, 2015; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Vosman 
& Baart, 2008). Some authors call practical wisdom indispensable, particularly in situations in 
which uncertainty, complexity and variability play a large role (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012). 
Conversely, other publications contend that practical wisdom is almost invisible in medical 
professional discourse and in professional education and assessments (Kinghorn, 2010; 
Kristjánsson, 2015). Besides, Kinsella and Pitman (2012) have argued: “Professionals in 
everyday practice are faced with an impossible bind: the need to decide on action in a context 
where the information available is incomplete, while operating within the dominant discourse 
of evidence-based practice, that assumes certainty is present” (Kinsella & Pitman, p. 167). 
Sellman has emphasized, as did Schön (1983, 1991) and Dunne (1993) before him, that 
professional organizations have narrowed the meaning of ‘professionalism’ to ‘technical 
rationality’ (Sellman, 2012). Kinghorn has called this “the technical project of modern 
medicine” (2010, p. 94), in which he believes practical wisdom does not play any role. Pitman 
has maintained, that healthcare organizations and supervisory authorities insufficiently value 
the relevance of practical wisdom; he has called them “hostile ground for growing phronesis” 
(Pitman, 2012, p. 131). 
Our questions. Our assumption is, that practical wisdom is in fact indispensable for 
modern medical practices, especially for the moral orientation of everyday actions. Modern 
discourses within health care and the medical profession do not seem to assign a significant 
place to practical wisdom, while they reduce morality to taking decisions in specific dilemmas 
(Kotzee et al., 2016; Kristjánsson, 2015). We argue that empirical research, as proposed by 
practice theory is required to clarify the role of practical wisdom in everyday practice. 
Practices are defined by Nicolini and Monteiro (2017) as “orderly, materially mediated doings 
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and sayings . . . and their aggregations.” We are interested in, how medical practitioners, in 
their practices, deal with the tensions related to practical wisdom that have been identified in 
various publications, and whether, and to what extent they establish a moral orientation 
(‘good care’): supporting sick and suffering patients in a meaningful way. We have therefore 
carried out a case study on the basis of medical files. In this article, we will use these files as a 
lens through which we observe both the everyday practice and the medical discourse. Our 
study was guided by three research questions: 
research question 1: What specific ratio is there in this case, within a medical practice 
in an institutionalized, complex context (the hospital), between a phronetic approach and a 
technical-systemic approach?    
research question 2: What influence does the dominant discourse exert on this ratio?  
 research question 3: What effects does the ratio observed have on the care actually given to 
the patient and her relatives, and also on the different professionals’ cooperation in the 
practice? 
Practical wisdom. Before we further develop our research questions by outlining a 
research plan, we will first indicate, how we define practical wisdom, in conjunction with the 
definitions proposed by a number of other authors. 
 Aristotle regarded phronesis as an intellectual virtue alongside the other intellectual virtues 
episteme (scientific knowledge) and techne (skill in making things – instrumental 
knowledge), and the moral virtues. He called it the ‘meta-virtue’ because, after his view, it 
guides and overarches the moral virtues and it determines their context-related value (Kinsella 
& Pitman, 2012; Kristjánsson, 2015). In addition, Aristotle has emphasized that praxis and 
phronesis are interdependent and reciprocally influence each other (Kemmis, 2012).  
Kaldjian (2014, p. 70) regards practical wisdom as: “a teleological approach to 
decision making focused on ends, bounded by moral principles, informed by concrete 
circumstances, and driven by the right kinds of motivation.” In addition to orientation to a 
moral goal, several authors (Higgs, 2012; Kaldjian, 2012; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; 
Montgomery, 2006) have pointed to the capacity to make clinically correct judgements as the 
core of practical wisdom in medicine. 
Our definition of practical wisdom is based on the Aristotelian concept, but it also 
takes into account that medical practices have essentially changed in current, late modern 
times. Current medical practices are characterized by complexity (De Bock, Willems & 
Weinstein, 2018; Sturmberg, 2018) and they are pervaded by institutional and societal 
influences (Hafferty & Levinson, 2008; Moore & Beadle, 2006). Consequently, we define 
practical wisdom as: the capability, which emerges in acting jointly within medical practices, 
of knowing how to remain focused on achieving the good for every individual patient, within 
the context of the practice and its telos, in ever-changing situations, and the capability of 
knowing how to accomplish this by the most appropriate means, while dealing with 
complexity and institutional and systemic pressure. 
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We will not elaborate on virtue ethics or on the various conceptual controversies about 
practical wisdom/phronesis in this article. This is because our investigation has primarily an 
empirical, not a theoretical aim. Against the backdrop of the distinction of first-order and 
second-order virtues, we have focused on practical wisdom, which, according to that 
distinction can be seen as a second-order virtue. In order to explore the role of practical 
wisdom in an average medical practice within an ordinary hospital we will use our definition 
as a working definition. 
Indicators. It is important for our study to specify what indicators can help to 
recognize practical wisdom in practices, and we will therefore now, describe the indicators we 
used: 1) The practice is oriented to the particular ‘telos’ to be achieved for the individual 
patient, which is also in line with the professional goal of the practice. (Kaldjian, 2014; 
Viafora, 1999). 2) The practice attunes care to patients in their specific context through 
variation and improvisation (Kinghorn, 2010; Timmerman & Baart, 2016). 3) The practice 
focuses on the patient’s concerns, as signposts that point to the goal to be achieved, using 
various sources of knowledge, including emotions and intuition (Mesman, 2002; Sayer, 2011; 
Stolper et al., 2011). 4) The practice reaches a balanced judgement on a patient’s condition 
and situation (Higgs, 2012; Kaldjian, 2014; Montgomery, 2006). 5) The practice builds and 
maintains a professional relationship with the patient (Van Eijsden, 2018; Van Heijst, 2005; 
Vosman & Baart, 2011). 6) The practice deals with complexity, uncertainty and systemic 
pressure, to accomplish good care for the patient (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012). 
By contrast, we consider the following as indicators of technical rationality: 1) a focus 
on procedures, guidelines, and directions; 2) operating in a routine manner and taking 
processes for granted; and 3) using predominantly evidence-based professional knowledge. 
Discourse. A second concept we need to define in advance is ‘discourse’. Some 
traditions regard discourse as a primarily linguistic entity, which needs to be analysed 
linguistically (Brown & Yule, 1983). However, we follow Shaw and Bailey (2004), Van den 
Berg (2004) and Jorgensen and Phillips (2002) in favoring a wider interpretation of 
‘discourse’. The latter authors have mentioned “a particular way of talking about and 
understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1). We 
see discourse as an interpretative framework, which represents a philosophy or a way of 
understanding reality that reflects how reality is constructed (Iedema, 2005; Nicolini & 
Monteiro, 2017; Van den Berg, 2004). Thus, a discourse is a way of structuring reality, which 
determines, what observations, knowledge, arguments etc. are thought to be relevant. A 
discourse also includes ideas about what the balance of power in a certain situation should be, 
and it reflects a dominant ideology (Fairclough, 2003; Foucault, 1980; Jorgensen & Phillips, 
2002; Van den Berg, 2004). The relationship between a discourse and its representatives (in 
this case physicians) is reciprocal: the physicians have been formed and continue to be formed 
by the dominant professional discourse, and they also communicate and personify it (Witman, 
2014). 
We will define and explain our qualitative empirical research method: a simple case 
study below, but we will, at first, summarize the case. 




Recapitulation of the case. In early October, a 68-year old woman is admitted to the 
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) of the hospital via the Emergency Department (ED). She is 
diagnosed with a cerebral hemorrhage, resulting from a burst aneurysm (a dilatation of a 
cerebral artery). From the moment of admission onward, her condition and prognosis are 
poor: she is aphasic (hardly able to speak); she has a hemiplegia; she is incontinent; she is no 
longer able to take care of herself, nor to walk or sit properly; she has trouble swallowing. 
After being admitted, the patient undergoes many operations: an external ventricular drain is 
inserted to drain the excess fluid from her head; the aneurysm is clipped; an internal 
ventricular drain is placed after numerous lumbar punctures. She is given many therapies, 
including physiotherapy, oral and intravenous drug therapy, speech therapy and tube feeding. 
A number of complications occur: accumulation of intracranial fluid; repeated dislocation of 
the jaw; respiratory infections with respiratory failure, whether or not by aspiration; a urinary 
tract infection; a pressure sore. She is re-admitted to the ICU on several occasions and is 
referred to the regular nursing ward each time she recovers. She is seen by 44 physicians. The 
relatives, in particular her husband and daughter, visit her every day and even spend the night 
in the hospital for some time during the first ICU-admission. In late December, she passes 
away relatively unexpectedly. 
Our investigation of this case took place within the context of an extensive research 
program, carried out in a Dutch general training hospital, and of a larger study within the 
neurology learning community (Baart & Vosman, 2015). The professionals within the 
learning community raised the case, because it had drawn their attention due to the 
unmanageable nature of the various problems that arose. At the same time, they pointed out, 
similar cases occur regularly. Many other cases were available in the research program 
mentioned above. We have searched for a patient case that was complex, in which 
multidisciplinary care had to be provided for a long period, of which documentation was 
complete and which could be studied along different lines. This patient case met all these 
criteria. Only during the investigation did we discover that it was also an exemplary case 
(Timmerman, Baart & Vosman, 2019). By choosing the method of a case study we follow 
Anderson, Crabtree, Steele & McDaniel (2005), Eikeland & Nicolini (2011) and Flyvbjerg 
(2006) in their rehabilitation of this research method. “The case study approach provides us 
with a strategy for studying integrated systems” (Anderson et al., p. 681). 
Research sources. Although we normally prefer direct observation of the caregivers’ 
dealings with their patients, this was not possible in this case, because the patient had passed 
away. We decided against conducting retrospective interviews with the people involved, 
because this might only reveal (possibly biased) explicit knowledge. Instead, we studied the 
complete medical files, on the premise that the files would reveal traces of implicit or tacit 
knowledge, as well as assumptions and truths that are taken-for-granted. The files might 
therefore better reflect the professionals’ discourse. Because the files contained daily reports, 
we were able to follow in detail what went on from day to day. 
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In addition to the daily medical reports the medical files included the records of the 
conversations with relatives; handover notes at transfers from one department to another; 
summaries of consultations among physicians and with other professionals; reports of 
additional examinations, surgery, and interventions; and letters to the General Practitioner 
(GP). Apart from the medical files, we also analyzed the nursing files, from which we will 
quote on a number of occasions; but we concentrate on the physicians’ role and the analysis is 
therefore based mainly on the medical files. 
Additionally, we studied the diary that the patient’s only daughter kept of the time her 
mother was in hospital. We regarded it as useful to analyze the diary, as we supposed that the 
physicians’ discourse would be partly influenced by the relatives’ questions and concerns, 
which would probably be articulated in the diary, and vice versa. The diary also offered us a 
unique opportunity to form an impression of the family’s ‘counter-discourse’, as well as of its 
perception of what happened to the patient, and of the information given by the professionals. 
We also expected that the diary would reveal what effect the case had on the family and 
would give us a clearer image of emerging practical wisdom, and of its impact. 
The hospital’s research ethics board has ruled that this case study was subject of a 
procedure ruled by law, instead of an ethical review. They gave their written permission to 
use the patient’s files for the research, as did the board of directors of the hospital, the medical 
staff involved, as well as the nursing staff of the emergency department, the neurology ward, 
and the intensive care unit. The relatives, i.e. the husband and the daughter also gave their 
written permission to use the patient’s files and the diary. 
Content and function of the documents. In order to evaluate the possibilities and 
limitations of the reports we studied, we will now discuss the content and function of these 
documents. The daily report in the medical files is written on the basis of pre-determined 
templates within the hospital, and according to a format defined within the medical 
profession. The reports consist of an electronic file in which the various sections are pre-
programmed. Special departments, like the ICU in this case, have a specific format, which is 
even more pre-structured, for instance on the vital functions (respiration, circulation, 
metabolism, neurological state). Such a frame defines in advance what information is relevant 
or not; and in doing so, the template also directs the user’s observation. The format includes 
the following categories: a description of the patient’s condition, reported by the patient 
herself or by a nurse (Subjective); the outcome of the physical examination by a physician and 
an account of the results of additional examinations (Objective); the assessment of all this by 
the reporting doctor (Assessment); and the plan derived from it for the continuation of 
treatment (Plan). (SOAP) Reports of conversations with relatives or of consultations are saved 
in separate directories, which means that they may escape a physician’s attention. The diary, 
written by the daughter for her sick mother, appears to be partly an expression of the writer’s 
feelings and thoughts. A diary is a personal document not limited by general rules. We 
assume that it especially represents those facts and events that the daughter regarded and 
experienced as important. 
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In everyday practice, medical files have at least a dual function: they are the central 
bearers of information about the patient that physicians regard as relevant, and as such, they 
represent the patient (Kotzee et al., 2016). This is important, for instance, for physicians on 
duty, who are called to a patient due to some acute incident, but who do not know the patient 
well. In addition, they structure the medical knowledge about the patient, in order to enable 
physicians to decide on the next step in the treatment process (Mesman, 2002). Thus, the files 
safeguard care from day to day, or from shift to shift (ICU). The attendant risk is that issues 
that are judged to be important for the short term are represented particularly well, but the 
long-term goals, the trend and the prognosis less so. The function of the diary is to record 
events for the author’s mother (we know this from a personal communication) and also, to 
accommodate the daughter’s structuring and coming to terms with the events and the 
emotions that they evoked.  
Method of analysis. We chose to carry out a thematic analysis of the documents, 
because we expected that distinguishing dominant themes would give us insight into the 
physician’s construction, or interpretative framework of reality (discourse), and into the role 
they attribute to practical wisdom. We expected that the thematic analysis of the diary could 
modify these findings. In using this qualitative empirical method, we relied on the definition 
and process description (design) of thematic analysis proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006: p. 
79): “a method for identifying, analyzing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.” 
Thematic analysis is a “widely used . . . method of qualitative data analysis” and it is a 
method “in its own right” (Braun & Clarke, 2012, p. 57). Furthermore, it is only a method of 
data analysis. It may be carried out in the context of different research designs, provided that 
it is suitable to answer the specific research questions. The thematic analysis of the dominant 
discourse has been a bottom-up, inductive approach, driven by what we have found in the 
data. Moreover, it has been experiential, in that we have explored the experiences and 
meanings that were reported in the data. On the other hand, the thematic analysis of practical 
wisdom has been performed using predetermined codes (the indicators) that were derived 
from our working definition and from literature; this is a deductive approach. At the same 
time it is a critical approach in that it has questioned the role of practical wisdom in this 
practice. Both analyses have been performed from a constructionist theoretical perspective, 
which means that we consider reality as being constructed by the observers (Braun & Clarke, 
2012).  
Procedure. The researchers were two medical specialists, who are familiar with 
professional medical discourse and with the format and terminology of the medical files, and 
two ethicists, who also participated in the larger study mentioned above. The doctors began 
by separately reading and rereading the voluminous files several times. While reading the 
documents, they added initial codes (the indicators mentioned above) to the texts, marking 
and naming parts they regarded as characteristic for the discourse or for practical wisdom. 
They then exchanged each other’s codes and discussed them until they reached consensus; 
this resulted in a condensation into subthemes. After this, they presented their findings to the 
ethicists, who had also studied the texts; the group held discussions and deliberated until 
agreement was reached, including what subthemes and themes could be identified. These 
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adapted codes and (sub)themes were then applied to content that had not been studied before, 
followed in the same way by a process of deliberation and adaptation. In this manner, the 
researchers were able to determine the themes of the underlying discourses of the files and the 
diary. It proved possible to clarify the ratio between practical wisdom and technical 
knowledge in this practice. Using questions that were expressed in the discussions, the 
researchers reassessed the material several times, on a few occasions modifying (sub)themes. 
In this way, we tried to prevent one-sided and biased interpretations. The validity of this 
research was thus safeguarded by researcher triangulation: various researchers went through 
the material independently, and also by the transparent mode of working with codes 
(indicators). It was further guaranteed by the fact that we used different sources, namely the 
medical files and the diary. We will comment on the generalizability of the results below, 
under reflection. 
Limitations. By limiting ourselves to two written sources, we missed all information 
exchanged orally during formal and informal discussions. Nor was there any information that 
did not fit into the files’ format: the files do not have a category for the aim of treatment. Data 
about the clinical situation and context were not included either, such as for instance the fact 
that the physician might be in a hurry or under a lot of stress; or about spatial characteristics; 
or the variation in the levels of experience of physicians and nurses involved; etc. We can 
only gain indirect insight into the current habits and prejudices within the practice through 
meaningful ‘signals’; this means we have to interpret them. In this way, the files function as a 
‘keyhole’ on reality. We have to take these limitations into account in our reflection, and 
when drawing conclusions. Nevertheless, the written sources we used, provide a great deal of 
detailed and meaningful information about day-to-day work in this practice. In the next 
section, we will describe the outcome of the thematic analysis and what it can teach us about 
the underlying discourses and the emergence of practical wisdom. 
 
Results 
The medical files. The thematic analysis of the medical files yielded the following 
results: The files almost exclusively contain information about the patient’s body, and thus 
mainly represent her injured body, primarily the brain hemorrhage. The files do not for 
instance refer to the considerable deterioration in the patient’s functions after the clipping of 
the aneurysm, or on the impact that this had: before the operation she could still speak and 
move her right body half; afterwards she was aphasic and paralyzed on her right side. By 
contrast, the diary did describe this deterioration; it caused the relatives considerable shock.  
As a rule, the files are restricted to information about the sick part of the body, and 
their focus is thus on the disease of an organ. As soon as the patient had to be transmitted to 
the ICU the focus shifted to the (dis)functioning of the patient’s vital functions and to how to 
support these functions. 
An example: on 10-17 the neurologist reports: “Awake, hemiparesis right, aphasia. Consciousness 
seems to fluctuate somewhat, respiratory pattern evolves accordingly.” And on 12-22 the 
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intensivist notes: “Respiratory: RBS without abnormalities. Empty cuff (trachea cannula) for a 
longer time. Little to no BT necessary, effective cough and swallow function.”  
By contrast, the relatives were increasingly worried about the patient’s steady deterioration, 
especially her low communication abilities, as the diary shows. 
In the files, information is structured according to the diagnosis-treatment scheme that 
is customary in the medical profession. We only encountered information that fit into this 
structure (SOAP). Sometimes the results of consultations or of a grand round were included. 
There was a category called ‘psychosocial’ at the ICU, but it contained only very general 
information about the context and the patient’s relationships.  
Example: “Married, 2 children (son, daughter) grandchildren, strength in hands impaired because 
of arthrosis. Works in care for the elderly as a volunteer.” 
We did not come across any remarks on the patient’s frame of mind, or on the arthralgia due 
to her arthrosis. As the diary shows, however, both issues were causes of concern to the 
relatives. The patient therefore appears from the files as lacking context. 
The files contain mainly short-term information: the writers looked back one day or 
shift and looked ahead one day or one shift, except when they had to work toward a specific 
medical goal like an operation that had been scheduled in a few days. In that case, the 
physicians focused on this interim goal. In this way the doctors obviously safeguarded the 
continuity of care over a period of a few days at the most. Summaries before the weekend 
were regularly lacking; whenever they were present, they occasionally contained inaccurate 
and increasingly incomplete information. In this way, the correct image of the patient’s past 
became diffuse. This was also true in respect of her future: in the first weeks in hospital, the 
files occasionally contain a remark about the patient’s future after the admission: about 
rehabilitation in a rehabilitation center. Later, such references to the patient’s progress in the 
long term were lacking, nor did we come across reflections on a possible fatal outcome. The 
reports of conversations with the relatives (except the first family conversation at the ICU) do 
not contain any information on long-term expectations or goals. By contrast, the daughter 
regularly wondered in her diary if she ‘will ever get her mother back.’ 
What do the files tell us about the way the physicians cooperate with each other and 
with other professionals? There is a distinction between the general wards and the ICU. The 
ICU-files show, that the attending intensivist and the intensive care nurses exchanged and 
coordinated the information presented per shift. However, this happened far less often with 
the information from other disciplines in the ICU. The files of the general ward show an 
allocation of tasks, in which the doctor on duty (the attending) held the coordinating role, 
assessed the patient, and determined policy. The attending also determined whether 
consultants or paramedics needed to be involved (a dietician, a speech therapist, or a 
physiotherapist), or a next step in the treatment route needed to be taken (mobilizing the 
patient, adapting a treatment or starting a new one). The attending sometimes did, and 
sometimes did not include the information she got from the nurse on duty in her report. She 
was the one who gave instructions to the nurses. 
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Example: on November 11, the attending notes: “Nurse: does not seem to improve; does not speak, 
does not make any noises, speech therapist is in consultation. Relatives have made a board hoping 
she will point at ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Seems to urinate little.” 
The files do not show that doctors and nurses discussed the patient or deliberated among 
themselves, not even when the relatives observed an alarming deterioration in the patient, as 
can be seen in the diary.  
Consultation with other specialists, as far as reported, (and that is quite rare), was 
never multidisciplinary, always bilateral: the attending presented a problem that is within the 
colleague’s area of expertise (e.g. the suspicion of jaw luxation to the dental surgeon), and the 
colleague in turn, pointed out the solutions she had to offer.  
Example: on November 11, the attending notes: “ask logo regarding language support”. . . 
“consult dietician regarding intake, more fluid.” And on November 28: “consultation dental 
surgery? Or other treatment?” 
Observations made by paramedical staff, like the speech therapist and her prognosis that 
aspiration might occur, were often neglected, even though this prognosis turned out to be 
accurate. 
What do the files reflect about the way hospital staff communicated with the patient 
and her relatives? Obviously, communicating verbally with the patient was not possible on 
account of her aphasia. Non-verbal communication was possible, however, through motor 
signals, like moving her head. Nonetheless, practically all communication seems to have been 
with the relatives. The files contain summaries of conversations during the first week of 
admission, all but one of which were initiated by the intensivist or the neuro surgeon. 
Conversation reports during admission to the general ward are few in number, although the 
patient stayed much longer in the general ward than in the ICU. All of the conversations held 
in the general ward were on the relatives’ request; mostly because they had experienced a 
problem. These discussions were not planned structurally (e.g. once a week). In addition, it 
appears from the reports, that communication with the relatives was a one-way process, with 
the physicians as senders, and the relatives as the recipients of information. Furthermore, it is 
remarkable, that information was usually given a posteriori, for instance, after a complication 
occurred, and not before, e.g. to prepare the relatives for an expected course. In the 
conversations with the family, the physicians reacted to, rather than anticipated events.  
Summary and first reflection. The themes that emerge from the files reveal a 
discourse with the following characteristics: 1) It is primarily focused on the patient’s body; 
hence, it is a discourse of the body. 2) It is concentrated on the sick organ and on the disease, 
not on the patient as a whole person; this means it is a reductionist discourse. 3) It is 
medically and technically sound, but it trivializes the patient’s context; it is a discourse 
lacking context. 4) It is mainly directed toward short-term continuity, but pays much less 
attention to the long term. 5) It suggests that cooperation with colleagues is established as the 
total of tasks carried out successively or alongside each other. Thus, the discourse 
compartmentalizes and fragments. 6) It is also a hierarchical discourse, in which the physician 
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is at the top of the hierarchy (and so has the natural power) and nurses and paramedics are 
lower down: the doctors give the orders and determine the relevance of information. 7) It 
includes a model of communication with patients and relatives, that is known as the 
informative model (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992), in which the sender, the doctor, determines 
what is important and in which information is often communicated after the fact. Neglecting 
the knowledge of paramedics, patients, and relatives, as points 5 and 6 illustrate, corresponds 
with what Fricker, 2007, has described as “epistemic injustice”: “a wrong done to someone 
specifically in their capacity as a knower” (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). 
These characteristics mostly fit the construction of reality of a traditional medical 
professional discourse, which has been characterized as paternalistic (Freidson, 2001; 
Tonkens, 2008) or as predominantly medical-technical, because observations and actions are 
mainly guided by medical-technical rationality (Dunne, 1993; Kinghorn, 2010; Schön, 1983). 
Furthermore, it presupposes a linear, certain, and uniform reality, instead of one that is 
complex, uncertain, and variable (Kinsella & Pitman, 2012). 
The diary. The diary illustrates the great importance that the sick mother has for the 
daughter. The daughter wrote that she could not live without her mother, who was her pillar 
of support and her main conversation partner. 
Example: “became weepy spontaneously, saying loud, no MUMMY, stay with us, it can’t be 
anything serious. I can’t do without you.” (page 4) She illustrates this by specifying that she is used 
to calling her mother whenever she was dealing with something emotionally important. “ it was an 
automatism of mine. When I am glad – or sad, I always call our mum.” (p 20) 
The diary voices the daughter’s fear that her mother will die, an intense emotion, 
which returned at every perceived deterioration in the patient’s condition and alternated with 
hope and joy whenever small improvements were observed. 
Examples: when she hurries to the hospital after being called by her father to tell her that her 
mother has been hospitalized, she writes: “my heart began to throb, I began to walk faster and 
faster. It is bad, it is bad, it is serious.” (p 3) 
Just before the operation during which the aneurysm will be clipped: “Yes, our mum was doing 
really well. Wonderful feeling – yes, I am getting my mum back very slowly.” (p 45) 
A second cause for intense emotions that emerges from the diary is the experience of the 
staff’s lack of consideration with the mother. 
Example: the relatives, after signaling that the mother is becoming more and more drowsy (a 
symptom of increasing intracranial pressure, to which their attention had been drawn by one of the 
intensivists at an earlier stage), while the doctors initially do not recognize this: “furious – angry – 
sad if we had not raised the alarm they wouldn’t have done anything …. through the cerebral fluid 
…. much drowsier every day.”  
The daughter also wrote about how she understands ‘good care’, both in her own life 
and in this professional situation. She described it as: “being there for you.” “we are there for 
one another.” “I will be there for you.” In different variations, such a phrase appears 22 times 
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in the diary. It seems to be her expression of recognition, of staying close. Whether or not 
professionals show this kind of consideration, also determines the opinion she has of them. 
Those who gave personal attention to the mother are described with appreciation and she 
knows their names. The others are indicated with the impersonal “they”. 
The diary reflects the very precise observations of the daughter, who knows her 
mother perfectly well. This allows her to notice at an early stage from small signals when her 
mother’s condition is going to deteriorate or to improve. This shows her to be a knower in 
Fricker’s sense. (see above) 
Example: when the mother returns to the ICU on the day of admission after an extra ventricular 
drain has been placed: “she said something, after a few times we understood it. She said I need to 
pee (…) Wow our mum can speak (I thought to myself) (…) I clearly saw that she moved both her 
arms to push herself up (…) again I thought wow she is not paralyzed.” (p. 10) 
The diary illustrates how the daughter is sometimes, but usually not, acknowledged as 
a knower, and as a partner in care.  
Example: when the daughter warns a nurse on November 13, because she observed ever since 
November 8 that her mother is sleepy and drowsy all the time, she notices that the attending 
physician only orders a CT-scan of the brain the next day. It is eventually carried out on November 
15 and the relatives receive the result on November 16 (8 days after their first observations). The 
amount of fluid and thus the pressure, in fact appear to have increased inside the skull, and 
treatment is finally started. Disappointed the daughter notes: “because of this a week’s delay for 
recovery.” (p 69) 
On other occasions, the relatives did not feel recognized in their natural concern about 
their mother. We see an illustration of this when the mother developed a respiratory 
insufficiency and again had to be referred to the ICU. Apparently, the relatives were not 
informed, and so they arrived unsuspecting for visiting time.  
The daughter wrote: “arrived in the corridor and saw nurses go to another room with our mum’s 
possessions. I say to our dad, oh, our mum is moving again. Nurse said we have taken your mother 
to a single room, I walked on normally, the curtains were drawn. I opened the curtains and saw 5 
doctors and our mum wearing an oxygen mask …” (p 71) 
The lack of care for and the disregard of the relatives led to a serious breach of trust 
and to the development of a conflictual relationship with the doctors. The lack of recognition 
for the relatives also illustrates a lack of practical wisdom. (indicators 3 and 5) 
Summary and first reflection. The themes we found in the diary, suggest that the 
daughter’s discourse is a discourse of the quotidian, in which the meaning of loving 
relationships (‘being there for you’) plays a key role. We can therefore also call it a relational 
discourse, one which resembles the care-ethical discourse. The latter discourse emphasizes 
the meaning of the relational embedding and context for the emergence of good care and thus 
of practical wisdom (Tronto, 1993; Van Heijst, 2005; Vosman & Baart, 2011). These 
discourses contrast with the doctors’ technical discourse. However, practical wisdom can be 
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very helpful in dealing appropriately with this contrast, and preventing or solving problems 
arising from it. 
The diary also indicates the daughter’s negative response to the doctors’ detached, 
technical, reductionist discourse: disbelief, disappointment, anger and distrust. 
Discerning practical wisdom. In order to discern practical wisdom in the medical 
files, we used the concept heuristically. We will now describe our findings according to the 
indicators, presented in the introduction. 
Orientation to a specific telos: the good to be achieved for this particular patient in a 
professionally competent way. We have found that the practitioners attempted to carefully 
define feasible and appropriate treatment goals for their patient, according to their 
professional standards. To give one example: the decision to perform a neuro surgical 
operation, during which an intraventricular drain would be placed to drain the accumulating 
cerebral fluid and to diminish cerebral pressure, was postponed because of indications of an 
infection which had to be treated first. In the meantime, the liquid was drained by means of 
lumbar punctures. However, there were no efforts to investigate the patient’s context or her 
former way of life in order to adjust long-term professional goals to her specific situation. The 
relatives’ own aim was expressed by their hope to retrieve their well-known intimacy with 
‘mum’, varying from doing the ironing together and watching television, to constantly talking 
about each other’s wellbeing. We searched the files in vain for professional attempts to bridge 
the gap between this hope and the instrumental treatment goals. In this way, the files show 
that goals are defined according to the dominant technical professional reasoning. 
Attuning care to the patient through variation and improvisation. We observed 
instances of this in the behavior of an intensive care nurse; she perceived the intimate 
relationship between the patient-mother and her daughter, and decided to involve the daughter 
in everyday care for her mother. She purposefully used the shower cream which the daughter 
had brought to comfort the mother, and allowed the daughter to participate in the care. 
Likewise, a speech therapist asked the relatives to tell her about the patient’s personality, her 
interests and daily life before the illness, in order to tailor her assistance to the patient’s needs; 
these were examples of practical wisdom. The physicians, on the contrary, predominantly 
appeared to adhere to their routines and standards. 
Focusing on the patient’s (and relatives’) concerns, using various sources of 
knowledge, including intuition and emotions. Although a doctor had already had a long 
conversation with the patient’s husband and daughter on the day of admission, the intensivist 
on duty decided to make time for another conversation with the son. The latter arrived in the 
hospital at 11.00 p.m., returning from his holiday destination, after an emergency call from 
his sister. Thus, the intensivist showed, that he was touched by the son’s concern and 
demonstrated practical wisdom (Molewijk, Kleinlugtenbelt & Widdershoven, 2011; Stolper et 
al., 2011). However, practical wisdom was lacking in the ICU, where the intensivists needed 
the speech therapist’s opinion, in addition to their own judgement, before removing the 
trachea cannula, and yet failed to consult the speech therapist. A lack of practical wisdom is 
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also apparent in the neglect of the relatives’ concern about their mother’s deteriorating 
condition. 
Reaching a balanced judgement about the patient’s condition and prognosis. After 
admission, the physicians’ judgement appears to be appropriate; moreover, their judgement 
about the right treatment and the poor prognosis were communicated sincerely to the 
relatives. These are examples of practical wisdom. However, the subsequent erroneous 
judgement about the rising intracranial pressure, especially the neglect of the relatives’ keen 
observations, shows a lack of practical wisdom.  
Building and maintaining a professional relationship. The files reveal that in this 
case the professionals failed to maintain a professional relationship with the patient’s 
relatives. It would have been practical wisdom to observe and utilize the family’s intensity of 
emotions as a signal that tensions in the professional relationship were mounting and to 
address them in order to keep or recover that relationship. Unfortunately, this did not happen, 
either because professionals felt incapable of doing so, or because they believed the emotions 
resulted from a procedure with many aspects, which they were unable to influence (for both 
statements see Baart & Vosman, 2015). 
Wisdom in navigating complexity. We also looked for practical wisdom in 
physicians’ signaling of and dealing with their complex, not always optimal, work context, 
but there were no indications of this. The files provide several examples: the patient was 
transferred from one ward to another on a Friday afternoon with minimal accompanying 
information. There is nothing in the files to indicate that the doctors were aware that the fact 
that the transfer would happen just before the weekend meant a potential risk for this patient, 
all the more so because she could not speak. Relatives did not appear to be prepared for this 
transfer, either (see also Hall, Robertson, Merkel, Aziz & Hutchens, 2017; Mannix, Parry & 
Roderick, 2017). A second example: a great number of physicians appear to have contributed 
to the medical files and thus to have been actively involved in the medical care of this patient. 
We counted 44 physicians, 26 in the ICU and 18 from the other departments, as well as 106 
different nurses and paramedics. We did not read anywhere that the physicians realized that 
the doctor-patient relationship was bound to remain distant and superficial on account of these 
large numbers, and that the effect on patient and relatives could be alienating and 
anonymizing. Neither did we see any indication that the physicians realized that this number 
involved the risk that they would lose sight of the patient’s personality and medical history, 
because they appeared to be informed only fragmentarily, possibly incorrectly, and that they 
might thus lose sight of the aim of their treatment. These weakened care relationships 
probably impeded the emergence of practical wisdom (Van Eijsden, 2018; Vosman & Baart, 
2011). 
Summary and first reflection. We have certainly identified traces of practical 
wisdom in this practice, as far as the files allow us to judge. However, in the ratio between 
practical wisdom and the professional technical rationality of protocols, guidelines and 
routines, the latter was dominant. Practical wisdom probably lost out, or was not given 
enough opportunity to emerge.  
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In the following section we will discuss the factors which enabled this asymmetrical 
ratio to emerge, and the ensuing effects for the care provided, as well as for the mode of 
cooperation within the practice. 
 
Reflection 
An asymmetrical ratio. The thematic analysis of the medical files has given us an 
understanding of the doctors’ discourse. This appears to be a traditional, medical professional 
discourse, appropriate for the technical-rational view of medical practice. The views and 
norms for procedures (like file-keeping), routines, modes of cooperation and hierarchy in 
professional relationships are standardized and fixed; the physicians, in view of their peers’ 
and supervisors’ subsequent appraisal, therefore probably tend to behave according to these 
views and norms (Witman, 2014). This discourse seems to obstruct an adequate awareness of 
the complexities, uncertainties and variabilities both in the patient’s condition and in the 
practice context. 
By contrast, practical wisdom implies the necessity of attuning care to every 
individual patient in her specific context and situation (Baart & Vosman, 2015; Kinghorn, 
2010). Moreover, the good to be achieved for individual patients proves to be changeable 
(Gawande, 2014; Kaldjian, 2014). Everyday complexity, with its inevitable uncertainties and 
un-predictabilities requires adequate judgements (Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017). The analysis 
revealed a lack of practical wisdom, as outlined above, in this practice.  
The files also permitted us to observe the factors that possibly occasioned the 
asymmetrical ratio between practical wisdom and technical reason. These factors were partly 
related to the professionals’ (view on their) practice in the strict sense, partly to the systemic 
infrastructure of the hospital.  
Practice-bound factors. In addition to the dominant (technical) discourse, we 
observed the following: the large number of professionals, none of them was able to establish 
and maintain a relationship with the patient and her family; the large number of transfers: the 
patient was transferred within the hospital on eleven occasions, and each time information 
was lost; the mode of professional cooperation, consisting of a variety of bilateral 
consultations, while the coordinating physician changed frequently; the hierarchical 
approach, in which the doctor determined what is relevant on the basis of a reductionist 
discourse, which filters or neglects information; material factors, like the format of the 
electronic record, which has no sections on ‘treatment-goal’, ‘the patient’s social situation’ 
(context), or ‘long-term prognosis’, but was completely pre-programmed according to the 
current diagnosis-treatment model. 
Infrastructural factors. The files also offered us a view of some infrastructural 
aspects of the organization of the hospital, which can also impede the emergence of practical 
wisdom (Vriens, Achterbergh & Gulpers, 2016). During this patient’s admission, the 
neurological ward apparently did not have any structure for multi-disciplinary deliberation, 
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aimed at joint reflection on a patient; apparently, there were no arrangements to put in place 
the safeguards that should surround an internal transfer, to guarantee continuity of care for 
the patient; similarly, conversations with (relatives of) patients who are hospitalized for 
lengthy periods of time, were not planned regularly, and no efforts were therefore made to 
maintain the relationship and exchange information; in the culture of this ward, there 
appeared to be no tradition of instantly alerting the relatives in case of sudden deterioration 
of the patient’s condition; neither did it appear normal to allow a concerned family member to 
be present during the daily care for the patient (a conflict arose about this between the 
daughter and a nurse who told her to wait in the corridor.) 
Occasional practical wisdom and its consequences. What were the possible 
consequences of the merely accidental presence of practical wisdom and the dominant 
medical-technical rationality? Because our view of the practice was limited, we were 
particularly cautious in drawing up our conclusions on this point. The sources reveal that 
increasing reciprocal estrangement and tension, mistrust and ultimately rejection and conflict 
arose between the professionals on the one side, and the patient’s relatives on the other. 
Moreover, we identified a number of flaws in the diagnostic and treatment process (described 
above); the patient and her relatives were not given the opportunity to prepare together for the 
end which was probably approaching; the relatives (and the patient?) did not feel supported 
by the professionals in the suffering caused by their mother’s illness, invasive treatments, and 
death; the physicians showed frustration and despair in respect of their inability to solve the 
frosty relationship with the family. Our suggestion is, that practical wisdom could have 
prevented or minimized at least some of these consequences. 
Proposals. Our findings enable us, to formulate several proposals, aimed at restoring 
the balance between practical wisdom and technical rationality in comparable situations. 
Firstly, medical professionals and medical practices should include, both structurally and ad 
hoc, moments for (preferably multi-disciplinary) reflection on the moral question whether 
they are giving ‘good care’ at that specific time and on what the aim of their involvement with 
an individual patient should be. Secondly, the format of the electronic medical record should 
be scrutinized, and complemented by categories like ‘goal’, and ‘context’. Thirdly, the 
infrastructure, i.e. structure and culture, of the hospital organization should be transformed, so 
that practical wisdom can thrive, e.g. by stimulating reflection as mentioned; by stimulating 
improvisation and diversification on behalf of each patient’s particular circumstances, and by 
promoting the importance of engaging the knowledge, experiences and concerns of patients 
and their relatives. Finally, medical professional associations should support the development 
of practical wisdom: they should criticize the one-sided promotion of the medical-technical 
discourse, and provide post-graduate courses or peer-coaching models to develop practical 
wisdom in practices (Hafferty & Levinson, 2008; Kinghorn, 2010; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012). 
Generalizability. A single case study like this, allows us to make an in-depth 
investigation of details in their relationship with each other, and this can yield new insights 
(Anderson et al., 2005; Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011; Flyvbjerg, 2006). The exact way in which 
factors and actors play a role and influence each other in such a case, is defined locally and 
temporally. Patients and their relatives differ from each other in many aspects, but they also 
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have much in common. The same applies to individual professional practices, physicians, and 
hospitals. That is why ‘communicative generalizability’ is the only objective of this study 
(Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011; Smaling, 2009a) i.e. the readers of this case study will have to 
determine themselves whether and to what extent the research results are important for their 
practices.  
Implications. What does our research add to the literature on practical wisdom? It is 
an empirical study, which, through the key hole of a complex patient’s medical files and a 
diary, has provided a picture both of day-to-day care and of the doctors’ discourse. Our 
detailed observations and analysis make it possible to complement the theoretical insights on 
practical wisdom. In addition to the institutional, systemic, and professional pressure, 
described in the literature, professional medical discourse also appears to threaten practical 
wisdom, as do factors linked to everyday medical practice. We observed, for example, how 
the professional relationship with a patient was distributed over many professionals, which 
made it difficult to maintain the relationship. We also found, that specialized medical 
discourse and the mode of cooperation that arises from it (the sum of bilateral consultations), 
can impede joint reflection. Finally, we observed, that a hierarchical culture with the 
physicians at the top, and the dominant medical-technical rationality both facilitate the neglect 
or disregarding of knowledge of ‘subordinates’ and of patients and their relatives, possibly 
resulting in failing medical assessment, and a failure to maintain the orientation to the good 
that is being pursued for the patient. Practical wisdom nonetheless appeared to emerge now 
and then; it should be possible to expand these occasional manifestations. 
 
Conclusion 
Our study has answered the question what the ratio was between practical wisdom and 
technical rationality in an everyday medical practice and in the dominant professional 
discourse. It has also demonstrated the effects which this ratio had on the care given to the 
patient and her relatives and on cooperation within the practice. Influenced by the dominant 
professional discourse, technical and systemic rationality appeared to prevail, although 
practical wisdom was observed incidentally. This asymmetrical ratio appeared to have 
negative consequences for the medical care provided and for the relational fine-tuning of care 
for the patient and her relatives, so that professionals were unable to satisfactorily support 
them in illness and suffering. Misunderstanding, distrust and ultimately a conflictual 
relationship were the result. Better integration of practical wisdom into this practice could 
possibly have prevented or solved these problems. The impact of the asymmetrical ratio on 
professional cooperation was that multi-disciplinary, joint reflection on the patient was scarce 
and that the knowledge of relatives, nurses and paramedics was often neglected, indicating 




Our research has led to additional insights regarding practical wisdom. In addition, it 
has enabled us to make several proposals to create scope for practical wisdom. However, 
more empirical research into practical wisdom in medical practices, aimed at better 
integration of practical wisdom into those practices is needed in order to achieve good care 















































“Never do what your mother tells you to do,
and everything will be all right for you.”
Annie M.G. Schmidt, De regenworm en zijn moeder [The earthworm and his mother]
Chapter 7
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Abstract 
Multidisciplinary professional care for adolescents with type 1 diabetes mellitus has been 
supported by detailed international consensus guidelines since 1995. However, several 
professional authors have argued that it takes more than excellent guidelines to give good care 
also in a moral sense in daily practices. In this article, we report on an exemplary case study 
into the adolescent diabetes outpatient clinic of a Dutch general hospital, with the aim to 
explore how practicing professionals enacted the attuning of general guidelines to individual 
patients in their specific contexts. To realize this aim, we have conducted 
ethnomethodologically inspired, participatory observations, and an abductive analysis, using 
tools that have been derived from grounded theory. We carried out the inquiry using the 
heuristic lenses of relationality and practical wisdom. In addition, we used care ethics and 
practice theory as theoretical frames. Relationality and practical wisdom appear to be strong 
vectors of good care in everyday diabetes practice. 
 
Introduction 
The problem: friction between guidelines and practice. In 1995, the International 
Society for Pediatric and Adolescent Diabetes (ISPAD)¹ published consensus guidelines for 
the medical care of children and adolescents with diabetes mellitus, and these guidelines have 
been regularly updated and complemented. The latest evidence on the disease has been 
incorporated into the guidelines, in combination with the expert knowledge of a multi-
disciplinary group of experienced professionals. The guidelines have been adjusted to the 
characteristics of local, regional, and national conditions. For instance, the American Diabetes 
Association published ‘Children and Adolescents: Standards of Medical Care in Diabetes 
2018’², whereas in the Netherlands, the Dutch Diabetes Federation in cooperation with the 
Dutch Association of Pediatric Medicine, produced a ‘Standard of Care’ (2009)³ based on 
these guidelines. In the formulation of ISPAD the ultimate goal of care for adolescents with 
diabetes mellitus is: “high quality of life, normal growth and development, and lower 
attainable risk of acute and long-term diabetes complications”. This goal describes the perfect, 
successful end point of professional diabetes care. 
The standards set out in the guidelines are biomedical target values of good care, 
described as physical, biochemical and psychosocial characteristics such as: optimal average 
blood glucose level (HbA1c 58 mmol/mol); normal growth and weight; no acute or late 
complications of the disease; self-management and independence. The guidelines also include 
standards for procedures and planning of care (frequency of check-ups; multi-disciplinary 
teams; use of plans for education and care). 
Inevitably, these guidelines are based on average patients. The guidelines do not 
discuss how possible discrepancies between standard and individual patients should be 
bridged. 
As it happens, however, authors from medical (Gawande, 2002; Gawande, 2007; 
Groopman, 2007; Hibbert, 2012; Kaldjian, 2010, 2014; Kinghorn, 2010; Montgomery, 2006; 
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Mukherjee, 2015; Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1993; Stolper et al., 2011) and from non-medical 
backgrounds (Baart & Vosman, 2015; Eikeland, 2001; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012; Mol & Law, 
2004; Mol, 2006; Timmerman & Baart, 2016; Vosman, Timmerman & Baart, 2018) have 
argued that practicing professionals need more than these useful guidelines to give good care 
to their patients. Several authors have mentioned that practitioners should be able to acquire 
adequate knowledge about the individual patient in her situation and context. The authors 
state moreover, that other modes of knowledge are required than evidence as it appears in the 
guidelines, or basic scientific medical knowledge, for instance intuitive, and experience-based 
knowledge.  
Furthermore, in these publications is stated that professionals should focus not only on 
realizing medical standards, but also on meeting moral norms, that is to “appreciate what is 
good for a patient as a person, not merely as a biological being” Kaldjian (2014, p. 73). This 
is the ethical dimension of care, according to Kaldjian. 
Finally, several authors have qualified the ideal goal of professional diabetes care. For 
example Iedema, Mesman and Carroll (2013, p. 81) have argued that daily practice is : “a 
mode of practice that aligns with what is possible more than with what is formally required.”  
Consequently, there appears to be a problem for professional practices of how to 
determine the correct ratio between the general knowledge of the guidelines and personal and 
situational knowledge about the individual patient (Mol, 2006). Or, in addition: how to find 
the correct balance between biomedical standards and moral norms in individual cases 
(Schermer, 2001); or how to transform ideal purposes into achievable goals (Franklin et al., 
2019). This problem has led to the following research questions: 
Research questions.  
1. How is a balance enacted between personal and situational patient knowledge and bio-
medical patient knowledge as prescribed in the guidelines, through ordinary actions 
within an everyday diabetes practice? This question will be addressed specifically for 
a) individual practitioners, b) the diabetes team, and c) the way the infrastructure of 
the practice facilitates this. 
2. How is (are judgements on) morally good care enacted, in relation to the medical 
standards of the guidelines through ordinary actions within an everyday practice? This 
question will similarly be addressed specifically for a, b and c (see above). 
3. How is a balance established between agreed, appropriate goals for individual patients 
in their specific contexts and the general goals laid down in the guidelines? This 
question will, once again, be addressed specifically for a, b and c. 
Before we describe the research method we have used in this study, we will introduce 
the conceptual lenses through which we observed the practice. 
Our perspective: care ethics, relationality, care practices and practical wisdom. 
First, we approached our subject from a care ethical perspective. In the context of the current 
study, this specifically means that we regard giving professional care as a relational activity, 
in which “care . . . results, becomes structured and relevant from thinking, exploring and 
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steering relationally” (Baart, 2018, p. 74). Furthermore, we argue that it is distinctive and 
relevant for patients in care relationships to be vulnerable and dependent, because they are ill 
and are suffering (Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017). 
Second, we studied medical care as a practice, and we have used this term as it is 
defined in certain practice theories. Nicolini (2012, p. 220) has described practices as “real 
time doing and saying something in a specific place and time” (Also see Nicolini & Monteiro, 
2017; Schmidt, 2012). Practices of care are enacted and re-enacted not by isolated individuals, 
performing alongside each other, but in complex networks of and interactions between actors, 
including patients in their contexts, and material and immaterial non-human actors (Barad, 
2003; Setchell, Abrams, McAdam & Gibson, 2019). Moreover, Vriens, Achterbergh and 
Gulpers (2018), as well as Moore (2005), and Moore and Beadle (2006) referring to 
MacIntyre (1985), have emphasized the relevance of the infrastructure in which practices are 
embedded. They advocate the alignment of organizational purposes with the ‘internal goods’ 
of embedded practices. 
Third, we have aimed at understanding professional practices ‘on their own terms’ 
(Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011; Mesman, 2002; Mol, 2006; Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017; 
Schmidt, 2012; Saraga, Boudreau & Fuks, 2019; Vosman & Baart, 2015), i.e. on the basis of 
the rationality ‘imbedded’ in these practices, a rationality which might be different from that 
of biomedical sciences. Mol (2006) has described this rationality as ‘the logic of care giving’; 
others have mentioned practical wisdom as its distinctive characteristic (Bontemps, Vosman 
& Baart, 2019; Kaldjian, 2014; Kinghorn 2010; Kotzee, Paton & Conroy, 2016; Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1993; Tyson, 2028). Our supposition has been that, by observing through the lens 
of practical wisdom, it is possible to make the ‘logic’, or the ‘grammar’ of the practice 
perceptible, and to describe it subsequently (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011). We define practical 
wisdom heuristically as: the capability which emerges in acting jointly within medical 
practices, of knowing how to remain focused on achieving the good for every individual 
patient, in ever changing situations within the context of the practice and its telos and of how 
to accomplish this by the most appropriate means, while dealing with complexity and 
institutional and systemic pressure” (Bontemps et al., 2019). We regard ‘the good’ as specific 
to individual patients in their contexts and situations, as variable, and as something that can 
only be validated retrospectively, by the experience of the care recipient (Klaver, Van Elst & 
Baart, 2014; Timmerman, Baart & Vosman, 2019).  
Our hypothesis is that observations made through the observational frameworks of 
relationality, practices and practical wisdom, will enable us to identify new and unexpected 
issues in the practice of care for diabetes patients, and to learn how good care is enacted in 
professional practices. The following section will set out the research methodology that we 
have devised to answer the research questions. 
 
Method 
An exemplary case study. We have opted to conduct a qualitative, exploratory case 
study, through direct observation of an adolescent diabetes outpatient clinic (practice) in a 
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Dutch general hospital. We approached this complex case (practice) according to Stake’s 
constructivist-interpretivist orientation (Harrison, Birks, Franklin & Mills, 2017) and as a 
complex and integrated whole according to Anderson, Crabtree, Steele and McDaniel Jr. 
(2005). We chose ambulatory care for patients with the chronic disease of type 1 diabetes 
mellitus, because this is a disease that has a great impact on patients’ daily lives and context 
(Hinder & Greenhalgh, 2012; Mol & Law, 2004; Mol, 2006). In addition, it is a difficult task 
to achieve the stable regulation, that the guidelines recommend. We then chose the age group 
of adolescents – children in the transition period to maturity, aged 12 to 21 – because this 
group’s physical, mental and social stability is under pressure during this phase, and the 
patients must establish ways of coping with the disease, independent from parents or 
counsellors (Crone, 2008). Supporting adolescents with diabetes therefore constitutes a real 
challenge for practitioners; this makes the case an exemplary one (Timmerman et al., 2019): 
“The exemplar methodology is a sample selection technique that involves the intentional 
selection of individuals, groups, or entities that exemplify the construct of interest in a highly 
developed manner” (Bronk, 2011, p. 1).  
An ethnomethodologically-inspired approach. Nicolini (2012) has described 
“ethnomethodologically(EM)-inspired approaches”, alongside other methods, which are 
‘slow’ and ‘in-depth’, and enable observation of details and specific particulars of a situation, 
as appropriate for research of practices. According to Nicolini, an EM-inspired approach 
focuses on accurately re-constructing a) the means practitioners use to accomplish actions 
together and b) the organization of relationships and interactions. Patton (2002) has 
emphasized that EM is focused on making the tacit knowledge of a practice explicit (Polanyi, 
1969), and on making sense of daily activities.  
Nicolini’s advice is to focus the research of practices not only on actions, interactions, 
and meanings, but also on “the landscape of tools, artefacts, and resources” (Nicolini,2012, p. 
223] and on the way these material agents are integrated. He also recommends taking note of 
the observable goal orientation, morality, and concerns within the practice. 
Participatory study. Direct observation of practices, ‘fieldwork’, consists of “the 
circumstance of being in or around an on-going social setting” (Patton, 2002, p. 262). This 
implies a more or less participatory approach. Patton has listed many advantages of direct 
observation, including being able to observe matters of which the participants are not aware in 
a practice, issues participants do not want to talk about in interviews, and issues that go 
beyond the participants’ selective perception, thus obtaining a more complete overall image 
(Patton, 2002, p. 27). 
At the time the observations were carried out, the first researcher worked as a 
pediatrician in the pediatric practice concerned, but she was not a member of the diabetes 
team. She was therefore both involved with, and at a distance from the team that was under 
study. According to Eikeland and Nicolini (2011), commitment to and active participation at a 
practical level during a well-defined period have the advantage that the researcher can better 
observe the sought-after ‘grammar’ of the practice. They have advocated “a new type of 
‘detached’ research aiming at knowledge and understanding from within the knowers’ own 
practice, not from a segregated position outside” (Eikeland & Nicolini, p. 7). The purpose of 
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this type of research is twofold: to produce a new type of theory, that is comparable to the 
grammar of language; and to provide “a tool for insight” into the practice to practitioners. 
However, our modest goal was only to acquire some important theoretical insights. 
As an insider and because of her experience, the first researcher had an understanding 
of the culture, the structures, and the context of the practice. That is why she must be 
considered as competent to devise adequate and rich interpretations of the data. However, her 
double role (as a colleague and a researcher) may also have led to bias and blind spots 
(Patton, 2002; Smaling, 2009a). Thus, safeguards had to be included to ensure the internal 
validity and trustworthiness of the study. First, we applied investigator triangulation: the 
critical co-evaluation of the observations and analysis by the two co-authors, who are ethicists 
and who are not affiliated with the hospital in question, although they are experienced 
researchers in other hospitals. Moreover, the researcher returned the entire research report to a 
group of seven professionals from the diabetes practice in question: member checking in a 
focus group (Birt, Scott, Cavers, Campbell & Walters, 2013). Practitioners were asked to 
check facts and interpretations and to add essential information they were missing. Results 
were adapted after reflection and deliberation within this group.  
Permission was obtained from the Institutional Ethical Committee and the Hospital 
Board to carry out this study. All patients involved, their parents and the practitioners gave 
their verbal informed consent, after they had been informed of the aim and the methods of the 
study. The data will be presented in de-identified form. In order to protect the participants’ 
privacy, pseudonyms have been used, and where necessary, factual details have been 
changed.  
Research data. Within the time-frame of three years (2014 to 2016), the first 
researcher gathered the research data by observing ten consultations for diabetes patients, 
during which on average five patients were seen, including preparatory discussions and final 
evaluations. Doing this, she was able to observe the five pediatricians and the four diabetes 
nurses who were members of the diabetes team, and 42 adolescent patients, some of them 
twice. In addition, she observed four contacts between patients and a dietician, and three 
between patients (accompanied by a parent, or by the whole family) and a psychologist. She 
followed a patient after the diagnosis had been made, during the first two months of 
ambulatory care. She observed the first contact between an adolescent in transition and the 
internist. If necessary, she interviewed practitioners informally immediately after a 
consultation, to ensure proper understanding. Furthermore, she interviewed one of the 
pediatricians, two very experienced diabetes nurses, and the child psychologist, with the aim 
to gather additional information, that could not be derived from available data (for example 
regarding their specific education). She attended two formal (quarterly) and three informal 
(weekly) team meetings; in addition, three educational meetings, and the presentation to 
practitioners and patients of a new device for glucose monitoring. She studied all available 
documents, such as the education plan per year group of 8 to 18-year-olds, individual care 
plans, and quality-of-life-questionnaires for children and parents. She consulted national and 
international guidelines, health insurers’ compensation rules, and quality and safety standards. 
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She made notes (field notes) of the observations, recorded the conversations and made 
verbatim transcripts of these (Philippi & Lauderdale, 2018).  
Method of analysis. We chose to conduct an abductive analysis, using elements of 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), modified according to Charmaz’s constructivist 
views (Charmaz, 2006; De Boer, 2011; Bainbridge, Whiteside & McCalman, 2013), such as 
the specification of ‘sensitizing concepts’; coding - initial, focused and theoretical -; memoing 
(researcher’s notes to document a line of thought and decision making); and constant 
comparison, to guarantee the rigor of the analysis, and to allow for conclusions to be drawn 
on the concepts of relationality and practical wisdom, that would be grounded in the data.  
Performing an abductive analysis means that a researcher enters the field with 
preconceived theoretical ideas, not as a theoretical ‘tabula rasa’, and aims for new theoretical 
insights from the observed practice. Abductive analysis was improved by using the 
methodological steps of revisiting (over time, repeatedly re-evaluating data) and de-
familiarizing (regarding data as deviant and strange) according to the recommendations of 
Timmermans and Tavory (2012) and Timmerman et al. (2019). 
After a first analysis of part of the data had been completed, the first researcher drew 
up a first draft text, which she critically discussed with the other researchers. The discussions 
yielded new insights and problems; subsequently, she repeated the analysis and adjusted the 
text. This was repeated until all data were analyzed and saturation was achieved. Finally, she 
presented the entire report to the focus group, and adapted the text again. 
In the following section, we will represent the results of the observations we made 
through the heuristic lenses of relationality and practical wisdom, and of the subsequent 




First research question: How is a balance enacted between personal and 
situational patient knowledge, and bio-medical patient knowledge as prescribed in the 
guidelines, through ordinary actions within this diabetes practice? 
This question will be addressed specifically for 
Individual practitioners. All practitioners appeared to have explicit knowledge of the 
latest guidelines. In addition, these guidelines were easily available electronically. Enacting a  
proper balance appeared to depend on gathering, integrating and applying knowledge in an 
iterative movement. 
Gathering knowledge: the ‘regular team’ (pediatrician [PE] and diabetes nurse [DN]) 
assigned to every patient, usually knows its patients from the beginning of the illness. During 
the intensive support that is offered at the emergence of the diabetes, professionals become 
acquainted with the patients’ living conditions, their personal characteristics, their school and 
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leisure activities; they record this in the patients’ files. Moreover, the regular team prepares 
each consultation contact, for instance by reading laboratory results and measurement results 
sent in (biomedical knowledge), and by reviewing the most recent arrangements made with 
the patient. During this preparatory deliberation, the team anticipates the consultation by 
sharing all kinds of knowledge gathered since the last consultation and by considering 
common policy. “What does this mean?” “Which of us will join?” “How are we going to 
proceed?” The same procedure is followed for annual check-ups, but in the larger team. In 
addition, the entire team as a whole informally discusses current patient issues at a fixed time 
every week. 
We observed that, during the consultations, practitioners attempted to increase 
personal knowledge, and knowledge about the patient’s living context by asking the patients 
many questions and by asking more questions if they perceived any difficulties or signals of 
ambiguities. In doing so, they not only concentrated on facts, but first and foremost on the 
patient’s perspective on this factuality.  
Bram, who has an insulin pump, has started secondary school this year. PE: : “How is school?” 
B: “Yes, fine.” PE: “School fun?” B: “Yes, It is.” PE: “Tell me, did anyone from your previous 
school go to the same school?” etc. Later on in the conversation PE: “Does anyone care, that you 
are different from the others? Does it bother you?” B: “Yes, it does, cause I’m often too low, for 
instance, when I’m going to play soccer or something like that..” PE: “Yes, you spend a lot of time 
outdoors don’t you? Hanging out outside?” (….) “Is that why it’s more difficult for you to know 
beforehand that you are going to play outside? Is that why?” B: “Yes, it is.”  
Integrating/applying knowledge: The following example shows that the practitioners 
include knowledge of the person (PE: “Nick has the characteristics of autism – the outcome 
of a psychological inquiry -. This will lead to problems with his diabetes because he is unable 
to put things into perspective”) in the way they deal with a bio-medical patient problem. 
Nick, who has an insulin pump, is upset, because he regularly, but not always has a hypoglycemia 
when he returns from his weekend job in the library. The diabetes nurse, like a detective, goes 
through the possible causes of the problem with him: his activities at work; the circumstances 
under which the hypo attacks occur; when and what he eats and when he injects insulin and how 
much. She then discusses in detail which pump settings he can use to take less insulin on Saturdays 
and how he can check when and whether the blood glucose levels are acceptable without them 
interfering with his work. 
The practitioners also communicated medical-scientific knowledge, dosed and tailor- 
made, during consultations: too much protein in the urine may be an indication of too high 
blood glucose levels over a longer period; even if patients have a glucose sensor, blood 
glucose levels must still be checked three times a day through a finger prick in order to 
calibrate the sensor; the areas used for finger pricks and for injections of insulin must be 
changed regularly; the dietician takes the patient through a checklist she has made to intercept 
hypo attacks. 
Bio-medical patient knowledge is derived from physical examinations, lab results and 
digital graphs. The division of tasks between pediatrician and diabetes nurse, that we 
observed, is as follows: The pediatrician does the physical examination, according to a fixed 
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pattern (for instance, she always checks pricked areas), draws attention to medical points of 
importance, like blood pressure or co-morbidity with diabetes (coeliac disease) etc. The 
diabetes nurse, together with the patient, looks at computer diagrams of blood glucose levels, 
intake of carbohydrates in food and levels of insulin injected; she also discusses the right use 
of materials. Other tasks were mutually interchangeable. The physical examination proved to 
be an intimate moment between doctor and patient, and regularly was an opportunity to gather 
more specific knowledge about the patient. “Where did you get that beautiful tan?” “Hey, you 
always prick in the same place; there is even a little wound. Why is that?” “I Can’t see any 
pricked areas on your tummy; do you ever prick there?” The physician ‘feels’ any tension that 
the patient may display, observes a patient blush, tremble or perspire. Conversely, because of 
the increased perception of vulnerability, barriers sometimes disappear, allowing patients to 
express themselves more easily.  
It is remarkable, that when they inspected their personal graphs on the screen with the 
DN, patients seemed to observe themselves from a distance, and it was precisely this distance 
that seemed to facilitate honest conversation about the results. 
Hans, who has an insulin pump, and is a secondary school student: DN: “Do you see those strange 
outliers – 20 on one occasion and 16 on another. Are you able to explain that in retrospect?” H: 
“Yes, I am, it is from injecting too late for a snack or injecting not at all on every occasion …that 
happens from time to time; I’m too lazy, or I forget it, or I think it’s OK” (….) DN: “So, there is 
usually an explanation? Not that you are saying: how is that possible? I’m such a loser?” H: 
“Well, it’s usually that I take a snack and forget to inject.”  
Applying knowledge: We regularly heard practitioners ask: “Are you comfortable 
pricking your finger and injecting in class?” When they found that a patient was worried 
about something, or was unable to solve some recurring problem they, generally, did not offer 
directive recommendations in accordance with the guidelines. Instead, they often worked on 
the basis of their knowledge of the patient-in-context to stimulate her to find an appropriate 
solution herself. Thus, they encouraged the patient’s growing independence. 
The pediatrician discusses the weekend with Tom. “If you begin your Saturday by working ( at 
home on the farm), and then go mountain biking, your injection schedule should really look very 
different than on schooldays. How would it be different?” 
Summary: The practitioners had ready knowledge of the guidelines. Additionally, 
from the first introduction of a new patient on they acquired and updated their personal and 
contextual knowledge of the individual patient by asking questions, asking further questions, 
deliberating with their colleagues in the diabetes team, and consulting notes laid down in the 
electronic patient record. Biomedical patient knowledge was gathered from physical 
examinations, lab results, measurement results and digital graphs. They integrated and used 
that knowledge when giving advice and when choosing an appropriate approach. 
The diabetes team. The members of the smallest team shared knowledge and 
experience on the spot, when they met the patient together; that is why they often succeeded 
in giving complementary guidance. In the following example, the DN’s input of experience-
based knowledge (routinizing an activity that is experienced as disagreeable, works better 
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than having to take a decision over and over again) and the PE’s input, intuitively linking 
motivation and result, mutually reinforced each other. 
Independent Ruud, who has an insulin pump, has an HbA1c of 65 mmol/mol. But he is not satisfied 
with this reasonable result, because he is struggling hard to achieve good regulation. He measures 
his blood sugar at least six times a day, he injects insulin when he eats an additional snack etc. 
Nevertheless, he has one hypo attack on average per week, which causes him a lot of problems. The 
DN, thinking practically, discovers that this is possibly caused by the fact that he does not change 
his infusion device often enough, because he finds that unpleasant. She advises him to reduce his 
aversion by turning this activity into a routine, changing it at fixed times, three times a week. The 
PE addresses Ruud in a different way: “There’s one thing I maybe think is still quite a challenge: 
you’re really putting in a lot of effort, and you’d like to ultimately see… you’d like it to produce a 
better result (…) that would also keep up your motivation!” R: “Yes, it will.” 
The larger team appeared to be effective in gathering, integrating and applying 
knowledge, possibly because of the frequency and variety of interactions between its 
members, which generally meant they were able to complement each other. They asked each 
other for advice on problems with assessments or judgements, or when they found it difficult 
to deal with a patient or family. Moreover, it also struck us during the observation of the 
interaction pattern in the larger team that the formal hierarchy (the PEs are at the top, 
followed by the psychologist and finally the DNs – sometimes seniority or recognition of an 
expert status resulted in higher ranking in the hierarchy for someone otherwise lower down) 
was present in interactions, but it was rarely expressed in the form of members exerting 
dominance on the basis of their position or their personality. Most of the time, the team 
members approached each other as equals and showed appreciation for each other’s expertise; 
contributions were assessed on the criterion of their value for the patient. The PE just as easily 
took advantage of the DN’s expertise, for instance in relation to Ahmed who was not handling 
his sensor well and was afraid to prick at school: PE: “Can you make a schedule for him in 
which you mention how often he has to prick his finger? And perhaps explain at school, as 
well? And go through it with Ahmed in a quiet moment?” or, vice versa, in relation to Kees, 
who had offended the DN by bluntly refusing to attend an educational program: DN: “Can 
you find out why, and explain to him why we think it is really necessary?”  
During the briefing for the annual check-up of Vicky, who was referred back to the PE by the 
internist after transition because she took irresponsible risks and refused to take advice, the team 
discusses the strict course that is to be followed. However, the DN who obviously knows the girl 
well, says: “You have to realize that she is already reluctant to come. Now, she has a new doctor, 
while she was really devoted to her former pediatrician. Let her just come with whatever she 
wants.” This proposition is accepted; and as it turns out Vicky is very cooperative. 
Disagreements and conflicts also occurred, for instance about the set-up of the weekly 
informal discussions. During the observation period, these sometimes led to confrontations, 
but not to a split within the team or to a loss of mutual trust. 
Summary: Frequent, formal and informal interactions, complementarity and mutuality 
were characteristic features of the diabetes team. This facilitated the gathering, integrating and 
applying of (personal, contextual and biomedical) knowledge. Despite the formal hierarchy, 
we observed egalitarian relations and mutual appreciation among the team members. They 
PRACTICAL WISDOM IN PROFESSIONAL CARE FOR ADOLESCENTS
7
129
gave each other advice and accepted each other’s advice. They discussed disagreements and 
did not allow these to escalate into a conflict. 
The infrastructure. The material infrastructure of the practice, which was partly built 
by the team itself, is well-developed. We will only address three elements; firstly, the ICT 
facilities. The constant availability of electronic information has become indispensable in the 
care of diabetes patients. This infrastructural facility enables caregivers to communicate 24 
hours per day; full patient details are available to all of them in real time and in easily 
accessible format. In addition, the electronic medical record shows laboratory results and 
diagrams that make the quality of the diabetes regulation, - the extent to which the biomedical 
standards are met - visible at a glance (stable or unstable; number of deviating values; the 
severity of the deviations; corrections applied; unexpected interventions). In this way, the ICT 
facilities support the integration of the different modes of patient knowledge. 
 In this article we have chosen to include limited description of two other elements 
from the infrastructure: the quality-of-life questionnaire, which patients and parents complete 
separately at annual check-ups and which is discussed together, and the individual care plans 
which contain points of interest for the three months that follow. 
The ‘quality-of-life questionnaire’ consists of 36 questions, distributed across a 
number of domains such as ‘general’, ‘mood’, ‘body image’, ‘social life’, and ‘living with 
diabetes’ and it also includes a couple of open questions. The introduction states that “the 
primary objective is . . . to identify possible problems and barriers . . . and to offer extra help 
where necessary.” In an interview, one of the DNs explained what insights this list can 
provide: “Because of these lists, we gained more insight into the different aspects of the life 
of a family, without having to ask explicitly. Parents and child have the opportunity to 
introduce subjects for discussion themselves.” Thus it helps the practitioners to obtain a better 
understanding of the impact the disease has on the patient’s life. The first question has proven 
to be a good trigger to express themselves for adolescents who do not normally speak very 
easily about their illness and the concerns it causes them: “There is a ladder. The 10 at the top 
of the ladder means the best life you can imagine. The 0 at the bottom of the ladder means the 
worst life you can imagine. Where on the ladder is your life in general?” 
Irma, who has an insulin pump, gives her life 7 out of 10. PE: “So, there’s room for improvement, 
but it’s not very bad either.” I: “No, it isn’t.” PE: “What would you like to see changed?” I: 
“Er..” PE: “I had expected you would say ‘no diabetes’ straight away.” I: “No, no pump.” PE: 
“No pump? Why?” I: “I can’t even wear a dress.” 
Jasmine, who also has an insulin pump, answers the question: “Does your diabetes prevent you 
from doing things away from your parents?” (parties, staying the night somewhere, going out) as 
follows: “I prefer it when they stay with me.” The PE concludes from this that diabetes is causing 
undesirable social obstacles in this instance; she begins a conversation about removing these. 
The personal care plans were developed by the team themselves. The plans are used 
by patients from 12 years on, and they are updated during each consultation. The patient’s 
role is mentioned in the introduction: “You are responsible for your health yourself, together 
with your parents”. Patients can specify the appointments they have during a three-month 
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period; they read what they have to do before the check-up (test blood just before they go into 
the consultation, read out the pump one day before the appointment), and what they can 
expect during a check-up (discussion of blood test results, checking of pricked areas, weight, 
height and growth, questions about hyper and hypo attacks etc.). For every checkup, they can 
also write down what arrangements were made about the details of the treatment: basal 
insulin, ratios, sensitiveness, target for blood glucose levels etc. There is space to address 
health objectives, but, above all, to set personal targets.  
The personal care plan which the patient keeps up to date herself, has proven to be a 
rich source for the practitioners to acquire situational and personal patient knowledge. It 
illustrates what difficulties adolescents face in dealing with the illness. At the same time, the 
care plan stimulates reflection on dealing with diabetes in everyday life. 
Summary: The three infrastructural issues mentioned have proven to be tools that 
patients can use to control their life with diabetes. For practitioners the tools can clarify a 
number of patient issues and concerns that would have remained hidden without them. Thus, 
the tools facilitate practitioners’ integrating and applying personal, contextual and biomedical 
patient knowledge, as well as patients’ involvement in these processes. 
Second research question: how is (are judgements on) morally good care enacted 
in relation to the medical standards of the guidelines, and how are they expressed in 
ordinary actions within this practice? This question will similarly be addressed 
specifically for: 
Individual practitioners. We observed that the PEs and the DNs in their contacts with 
patients regularly mentioned the medical standard that they were concentrating on: optimal 
and stable regulation of diabetes to prevent early or late complications. It was also clear that 
they engaged with the patient on how that standard could be obtained in daily life. (For the 
latter, see the example of Tom, described under the first research question). 
In the case of Judith, who has an insulin pump, and an HbA1c value that is much too high (83) the 
PE finds out by asking questions that the girl only measures her blood sugars twice a day: in the 
mornings and in the evenings. The PE also finds out that Judith does not properly correct values 
that are too high. After many questions and negotiations they agree that Judith will measure at 
least four times a day, and that she will correct blood sugar levels that are too high. In this way she 
will try to reach the standard again. 
However, during almost every consultation we also observed that practitioners 
pursued a moral standard (appreciating what is good for the patient as a person) even if this 
meant that they had to deviate from the medical standard, albeit within the confines of a 
certain bandwidth. Remarkably, the practitioners we observed seemed to take this as a matter 
of course. Although there were various differences, explicit deliberation about the principle 
appeared to be barely necessary. When asked about this, they explained it by: “It is all about 
the patient.” “The patient must be able to carry on.” The extent of the bandwidth within which 
deviations from the medical standards are deemed to be acceptable, was determined on an ad-
hoc basis or in mutual consultation; and this bandwidth was not identical for every patient. 
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It transpires that Emiel, who has an insulin pump, has moved into his own place a few months 
before the consultation. This boy with a mild intellectual disability gets little support in dealing 
with his diabetes from his (divorced and also mentally disabled) parents (both of whom are living 
with new partners). He has accepted a job at a car wash and is running his own household: he 
does his own shopping, cooking and cleaning. He even managed to decrease his HbA1c value from 
92 to 80. It is evident that he counts his carbohydrates fairly assiduously and adjusts his insulin 
dose accordingly. The PE and DN both consider this such a great achievement that they 
congratulate Emiel and motivate him to continue in this vein (“Keep it up! Good job!”) without 
mentioning “but of course, the standard is 58.” 
Jasmine is over-accurate and worries about her high glucose levels. It transpires that her HbA1c 
value has risen from 41 to 48. The PE tries to rein her in, judging that the strict regulation of blood 
sugar levels is threatening to dominate the girl’s life; furthermore, she recognizes the risks for the 
future (becoming de-motivated by the instabilities of adolescence that are irreversibly 
approaching). She says explicitly that she is very pleased with these levels and stimulates the girl to 
check her blood glucose levels less often. 
Summary: The practitioners prioritized moral norms above biomedical standards and 
in fact did take this as a matter of course. They determined the limits of justifiable deviations 
from the biomedical standards through reflection and deliberation. The acceptable deviation 
bandwidth was different for every patient. 
The diabetes team. It is striking that the psychologist on the team (whose discipline 
predisposes her to be less focused on pursuing exclusively biomedical norms), regularly and 
explicitly raised the question : “What is good care here?” This question usually was followed 
by a dialog during which various considerations were discussed and a direction was chosen. 
An example: 
Alice is able to achieve with her insulin pump a sharp regulation of blood sugar values, but also 
has many hypo attacks which make her uncertain and ill-tempered. She is working as a trainee at a 
health care institution, with irregular working hours, including night shifts. The psychologist she is 
seeing due to severe family problems, proposes that she should stop with the insulin pump: “You 
have to look at the technical aspect (achieving balanced regulation) alongside the emotional aspect 
(being able to live a pleasant and quiet life) and you would like them to overlap. That doesn’t 
always work.” The PE and DN subsequently decide to switch to a schedule of four injections a day 
with an insulin pen, which does not permit the same accuracy in regulation, so that a rise of the 
average blood sugar level is expected. 
Three months later, at the outpatient consultation (where she attends with her mother), Alice 
appears to be pleased and motivated and says: “I have a more pleasant life now.” Her mother 
says: “We have chosen value of life; Alice is feeling better, she is more fun with higher blood sugar 
levels and it has become much quieter at night; she sleeps better.” 
Summary: in the diabetes team, the psychologist especially emphasized the priority of 
the moral norm over the biomedical standard. The team participated through mutual reflection 
and deliberation. 
Facilitating through infrastructure. It is clear that the electronic patient record 
facilitates reflecting on the biomedical standard versus the moral norm. An unstable pattern 
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and a lot of red figures in the laboratory results, pointing at deviations from the guideline 
standard, are, also, sure indications of a life that is frequently disturbed by diabetes. 
The quality-of-life questionnaire constitutes a second resource: a low number on the 
list indicates that there is a problem with ‘living with the disease’, often illustrated by answers 
to follow-up questions such as: “how often does diabetes stop you when you are planning to 
do something with the family?” and “how does diabetes hinder you in your social life, 
friendships and relationships?” or “how often does diabetes disturb your leisure time?” The 
answers give the practitioners valuable input for a conversation about achieving a balance 
between medical and moral standards. They can assist in weighting aspects: “what is most 
important for you?” and in looking for ‘livable’ solutions. 
The same is true for the individual care plans: the biomedical standards and the 
standards for the organization of care that have been incorporated in them. Under the heading: 
‘health targets’ the plan states: “keep an account here of your (measured) values and living 
habits. Discuss what goes well and what could be better for you with your physician or with 
the diabetes nurse.” This chapter of the care plan can provide starting points for an exchange 
and for the weighting of biomedical and moral standards in the consultation or in the team. 
DN in team: “Alice may achieve a fasting blood sugar level of between four and six (that is the 
target), but that only works if she measures glucose (finger prick) during the night; it would 
interfere with her sleep. Maybe we should accept a higher morning glucose level.” PE: “ Yes, we 
should; a night’s rest is very important for her. But how are we going to do that?” 
 Summary: the infrastructure creates scope for thinking together about a normal life, in 
which medical standards are judged in relation to moral norms. This was confirmed in the 
focus group. 
Third research question: How is a balance established between agreed, 
appropriate goals for individual patients in their specific contexts, and the general goals 
laid down in the guidelines? This question is addressed specifically to  
Individual care givers. Determining objectives, is a matter of defining purposes for 
the short term (motivation, tight regulation without disruptions, self-reliance or 
independence), and for the long term (absence of complications and a high quality of life in 
the long run). In their interactions with diabetes patients, the practitioners looked for acute 
disruptions, signals of poor motivation or poor acceptance of the disease, and of lasting 
dependency, in particular on parents, and subsequently discussed these.  
Smart Joris, who has an insulin pump, is careless about his disease, and for instance only checks  
his blood sugar once or twice a day. As a consequence, he only narrowly escaped a major 
disruption on several occasions. The PE strictly confronts him with this behavior. Then Joris says: 
“I don’t like my diabetes” PE: “You don’t like your diabetes; you just don’t want to live with it.” 
J: “No, I don’t.” PE: “Right?.” J: “Yes.” PE: “Perhaps we have to start helping you a bit with 
it.” J: “Yes.” PE: “Cause that’s the package deal: this diabetes belongs to you!” J: “Er..” PE: 
“and it won’t go away if you don’t stick to our plans.” J: “No.” PE: “Cause if you can control 
your diabetes well, there is a lot you can do. More than that: you can simply live a normal life.” 
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 Ilse, who also has an insulin pump, is going on a working holiday to Nicaragua. The pediatrician 
discusses the journey with her: necessary precautions; what she has to take with her, for instance a 
spare pump and a spare meter, insulin pens etc. The pediatrician ends the conversation with: “You 
can consult directly with the diabetes team in the Netherlands about all your blood sugar 
problems. You can always contact us.” The pediatrician judges, that precisely this patient, 
although she is very independent, needs confirmation that she can ask for help, if necessary. 
For Emiel (see above), PE and DN see it as the maximum achievable result, that he is able to live 
an independent life (a job, a driving license, playing sports, performing housekeeping tasks, 
communicating, digitally about diabetes, and also, in case of illness or exceptional circumstances, 
keeping his blood sugar at an acceptable level within wider limits) and that this requires a major 
effort on his part. That is why they (possibly temporarily) accept his current blood sugar levels that 
are too high. 
Summary: The practitioners interpreted the vague concept of ‘quality of life’ as 
‘normal adolescent life among family and peers, with as little disruption or hindrance from 
diabetes as possible’. At the same time, they continuously were aware of the aim to prevent 
early and late complications for their patients. They had to deal with the tensions caused by 
the discrepancy between ideal and realizable goals. 
The diabetes team. Occasionally, sharing and exchanging knowledge about current 
developments led to high biomedical targets being adjusted.  
At the briefing for the annual check-up, the intelligent, but quiet Roel is discussed. The 
psychologist shares her impression that Roel is being kept childish and dependent at home, 
because his parents are very concerned about disruptions. The team members agree without much 
discussion that Roel should become more independent and make arrangements on how to facilitate 
this. 
The team probably realizes and accepts that promoting Roel’s independence means at 
the same time that his diabetes regulation temporarily becomes less strict.  
The team discusses Kees (parents recently divorced; he and his younger brother live alternatively 
with the father and the mother). All the practitioners see that it is very difficult for Kees that his 
parents argue a lot about how to deal with his diabetes. The father leaves (too?) much to the boy 
himself; the mother is over-concerned and even checks his blood sugar level with finger pricks in 
the middle of the night. The psychologist suggests that Kees is experiencing a conflict of loyalty 
and that he suffers from his parents’ approach. However, loyal as he is to both parents, he does not 
want to discuss this burden with other people. This could also be the reason why he is refusing to 
attend educational meetings.  
The team members agree on a short-term aim for Kees in this fragile context: to be 
able to sustain the situation without serious deregulations (so temporarily accepting higher 
blood sugar values) and to maintain his care relationships with the team (so temporarily 
accepting that he won’t attend educational meetings). 
Summary: the practitioners needed the discussions and the sharing of responsibilities 
in the team to be able to adjust the purposes set out in the guidelines, and thus to deal with the 
tensions mentioned above. 
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Facilitation by the infrastructure. The purpose of the international guidelines has 
been incorporated explicitly into the quality-of-life-questionnaires, but it has been reduced to 
more modest proportions: “help children/adolescents in their efforts to overcome psycho-
social problems and barriers.” The questions are specific; answers constitute the basis for 
discussing everyday life and impediments that patients experience, with the aim of removing 
them. One example is the objective: “I am satisfied with the way I look.” 
The individual care plan offers scope both for general purposes derived from the 
guidelines (the ‘know’ and ‘can do’ goals) and for personal objectives. It often mentions 
typical everyday challenges for the patient in question, such as:  
“Think of something that can remind me to do blood sugar checks when I am playing at a 
friend’s.” “Think about at what age I want to be ready to go to an internist.” “When I get the 
pump, measure my blood sugar at school as a fixed habit.” “I am going to make an appointment at 
the hospital, together with my parents and my girl-friend to decide whether I want to continue with 
the pump.”  
It is clear from the preceding that, although the ideal purposes of the guidelines set the 
horizon for professional care, the practitioners and the team frequently opted to (possibly 
temporarily) adjust these purposes to what they thought was feasible, realistic or desirable for 
each individual. 
Summary: the findings illustrate that this practice focuses on constantly gathering 
knowledge about the individual patient (and her perspective) in her situation, in addition to 
gathering biomedical patient knowledge, and to integrating these types of knowledge. We 
observed that with the help of the integrated knowledge the practitioners regularly considered 
to what extent it was possible to deviate safely from the biomedical standards on the basis of 
the moral standard: to live a good life with the disease. Purposes were broken down into 
feasible sub-objectives; the absolute ideal of the guidelines was regularly reduced to a 
realistic target: to carry on with daily life, with as few disruptions and restrictions on account 
of the diabetes as possible. Thus, a balance appeared to be struck regularly between the 
guidelines on the one hand, and the particulars of a patient in her specific context and 
situation on the other. We were able to describe how these balances were enacted, and we will 
reflect on this under ‘reflection’. 
We asked the focus group about factors that they experienced as being a hindrance or 
a help when it came to this process of constantly balancing the guidelines with the specific 
situation of the individual patients. They mentioned two major impeding factors: 1) no or very 
limited professional relationship, for instance when they had to unexpectedly take over from a 
colleague. They stated that it was difficult or even impossible to build a relationship of trust 
under pressure. In these circumstances, they mostly made only medical-technical agreements 
with patients. 2) Time constraints, being in a hurry, stress through overburdening. The group 
emphasized that they needed a certain peace of mind and relaxation to be able to observe, 
judge, weight and decide properly. Although this has been taken into account in the planning 
of consultation hours, the schedule is often disrupted by unforeseen events. The practitioners 
mentioned three major supportive factors: 1) Mutual support in the team, mutual 
deliberations, joint training courses and working together to organize activities for patients. 2) 
PRACTICAL WISDOM IN PROFESSIONAL CARE FOR ADOLESCENTS
7
135
Being able to discuss questions or problems instantaneously and informally with one or more 
team members. 3) Being familiar with the living environment of their patients and being able 
to give care ‘close to home’. 
However, the underlying question of this study is the question of the 
‘grammar’(Eikeland and Nicolini, 2011), or ‘internal logic’ (Iedema, Mesman and Carroll, 
2013; Mol, 2009) of the practice.  
The ‘internal logic’ of the practice. As stated above, we have tried to improve the 
abductive analysis, by using the lenses of relationality and practical wisdom. What did we see 
through these lenses? 
Relationality. The relationality lens enabled us to distinguish the ‘logic of the 
practice’ in the structure and content of the consultations: from the beginning through the 
central part to the conclusion. The start of consultations appeared to be aimed at (re-
)affirming a relationship, which can be characterized as open, confidential and safe. The 
practitioners did not go straight to the point; the greeting was always very cordial: the 
practitioner turned to the patient, looked them in the eye, shook their hand and welcomed 
them by saying “Hi, hello, Niels”, or “Welcome, Irma”, followed by an expectant “How are 
you?” This welcome was often followed by a few pleasantries: when 15-year-old Erik 
arrived, without his mother for the first time, he was greeted with: “Hey, Erik, all alone!!! 
Cool! Did you tell her to stay outside?” Now and then there was small talk or a direct 
question: “Did you pass your driving test?” or “How was Nicaragua?”  
During the central part, the ‘body’ of the consultation, the subject was diabetes itself, 
recent incidents, the measurements presented, difficulties and questions, physical examination 
and the best possible approach for the period ahead. The characteristics of the relationship 
mentioned above probably made it easier for patients to express mistakes, difficulties that 
they experienced and concerns. Practitioners asked direct questions, asked further questions if 
necessary and listened intensely. It was striking in this context that they alternately adopted 
the professional perspective and the perspective of the patient’s life. In addition, that they 
actively looked for the meaning-for-the-patient of any behavior or expression. Only when 
they had been able to discover that meaning, did they present their advice, and this in a way 
they judged to be suitable for the patient.  
Lucas has a diabetes pump, is in the midst of puberty and is very focused on his appearance: he 
wants to look slim and muscular, and that is why he does not want to inject into his abdomen. His 
diabetes regulation is far less stable than it was in the past; he has been injecting extra insulin 
several times a day and despite this, his HbA1c value has increased. When he is asked follow-up 
questions, he appears to assume that a larger insulin requirement means that his diabetes is 
‘getting worse’. He is therefore unwilling to agree to a higher dose of basal insulin. When the 
pediatrician has managed to clarify this, she explains in detail that he has a greater insulin 
requirement, because “ that is normal for your age, because the sensitivity for insulin changes, that 
is consistent with your growth, that is consistent with your build, that is consistent with puberty, 
isn’t it, so, actually it’s a normal phenomenon.” In addition, the pediatrician cautiously suggests to 
Lucas that he should also consider injecting into his abdomen, but does not insist that he should 
start doing this immediately, because she expects that he needs time to adapt his behavior. 
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The fact that practitioners sometimes paid a relatively great deal of attention to 
professionally insignificant matters (which, however, were obviously bothering the patient, 
even though they were unrelated to their diabetes, their ‘concern’ according to Sayer, 2011), 
seemed to result from their habit of listening intensely and inquiring actively into the patient’s 
concerns. 
Emiel (see above) is concerned about pimples on his legs. The pediatrician spends much time 
talking about this, examines his legs thoroughly and discovers a connection with Emiel’s work at 
the car wash. He explains that it is probably a harmless rash, and that Emiel can probably solve 
the problem by applying Vaseline to the affected areas every day. 
The conclusion of a consultation included making or summarizing arrangements for 
the next three months period. The way this was done varied however: from going over 
everything very explicitly and item by item to simply mentioning everything in passing, or 
even a general ‘carry on’. It is evident that the practitioners adjusted the way they approached 
the patient to what they believed was necessary or appropriate in the professional relationship: 
sternly, encouragingly, stimulatingly, casually, etc. Goodbyes to mark the end of the meeting 
were usually warm and informal: “See you soon.” “Happy holiday.” “Good luck with your 
test.” 
Our observations show that the absence of relationality on several occasions, caused 
problems (mutual misunderstanding, conflicts) or awkward conversations, particularly when 
the subject under discussion was a lack of compliance or an unstable diabetes regulation: 
Ahmed, who has been living in the Netherlands for a few years, visits the consultation with his 
parents. They are refugees from the Middle East. Ahmed has an insulin pump and a glucose sensor, 
but he uses these devices in a manner that increases risks. The DN has asked the new PE, who is 
going to have her first encounter with the patient, to discuss this problem with him. The PE agrees 
to do this. At the start of the consultation, she is nervous and she immediately raises the problem: 
too few calibrations of the sensor, insufficient corrections of high glucose levels and too high 
HbA1c values. A conflictual situation then arises with the father, who even accuses the PE of 
discrimination.  
Afterwards, reflecting on the case, the PE suggested it would have been better not to 
have accepted the DN’s ‘order’, precisely because she had not yet been able to build a 
relationship with the patient and his relatives. 
Professional relationality has to be built and maintained; it is a specific kind of 
relationality that is needed to attune care every moment anew to particular patients in their 
specific situations. For mutual relationality it is also essential for patients to believe, that 
practitioners’ aim is to achieve the best possible outcome for them, so that they are willing to 
be honest and open.  
Our study shows that the practitioners and the diabetes team focus their ‘ordinary 
actions’ on entering into and maintaining a professional relationship with patients and their 
relatives, as well as on accepting their professional responsibility in these relationships. In 
addition, that they succeeded in using that relationship to acquire and renew the personal and 
situational knowledge they need in order to fine-tune their treatment of the diabetes patients. 
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One of the pediatricians in the focus group pointed out: “You always have to keep working on 
the fragile relationship with the patient based on mutual trust. That is because the patients 
must be able to rely on you any time they need you.” In conclusion, this study proposes that 
relationality as described belongs to the ‘grammar’ of professional care. The other important 
constituent appears to be practical wisdom, to which we turn now.  
Practical wisdom. Practical wisdom emerged preeminently as the ability to determine, 
sometimes in an instant, what is good for the patient, what the patient needs to continue her 
life. In addition, it appeared as the ability to individualize medical standards and the 
objectives of the guidelines. 
Our observations give rise to further elaboration on how individualization was realized 
in this practice. In the first place, it involved estimating the bandwidth within which it was 
possible to deviate from the medical norms without harmful consequences for the patient, and 
it involved determining the bandwidth margins. The ability to judge was essential for the 
practitioners and the team to be able to perform this task. For instance in the case of Emiel, 
the team members judged that, unlike the former value (92), an HbA1c value of 80 was 
acceptable for that particular moment. The DN confirmed in an interview that she expected 
Emiel would soon learn to approximate the threshold. Thus, the judgement above, like other 
judgements appeared to be influenced by the situation, by the here and now. Individualization 
was also evident in judging the hierarchy of norms, in which moral norms were sometimes 
put alongside and sometimes above medical norms.  
In the case of Emiel, the practitioners judged that (in the current situation) it was more important 
to help him lead an independent and meaningful life, than to hold him to the optimal HbA1c value. 
In the case of Alice, it was more important to reduce stress levels caused by the disease, to improve 
sleep, and to achieve greater stability than to recommend use of the insulin pump according to the 
guidelines. In the case of Kees, it was about being able to survive the conflict of loyalty with his 
parents rather than being forced to attend educational meetings.  
At the same time, however, the practitioners know that if they allow patients to free 
themselves of the standard, there could be harmful consequences due to early (acute 
disruptions) or late (vascular damage) complications. Practical wisdom emerges in the ability 
to compromise between skirting the norm and crossing critical limits. 
Likewise, adapting the excellent objectives of the guidelines to objectives that are 
regarded as feasible for a specific individual: a life that patients can bear because they do not 
experience it as a disabled life, appears to be a manifestation of practical wisdom. The 
practitioners kept looking for the best possible ‘overlap’ between the ideal objectives and 
their patients’ personal objectives. To this end, they used acquired knowledge of the person 
and their situation, such as impairments patients were already living with (Niels’s autism, 
Emiel’s intellectual disability, Vicky’s psychological lability, conflictual living conditions 
(Kees), and lack of understanding in the living environment of school and work ( a ban on 
checking blood sugar during class time).  
At the same time, practitioners were serious about the prevention of early and late 
complications, focusing on a life-not-disturbed-by-the-disease in the future.  
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PEs emphasized this during the physical examination: “Always prick the side of your fingers and 
switch fingers regularly. Why is this again?” They promoted developing a life style that includes 
sports and exercise, gave extra attention to the regulation of blood sugar when engaging in 
physical exertion and sports, and they did this both individually and during educational meetings. 
They also highlighted the prevention of complications during their discussion of the insulin-pump 
read-out and the blood sugar diagrams: “What can the results be if your blood glucose levels are 
too high or too low?” followed by: “What can you do to prevent these highs and lows?’ And when 
giving individual advice: Emiel is told by the DN: ‘Now that you are living on your own, … when 
you go to sleep after an evening out, you have to set the alarm clock to measure your glucose 
level.” The PE tells Joris: “It’s dangerous to deal so carelessly with your pump; perhaps you’ll 
have to go back to using the pen.”  
We observed an ongoing search for the best possible way to follow, meandering and 
improvising, supported by inventiveness, intuition, tacit knowledge, and experience. The 
professionals in the focus group acknowledged that this was essential to their craftsmanship. 
Doing relationality and practical wisdom. Our observations show that relationality 
and practical wisdom are established in the doings and sayings of the practitioners and the 
team and in addition, that these must be re-established in every new situation (a new problem, 
a different check-up appointment). They also demonstrate that relationality and practical 
wisdom occasionally failed to help a patient well, despite the practitioners’ efforts and 
deliberations. For instance, it proved impossible to support Kees in his loyalty conflict with 
his parents. Over time, he switched hospitals, owing to the imminent obligation to attend the 
educational meetings. 
We also observed that relationality and practical wisdom were imbedded in self-
developed, routinized actions, within the team and the infrastructure: consultations that begin 
by asking questions to establish the context; structural discussions before and after the 
consultation; sustained sharing of knowledge; the team culture and a way of cooperating that 
was aimed at complementarity and reciprocity and the desire to bear responsibility together; 
discussing care plans and quality-of-life-questionnaires with patients.  
Finally, we saw relationality and practical wisdom emerge in the quality of the 
professional attitude adopted by the practitioners: searching for solutions together with the 
patient; looking for and responding to concerns; discussing possibly tolerating a deviation. 
We also occasionally observed it when the practitioners adopted a specifically teaching, 
educational attitude to transfer their expertise, attuned to the individual patients, in suitable 
doses and in a dialog with the patient. And also, whenever the practitioners in question 
approached the patient as an expert on her own disease. Sometimes they were surprised by 
solutions that patients or relatives had found.  
Lucas’ mother found a special needle on the internet that can be used to install an infusion system, 
so that insertion is less painful. Jeroen’s mother proposed that she would measure her son’s blood 
glucose levels and adapt his insulin pump after an operation her son had to undergo, when the 
anesthetist admitted she found it difficult to do this.  
PRACTICAL WISDOM IN PROFESSIONAL CARE FOR ADOLESCENTS
7
139
Summary: the ‘internal logic’ or ‘grammar’ of this adolescent diabetes practice is 
characterized by relationality and practical wisdom. Relationality and practical wisdom 
appear to be indispensable to enact accurate balances between personal-situational and 
guideline knowledge, norms and purposes. 
 
Reflection 
Our research questions were aimed at the enactment of workable ratios of guideline 
knowledge, standards and goals on the one hand and patient oriented knowledge, norms and 
goals on the other, in an outpatient diabetes practice. We have described the outcomes of the 
study per question in the results section. Apparently, ordinary actions have to be attuned time 
and again to each patient in a purposeful, continuous and multifaceted way in ever changing 
situations. Hinder and Greenhalgh (2012) have emphasized the importance of personal and 
situational knowledge in caring for people with a chronic condition. However, they did not 
point out in what way this knowledge can be properly balanced with guideline knowledge and 
standards from moment to moment, in everyday practices.  
In addition, we found that the underlying ‘internal logic’ of the practice was 
characterized by relationality and practical wisdom, and we have described how relationality 
and practical wisdom were established. So far, hardly any attention has been paid to the 
empirically investigated ‘how’ and the ‘internal logic’ of medical practices in publications, 
with some exceptions: (Iedema et al., 2013; Mesman, 2002; Timmerman & Baart, 2016; Mol 
& Law, 2004; Mol, 2006; Saraga et al., 2019). The results section shows that our empirical 
findings differ from statements about relationality and practical wisdom in theoretical 
publications.  
 For example: professional relationality turns out to differ significantly from simply 
having empathy, or from communicating excellently, as Bensing (2000) and Visser (2017) 
seem to believe. Conversely, professional relationality as a practice means the enactment of 
knowing and understanding a contextualized patient and her perspective. This study 
demonstrates additionally, that it means the imbedding of relationality in individual 
practitioners’, team and infrastructural routines, culture and structures, for example in 
structural team discussions before and after each consultation, and in a culture of 
confidentiality and safety. The performativity of cultural aspects in practices has been 
confirmed in an empirical study by Setchell et al. (2019). The embedding of individual 
activities in the actions and influences of other agents (like team, culture and infrastructure) 
has also been described as a necessary condition for the emergence of practical wisdom 
defined as acting virtuously within organizations by Vriens et al. (2018). 
Although the ability to individualize has been mentioned as an essential element of 
practical wisdom by Aristotle and other authors (Hibbert, 2012; Kaldjian, 2014; Kinghorn, 
2010; Kotzee et al., 2016), none of these authors has further elaborated on how 
individualization is realized in practices. We have found that it involves estimating the 
bandwidth within which deviating from medical standards is judged acceptable, and that it 
involves determining bandwidth margins. This again has been demonstrated in other 
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empirical studies of practices. For example, Mesman (2002, p. 159) has called the process 
that concerns the demarcation of boundaries a “source of morality in practices.” Saraga et al. 
(2019, p. 44) have mentioned “trespassing common boundaries and limits” such as guidelines 
“by applying one’s own judgement or intuition” as a characteristic of clinical practices.  
Kaldjian (2010; 2014); and Pellegrino and Thomasma (1993) have emphasized goal-
directedness as a feature of practical wisdom, but they did not pay any attention to the 
practical challenge of bridging the gap between excellent and realizable goals. The empirical 
investigation of Franklin et al. (2019) has illustrated that health professionals’ interaction 
styles determine to what extent patients’ participation on personal goal setting is allowed. Our 
study has clarified that even practitioners’ interaction styles must be attuned to the 
particularities of patients and their actual situation.  
Kinsella (2012) has called the art of balancing a characteristic of professionality and 
practical wisdom. Kaldjian (2010, 2014) and Montgomery (2006) have mentioned sound 
judgement an identifier of practical wisdom. However, none of them was able to explain that 
balancing and judging are being established by an ongoing search for the best possible way to 
follow: meandering and improvising, supported by inventiveness, intuition, tacit knowledge, 
and experience. Conversely, the observations of this practice as well as discussing everyday 
work with practitioners revealed, that professionals judged these features to be essential for 
their craftsmanship. Mol and Law (2004), describing ethnographic observations of practices 
of care, have used ‘tinkering’ to characterize the improvising, meandering working method of 
practitioners.  
Finally, the problem of uncertainty, that is currently inextricably linked to professional 
practices (Kemmis, 2012), has differently been addressed from within practices. In the focus 
group, the professionals involved, indicated that they experience deviating from the 
biomedical standards and the goals of the guidelines as a continuous and burdensome 
uncertainty which is inextricably linked to their life as a professional. “Is it possible always to 
comply with the guidelines? At what cost? How do I know that I am right? Nobody can take 
that uncertainty away from you.” Mesman (2002, p. 159) has contended in relation to this: 
That the existing rules carry a certain idea of a practice and a problem and that this does not 
always fit with real practices. This study has revealed that deliberations in a committed team 
can be very important in supporting practitioners, who have to endure these uncertainties.  
 The relevance of this research emerges in the fact, that over a longer period of time 
we have observed the everyday practice of taking care of patients suffering from a chronic 
disease, through the lenses of relationality and practical wisdom. Although care ethicists have 
pointed out that relationality is essential for people to live together in this world (Tronto 1993; 
103), and practical wisdom has been identified as necessary for medical professional practices 
(Kinghorn, 2010; Kaldjian, 2014), so far, relationality and practical wisdom have been 
described mainly theoretically from the outside, and mainly as characteristics of individuals. 
This case study shows from within a medical practice, in what way relationality and practical 
wisdom are enacted. This has not been done before in such an extensive and longitudinal 
way. 
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Limitations. Although they were extensive, our observations only covered a limited 
section of the diabetes practice: limited in time – developments go on; for instance the 
diabetes practice of the hospital concerned has in the meantime been transferred to a larger 
hospital – and in the elements they focused on. For example: the professionals in the focus 
group indicated that the practice as described was the result of a lengthy and fragile growth 
process, that included trial and error. Our study was not, however, designed to give any 
attention to this growth process. Nor could it reflect on the wider organizational and national 
infrastructure of the practice, even though there is so much more to say, for instance, about 
the influence of technologies on life with and treatment of diabetes. 
The lenses we have chosen form a second limitation; they show a number of aspects 
of the practice sharply and clearly; but other elements remain vague. Observation using other 
frameworks would certainly have highlighted other aspects. For instance, it has been 
insufficiently clarified that treating patients with a chronic disease is an ongoing process, not 
the sum of isolated moments, and that the examples in time, place and persons that are 
depicted are only incomplete representations of that process, as Schermer (2001) has 
emphasized too.  
A third limitation arises from the case study as such. As Anderson et al. (2005) have 
described, case studies make it possible to study a practice as an integrated whole, but at the 
same time it is difficult to generalize from them. That is why our aim instead has been 
communicative generalizability or ‘transferability’ (Smaling, 2009a; Timmerman et al., 
2019). This means that the readers must judge to what extent the results can be transferred to 
their own practice. 
 
Conclusion  
To conclude: care given in this practice was good care to the extent that it was possible to stay 
close to the patient, to move at the pace of the patient’s difficulties and concerns and at the 
same time, to comply with medical evidence, norms, and purposes in the best possible way. A 
certain synthesis was often, but not always reached through the ‘logic’ or ‘grammar’ of the 
practice, which consisted of relationality and practical wisdom. The thorough empirical 
investigation from within this everyday practice has enabled us to describe the characteristics 
of this grammar. 
We also conclude that in modern practices, individual professional acting is embedded 
in the social and material network of the practice: in the treatment teams and the infrastructure 
(in a narrower and a broader sense). This means, that relationality and practical wisdom do 
not only emerge in the actions of individuals, but also in the social and material agents which 
together constitute networks. Our study has been able to demonstrate this in the practice in 
question through numerous examples.  
Future research could focus on further exploration of these networks and the 
influences that are brought to bear upon them, in particular, social and material influences, as 
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well as on the broader infrastructure of practices, constituted by healthcare organizations and 
the funding and supervisory bodies that surround them. 
 
Notes 
1. International Society for Pediatric and Adolescent Diabetes: ISPAD Clinical Practice 
Consensus Guidelines 2018. https://www.ispad.org/ISPADGuidelines2018  
2. Standards of Medical Care in Diabetes 2018; American Diabetes Association. In: Diabetes 
Care (41) (Supplement1): S1-S2. https://doi.org/10.2337/dc18-SINT01  
3. NDF Zorgstandaard; Addendum Diabetes type 1; Deel 2 Kinderen en Adolescenten. 
[DDF Standard of Care; Addendum Diabetes type 1; Part 2 Children and Adolescents]. 












































“But still, if it’s true,
how can it be a lie?”





We will start this concluding chapter by giving an overview of its structure: first, we will 
summarize the conclusions that follow from the results of the four separate empirical studies; 
then we will point out the interconnections between them. We will subsequently integrate the 
results and attempt to gain a deeper understanding of them, reflecting for instance on the 
meaning of practical wisdom for the morality of the care given within medical practices and 
health care institutions. We will also return to the question raised in chapter one: whether, and 
if so, why, practical wisdom is becoming increasingly important for medical professionalism 
as a ‘praxis’: activities impregnated with morality, in the current complex, dynamic and 
pluralistic healthcare context that is strongly marked by a chameleonic neoliberal discourse 
(Biebricher, 2017). 
Second, we will discuss what these results mean for our heuristic, tentative definition 
of practical wisdom: do they require that the definition be adapted and if so, how, or can it 
remain unchanged? Next, we will reflect on the implications of the conclusions for theories 
about practical wisdom, particularly theories related to medical professionalism. 
Third, we will discuss the possible implications of our findings for the frameworks 
chosen for this research: care ethics and practice theory, in particular the specific school 
whose main representatives are, Nicolini (2012), Schmidt (2012) and Gherardi (2016). 
Fourth, we will evaluate the research methods that have been used, specifically 
participatory research from within medical practices. 
Fifth, we will discuss the relevance of this study for practitioners. Subsequently, and 
in relation to this, we will discuss to what extent the results obtained are transferable or not, 
and thus whether they are also relevant for different medical and non-medical practices. 
Finally, we will make suggestions for further research of morality and practical 
wisdom in professional practices, both medical and otherwise.  
 
I.1. Results: summary of the empirical studies 
1. In chapter 4,‘The multiple faces of practical wisdom in complex practices’, we 
provided a survey of the various manifestations of practical wisdom that we have 
observed. We observed patterns such as: 1) a meandering instead of a linear work 
routine; 2) attuning the available means (e.g. guidelines) to the patient through 
improvisations; 3) getting the timing right for the patient; 4) taking advantage of 
different sources of knowledge; 5) actively maintaining, repairing or consolidating 
professional relationships. Moreover, we found various ‘interruptions’ or disturbances 
(of workflow and routines; of the doctor-patient relationship; of physicians’ (work) 
conditions; of patient’s characteristics) of which it has been suggested that they are 
able to trigger or encourage the emergence of reflection and practical wisdom (Frank 
2012). Reflection and practical wisdom did not automatically result from these 
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interruptions. We were only able to investigate to a certain extent our assumption that 
the triggering of practical wisdom could be facilitated or obstructed by specific 
‘figurations’ of the work structure. Finally, we reached a few unexpected insights, 
such as that professionals’ awareness of the good (the telos) is the essential point of 
reference for practical wisdom, and that practical wisdom as ‘doing wisdom’ takes 
seemingly trivial, commonplace forms. 
 
2. In chapter 5, “Professional workplace-learning. Can practical wisdom be learned?” 
we investigated whether practicing medical specialists learn practical wisdom through 
regular joint case discussions that are focused on a general learning objective. This 
study did not offer any insight into medical practitioners’ individual learning. 
However, it did demonstrate social learning (in medical practices) and organizational 
learning (in the hospital organization) of practical wisdom. Social learning emerged as 
1) increased awareness and recognition of the four components of practical wisdom 
(telos, balance, judgment and reflection/reflexivity); 2) increased reflexive capability; 
3) recognition of the morality of medical practices in mundane, multiform shapes 
(postponing an operation to help the patient prepare better for the risks she was likely 
to run; deciding not to apply physical restraints to prevent falling, because the 
disadvantages of restraints for a specific patient are disproportionate to that risk); 4) 
implicit or tacit knowledge of practical wisdom (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 
1969; Vosman & Baart, 2008), i.e. ‘practical wisdom’ was not mentioned explicitly 
anywhere; 5) distributed intelligence (Iedema, Mesman & Carroll, 2013)/distributed 
wisdom: practical wisdom was ‘crystallized’ in the physicians’ mores (see chapter 3). 
Moreover, the practical wisdom derived from the case discussions emerged in the 
structure and culture of the hospital organization, as the impact research showed. In 
that sense, there had been organizational learning of practical wisdom (Minzberg, 
2012; Schwarz, 2011; Vriens, Achterbergh & Gulpers, 2016). 
 
3. In chapter 6, “Professional medical discourse and the emergence of practical wisdom 
in everyday practices. Analysis of a keyhole case” we investigated 1) the ratio 
between the phronetic and technical-systemic approach to a case within the medical 
practice of a training hospital, 2) the influence on this ratio of the dominant discourse 
and of the care organization and 3) their effects on the care given and on cooperation 
between the various professionals.      
We found an asymmetric ratio between the technical-systemic approach 
(which relies on protocols, guidelines and routines) and the phronetic approach, whith 
the former being the dominant approach. The factors that occasioned the asymmetric 
ratio were partly practice-bound, like the dominant (medical-technical) discourse, and 
were partly characteristics of the infrastructure of the hospital. 
We were able to identify the devastating consequences of the suppression of 
practical wisdom, for example growing reciprocal estrangement, loss of trust, mutual 
misunderstanding and conflict between the professionals and the patient’s relatives. 
Our suggestion is that practical wisdom could have prevented, minimized, or solved at 
least some of these consequences. 
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4. In chapter 7, “Making the best of it: practical wisdom in professional care for 
adolescents with type 1 diabetes mellitus”, we examined how practitioners struck a 
balance between knowledge of patients, moral norms and individual objectives on the 
one hand, and general guidelines, medical standards and ideal goals on the other.  
We found that a balance appeared to be struck regularly in this practice between the 
acquisition and use of knowledge (general as well as specific), dealing with 
standards/norms (for medicine and life), and defining (sub-)objectives (ideal and 
realizable ones). We also found that the ‘internal logic’(Mol, 2006) or the ‘grammar’ 
(Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011) of the practice lies in relationality and practical wisdom. 
We subsequently looked at how the professionals and the team, supported by the 
infrastructure, enacted relationality and practical wisdom. The team, with 
characteristic mutuality, turned out to be important as a context in which mutual 
reflection and consultation were possible on the basis of equality; it also facilitated ad 
hoc informal or crisis meetings, and offered support for difficult decisions. The 
professionals had developed and honed the infrastructure of the practice over many 
years so that it optimally supported relationality and practical wisdom.   
In addition, relationality emerged in 1) the structure and content of the 
consultations. It was striking that professionals were guided by the patient’s 
perspective, or ‘concern’ (Sayer, 2011); this became clear, among other things, from 
the fact that they were willing to discuss matters that were unimportant from a 
professional point of view, but that patients worried about. 2) In addition, relational 
work turned out to be translated into action routines and work structures. 3) Finally, 
the practitioners had developed a specific, flexible attitude (similar to the habitus 
defined by Aristotle, 2009; Bourdieu, 1990; and Eikeland, 2006), in which they easily 
attuned their approach to the specific patient they were seeing (directive, stimulating, 
compassionate etc.).    
Practical wisdom emerged preeminently as 1) the ability to determine, 
sometimes in an instant (intuitively and creatively), what is good for the patient, what 
the patient needs to continue her life. 2) In addition, it appeared as the ability to 
individualize medical standards and the objectives of the guidelines. Individualization 
was realized by estimating the bandwidth within which it was deemed acceptable to 
deviate from the medical norms without harmful consequences for the patient. This 
involves determining the margins of the bandwidth. 3) Practitioners and the team both 
need the ability to judge to be able to perform this task (Kaldjian, 2014; Montgomery, 
2006). 4) Individualization was also evident in judging the hierarchy of norms, with 
moral norms sometimes being placed alongside and sometimes even above medical 
norms. Practical wisdom emerged in the ability to compromise between skirting the 
medical norm and crossing critical limits (Mesman, 2002; Saraga, Boudreau, & Fuks, 
2019). 5) In addition, adapting the excellent objectives of the guidelines to objectives 
that are judged to be feasible for a specific individual appeared to be a manifestation 
of practical wisdom. 
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I.2. Results: interrelations, or how each theme emerges in the separate studies  
1. The theme of the first study (chapter 4), manifestations of practical wisdom in 
everyday practices, also appears in the other three empirical studies. In chapter 5, 
patterns already described such as the meandering work routine (in which 
professionals deviated from schedules, or inserted moments of reflection or 
interdisciplinary deliberation on a dead-end diagnostic path) were again discernable. 
The same is true for improvising: attuning available means to the particular patient by 
modifying them, i.e. adjusting guidelines, procedures, routines and instructions (for 
instance, when it is necessary to pursue opposite goals, such as reduction of liquid 
because of heart failure and, conversely, supplementation of fluid because of the threat 
of dehydration for the same patient). There are also various examples of the three 
other patterns mentioned before. We also saw new patterns, such as actively 
investigating the patient’s perspective (if necessary through the relatives) and taking 
time-out to hold a multi-disciplinary consultation to solve difficult diagnostic or 
therapeutic problems. In chapter 6, we recognized the sporadic practical wisdom in 
getting the time right for the patient’s sake when an intensivist decided to make 
herself available for another conversation with a concerned relative at an unusual time. 
Apart from the patterns already mentioned in chapter 4, two new patterns stand out in 
chapter 7: first, the recognition of the patient’s concern and the decision to let this be 
decisive, although it seems medically unimportant, and second, the professional’s 
tolerating of certain behaviors on the part of the patient (Van Heijst, 2005; Vosman & 
Baart, 2008), i.e. professionals did not purposefully emphasize or only minimally 
emphasized undesired patient behavior (alcohol consumption), for instance to avoid 
damaging the relationship or trust.            
In chapter 5, we sought and found ‘interruptions’ or ‘disruptions’: the practice 
was riddled with these. The most common were uncertainties of various kinds, 
unexpected problems in the organization or the conditions of care (operation theatre 
not available; computer network malfunction; medicine or tool ordered was wrong or 
was delivered too late etc.), and disruptions of the doctor-patient relationship (through 
misunderstandings, incomprehension etc.). In chapter 6, we noticed that the indicative 
role of the many interruptions (unexpected transfers; a life-threatening incident; 
intense negative emotions on part of the relatives) was practically absent. On the other 
hand, in chapter 7, the warning function was mostly excellent. For example: patients 
made surprising, unexpected remarks: “I cannot even wear a dress!” “Stay overnight? 
I would prefer them to come to me.” All the studies confirmed that the interruptions 
were not automatically used as a signal for the emergence of practical wisdom.  
Chapters 5 to 7 yielded many examples of figurations in the work situation that 
had a facilitating or a constraining influence on the alerting function of interruptions. 
In chapter 5, cultural and structural factors exerted a positive influence (a learning, 
open-minded, safe culture of mutual support by colleagues and the opportunity for 
planned and unplanned multi-disciplinary consultations in all kinds of situations 
respectively). Chapter 6 listed the constraining figurations of the practices involved 
and of the hospital infrastructure. However, chapter 7 clarified, how several 
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figurations facilitate the function of interruptions as an alert, and thus the emergence 
of practical wisdom. Examples are: the team’s qualities and thus, the quality of the 
social environment and of professional relationships; the team-culture as described 
above; the design and accessibility of the EPR; and the infrastructure, including all 
kinds of tools, such as individual care plans and quality-of-life questionnaires.
 Additional findings (not looked for, but serendipitously found) from chapter 4 
were: practical wisdom is manifested in ‘ordinary actions’. This means that practical 
wisdom appears to be not only wisdom in reasoning, but also and possibly primarily 
wisdom in action.               
Moreover, this wisdom in action appears to take seemingly trivial and 
commonplace forms. Both findings were confirmed in the follow-up studies. Thus we 
concluded in chapter 5 that practical wisdom had acquired “a concrete and 
manageable face”. We found there that practical wisdom emerges in “various daily 
and situation-dependent forms”, which we called ‘mundane’ and ‘trivial’. In chapter 6 
we recognized practical wisdom in the action of a nurse, who let a patient’s daughter 
participate in her mother’s daily care even though this was against existing explicit 
custom. In chapter 7 we identified practical wisdom in the joint and intentional 
acceptance of deviating standards and in practical advice (to change the infusion 
system at set times); again, therefore, in actions, judged to be very normal by the 
practitioners. 
 
2. The theme of the second study (chapter 5) is learning (four distinctive factors) of 
practical wisdom. Learning to distinguish one or more factors and learning to use 
these factors in daily work also appeared in the other studies. It was acknowledged in 
chapter 4, that the point of reference for practical wisdom is the telos: “the good that 
has to be achieved for the patient and that is in accordance with the goal of the 
professional practice”. We also found there that this goal varies for individual patients 
and their situation. In chapter 6, it became clear that learning practical wisdom (here, 
particularly learning reflection and reflexivity) was constrained, or perhaps made 
impossible by such things as the dominant, technical-instrumental professional 
discourse, the absence of structural opportunities for multi-disciplinary consultation, a 
mode of cooperation that involved mainly bi-lateral consultations and a hierarchical 
structure. The constraint consisted of the inability to perceive one-sidedness and 
deficits in its own discourse; a culture characterized by absence of openness to 
different perspectives (see also Jenkins, Kinsella & Deluca, 2018). In chapter 7, we 
identified a learning culture within the diabetes practice, consisting of listening well, 
an attitude of inquiry, frequently changing perspectives, especially in contacts with 
patients, recognition of uncertainties and intentionally setting aside time for reflection, 
including explicit reflection on the actual goal of professional guidance, the right 
balance between what is desirable and what is feasible and on achieving good shared 
judgement by carefully weighing pros and cons. 
We found social and organizational learning in chapter 5, but could not 
demonstrate the occurrence of individual learning. In chapter 7, it was made plausible 
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that this social and organizational learning can stimulate individual learning and vice 
versa. 
 
3. The theme of chapter 6 is the suppression of practical wisdom, due to the fact that 
medical professionals are primarily guided in their daily activities by the dominant, 
professional, technical-instrumental discourse. Moreover, suppression takes place due 
to specific practical and infrastructural figurations which in turn are determined by 
institutional control. In chapter 4, various suppressing factors were mentioned, such as 
the imposition of general and binding rules, appointments and routines, limited time 
and mandatory schedules. These create “hostile ground for growing phronesis” 
according to Pitman (2012, p. 131). As the opposite, ‘contextual promoting 
figurations’ for practical wisdom we described “structural moments for reflection” in 
chapter 4, such as “care provider huddles (informal meetings) at the beginning of 
every shift” (Widmer, Swanson, Zink & Pines, 2018). Chapter 5 shows that creating 
structural scope for joint reflection, purposefully learning to reflect and jointly 
realizing the kind of culture mentioned above (learning, safe, open-minded, 
supportive) appear to facilitate the emergence of practical wisdom. In chapter 7, the 
professionals named factors that hinder them in developing practical wisdom, such as 
lack of time or time pressure and being obliged to treat chronic patients with whom 
they have not had the opportunity to build a good professional relation. These 
contextual factors correspond with the figurations in chapter 4.         
All our empirical investigations were focused on practices, not on individual 
actors. We therefore paid less attention to personal impediments or stimuli for 
practical wisdom. 
 
4. In the fourth study (chapter 7), we investigated the subject of individualizing by 
keeping course while being prepared to compromise. In this study, the contrast with 
providing medical care in a linear, systematic way became very clear. Meandering or 
‘tinkering’ (Mol, Moser & Pols, 2010; Timmerman & Baart, 2016) is essential, 
because it is necessary, time and again, to determine each patient’s goal, as well as 
whether and to what extent deviations from general guidelines (to attune care to the 
individual patient in her actual situation and context) are acceptable. Knowing how to 
individualize appropriately (taking the ‘particulars’ into account) here stands for 
practical wisdom. (Aristotle, 2009; Kinghorn, 2010; Hibbert, 2012; Kaldjian, 2014; 
Kotzee, 2016). In chapter 4, the second manifestation pattern of practical wisdom 
appeared to be: attuning available means to the patient and the situation by modifying 
them. Also, attunement to the individual patient is the (sub-)goal of the other 
manifestations mentioned in chapter 4. Thus the meandering procedure represents the 
aspect of compromising. In chapter 5, one of the learning points under ‘telos’ was that 
this telos frequently needs to be specified according to situation and patient. Finding a 
concrete balance, as indicated with many examples, is intended ‘to hit the mean’ 
(Eikeland, 2006) in the Aristotelian sense, i.e. not an average or median, but a 
balanced best point between two extremes. Weighing at another moment under 
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different circumstances may yield a different ‘mean’. Burbules (2019, p. 128) means 
the same when he refers to “finding the sweet spot”. For the indicators of judgement 
and reflection, the ability to differentiate appeared to be necessary to assess the  
particulars of a patient and her situation. In chapter 6, there was insufficient 
individualization and therefore a lack of practical wisdom; in this case, in particular, 
the professionals failed to distinguish the patient’s and her relatives’ concern, or to use 
the relatives’ knowledge to achieve good individual fine-tuning. This chapter also 
demonstrates that individualization is more difficult the more guidelines or a dominant 
discourse become a decisive factor. Moreover, this chapter shows, that fine-tuning is 
practically impossible when good professional relationships or relationality as a 
characteristic of the practice are lacking. This is because it is precisely in professional 
relationships that a patient’s distinctive characteristics and her perspective can emerge. 
None of the four studies, offered any opportunity to directly study the influence of 
extra-institutional factors on the practices: such as the prevailing political and social 
discourses; the supervisory authorities that often have a strongly technical-systemic 
orientation (on quality, safety, accountability systems); the government authorities and health 
insurers; or public opinion, influenced by traditional and social media. Yet, these extra-
institutional influences can be indirectly recognized in the studies through the dominant 
professional discourse and through the organization in which the practices studied are 
embedded. This is clear from for instance the emphasis on efficiency, with ensuing work 
pressure (chapter 7), from the uncertainty that professionals experience when they deviate 
from protocols and guidelines (chapter 7), or from the absence of ‘reflective spaces’ i.e. 
opportunities for joint reflection (chapter 6). Extra-institutional bodies especially seem to 
represent a restricted view on the ethics of medicine and health care: they regard this either as 
a matter of taking decisions on social dilemmas (euthanasia, abortion, genetic manipulation) 
or as decisions that are confined to the private sphere of individuals (Tronto, 1993; Vosman & 
Baart, 2008; Baart, 2018). Baart has therefore spoken of ‘moralicide’ (smothering the ability 
for moral reflection) in the professional sphere. Moral issues, as they emerge in the present 
study, are invested, as it were, with a different identity, for instance a legal, organizational, or 
systemic identity and are consequently no longer recognized as ethical issues. There are still 
many questions and opportunities for future research here. 
We have presented the outcomes of the studies in relation to one another in the table 
below. 
  




     





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I.3. Results: integration 
In this section, we will do two things: first, we will look at outcomes of this inquiry into 
everyday medical practices, that emerged accidentally: things we did not set out to seek, but 
that we serendipitously found nonetheless. Second, we will investigate the conclusions that 
arise when the results of the four studies are interrelated at a higher level: overarching 
conclusions. 
Practical wisdom involves interconnected reasoning and actions: practical 
reasoning and ordinary actions. Although this outcome has already been mentioned above, 
we will give a detailed explanation here, because this finding of our empirical research is a 
concrete instantiation of the concept that has been developed theoretically. Kinsella and 
Pitman (2012, p. 1) depict phronesis “ as an organizing framework for professional 
knowledge.” Kinghorn (2010, p. 100) describes practical wisdom as: “practical reason leading 
towards action.” Eikeland (2006, p. 5) emphasizes that “ its primary focus is ‘application’, 
performance, or enactment ”, but these authors do not address what ‘practical reasoning’ and 
‘enactment’ look like in practice and how they can be discerned in daily practices. The current 
study demonstrates that the reasoning does not foremost refer to taking decisions as Kaldjian 
(2014) and Conroy et al. (2018) emphasized, but to observing well, to being able to perceive 
other perspectives (at least the patient’s perspective), to evaluating and weighing, to being 
able to handle uncertainties, to clarifying specific, feasible and desired goals and to realizing 
these using the most appropriate and available means. This implies that the reasoning has 
been incorporated into actions and also has actions as its goal; and conversely that knowledge 
emerges from actions, as Kemmis (2012) emphasized. This illustrates the interconnectedness 
of reasoning and actions. Moreover, our study shows that not only basic-scientific knowledge 
and evidence are important for detailed, specific observation and for practical reasoning, but 
also the practitioner’s mature experience, emotions, and intuition, and their ability to listen 
carefully to patients and their relatives. This issue has already been raised in publications by 
clinicians (Groopman, 2007; Gawande, 2014; Westendorp & Kusumastuti, 2019). ‘Reasoning 
in action’ can manifest itself in many forms: for instance in resolutely returning to the 
beginning of the complaints with the patient, adopting an inviting attitude when resistance on 
the part of the patient is to be expected, or looking together as a team for the best solution by 
weighing various alternatives (deliberation). Our study shows that practical reasoning is 
always focused on actions and manifests itself in actions. Practical wisdom differs, therefore, 
from clinical reasoning, which is primarily oriented to knowing. Moreover, the actions often 
appear commonplace, sometimes trivial, mundane: watchful waiting, postponing a treatment 
to be able to consult colleagues, giving a patient the time for reflection; repeatedly asking 
open questions to gain better understanding, involving someone who has the patient’s 
confidence, taking a reasoned decision to deviate from a guideline or instruction etc. In such 
seemingly unessential actions, practical wisdom is manifested in practice. Practical wisdom is 
not primarily about solving difficult problems (for instance agreeing a treatment limitation 
with a patient), although, these problems too, certainly ask for practical wisdom. Practical 
wisdom is the capability to purposefully attune the practice from moment to moment to what 
the specific patient needs in her situation through everyday actions.    
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Interruptions replace dilemmas as ‘initiators’ of practical wisdom in daily work. 
Traditionally, dilemmas are regarded in medical ethics as initiators of explicitly moral actions 
and as the subject of moral deliberation (Stolper, Molewijk & Widdershoven, 2016; 
Inguaggiato, Metselaar, Porz & Widdershoven, 2019). (for morality and practical wisdom see 
the next section). Moreover, medical literature deals especially with certain specific dilemmas, 
such as to refrain from treatment versus to start or proceed with treatment, curative or 
palliative treatment, whether or not to perform euthanasia, whether or not to recommend an 
abortion, whether or not to conduct genetic research, whether or not to inform (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1993; Kaldjian, 2010, 2014; Kristjánsson, 2015). This study shows that the 
‘interruptions’ - of the work situation or of the practitioners’ stream of thoughts - as 
mentioned by Frank (2012) can cause practical wisdom and, therefore, morality to emerge. 
This may happen through individual reflection, sometimes in a flash (the ‘reflection-in-action’ 
mentioned by Schön, (1987) or through inter-individual, more time consuming deliberation. 
These interruptions emerge, just like practical wisdom, as nonspecific, diverse everyday 
manifestations, as ‘ripples’ in practices (an emergency intervention that disturbs the planning 
of consultation hours, unexpected or fierce emotions in a patient that have to be taken care of, 
the sudden bright understanding that a diagnostic hypothesis is not accurate). However, in 
order to make it possible for practical wisdom to emerge, these disturbances need to be 
perceived and then used as a signal for ‘practical wisdom’; it is not a matter of automatic 
causation. 
There is another difference between the traditional dilemmas mentioned in the 
literature and clinical practice: the concept of di-lemma suggests, that it is a matter of 
either/or between only two incompatible alternatives By contrast, Eikeland (2006, p. 42) 
argues: “First of all, divisions do not necessarily operate in pairs, neither in Aristotle nor in 
the real world. In addition the divisions are not always mutually exclusive. There are many 
overlaps, and many fuzzy borderlines.” Complexity theory has similarly criticized binary 
thinking based on science (Hollnagel, Wears & Braithwaite, 2015) because it does not fit into 
the complex reality of current care practices. The interruptions mentioned do fit this reality, 
precisely because they leave scope for nuances, alternatives and possible solutions . 
Multiform, changing figurations may support the emergence of practical wisdom; 
management aimed at control, efficiency, and linear planning impede it. Practice theory 
(Schmidt, 2012; Nicolini, 2012; Gherardi, 2016) investigates “ how concerted 
accomplishments and performances are connected and hang together to form constellations or 
larger assemblages” Nicolini & Monteiro, 2017, p. 13). Moreover practice theorists, like 
complexity theorists (Dekker, 2011; Sturmberg, 2018; Braithwaite, 2018), emphasize that in a 
complex reality like the current one, linearity is an illusion and that the impact of a single 
factor is unpredictable. They thus qualify the possibilities of management and planning in 
complex practice situations. The current research shows that there are all kinds of figurations 
in practices, which either support or obstruct the emergence of practical wisdom and the 
alerting effect of interruptions. Figurations are networks of human and non-human, material 
and immaterial, interrelated and interdependent factors, which constantly adapt in dynamic 
processes (Elias, 1971; Wilterdink, 2011; Schmidt, 2012). We mentioned a number of 
facilitating and constraining figurations: an open-minded, safe, supportive culture of 
cooperation versus a technical-instrumental dominant discourse respectively, and also studied 
the material surroundings as a part of the figurations (the EPR, individual care plans). In 
addition, we demonstrated that although there are interruptions with an alerting effect and 
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although the figurations are of a facilitating nature, yet, practical wisdom does not 
automatically emerge. For instance, see in chapter 7 the pediatrician who agrees to confront a 
patient with a failure to follow up prescribed treatment. However, she does not have a 
professional relationship with this patient yet. This example also illustrates that in complex 
practice situations single influences can have unpredictable consequences: there was an 
unpleasant clash between this practitioner and the patient’s parents, because the father, totally 
unexpectedly, linked the confrontation to earlier incidents that had happened with someone 
else and that he had experienced as discriminatory. This implies that practical wisdom in 
organizations and practices cannot be established by straightforward management programs, 
nor by organizing course programs in isolation from daily practice. However, organizations 
and practices can design and modify their infrastructure in such a way that practical wisdom 
can flourish. Listening to the ‘knowers’ within core-practices, creating reflective spaces, 
providing ‘good care’ by showing flexibility and readiness to adjust, and the promotion of a 
culture of mutual support are certainly necessary to achieve this purpose. (see also Nonaka & 
Toyama, 2007; Minzberg, 2012; Eikeland, 2006; Vriens et al., 2017) 
Practical wisdom (phronesis), skills (techne) and basic sciences and evidence 
(episteme) partly overlap and have fuzzy boundaries. In the four empirical studies, practical 
wisdom regularly emerged as working towards a goal (the good for the patient in the long 
term and in the short term) in an improvising, searching, meandering way; a goal, that was 
sometimes difficult to grasp, because it was opaque and fluid. One example was, to establish 
what a ‘good life’ might imply in the current and future situation for the patient with diabetes 
whose sugar level was difficult to regulate and whose insulin pump was replaced by an 
insulin pen. In his publications (1987; 1983/1991) Schön addressed solving professional 
problems by improvisation supported by reflection in the ‘messy swamp’ of daily reality. He 
compared practicing professionals to musicians in a jazz orchestra who improvise on a theme. 
Broad experience and great competence (knowledge and skill) are needed for such 
improvisations to be successful, both with regard to the music they make with their own 
instruments and to realize optimal harmony. The same is true for the medical professionals we 
have observed. The improvisation and meandering did not happen at random, nor were they 
separated from the context of the practice. Instead, they were done in a goal-oriented way, 
using the available experience, knowledge and competence, and in a way that was appropriate 
to the history and situation of this patient in this practice. We observed the emergence of 
practical wisdom and competence (Sennett, 2009; Tyson, 2018) for instance in the way a 
practitioner performed a physical examination, encountered a patient or colleague, accepted 
that a patient needed time to take in the news, or in the way they used an instrument (a needle, 
a stethoscope) or a device (blood pressure device, a monitor). Thus, practical wisdom also 
manifested itself as a quality of technical-professional actions. Burbules (2019, p.130) also 
pointed out: “Techne and phronesis aren’t opposed to one another, they are related – and 
related in such a way that one enables the other.” Eikeland (2006), too, emphasizes that 
practical wisdom presupposes that actors have acquired general professional competences and 
have knowledge of the domain in question, including of the specific telos. He argues that 
professional competences and knowledge are essential to analyzing localized situations 
adequately and to weighing different goals and arguments through deliberation. 
Practical wisdom and relationality are interrelated and interdependent. The four 
empirical studies show that practical wisdom in medicine today does not emerge without 
relationality, neither in reasoning nor in other actions. As chapter 7 in particular shows, 
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correct, integral perception of the patient in her unique situation and context constitutes the 
basis for adequate diagnostics and together with this, for adequate determination, from 
moment to moment, of the treatment. For the correct integral perception of a complaint or 
problem, good professional relationships with the patient and good professional relationships 
among colleagues are necessary. Facts are exchanged in these professional relationships, and, 
moreover, different perspectives become apparent and different meanings emerge. That is 
exactly how the integral and individual aspect of care can be realized. Chapters 5 and 7 show, 
that the structural exchange of these perceptions, interpretations, perspectives and meanings 
through joint inter-professional reflection, deliberation and dialog (see above) are also 
indispensable to realizing practical wisdom as a team. Chapter 6 demonstrates that the 
absence of joint reflection and consultation has disastrous implications for the quality of the 
treatment and for the professional relationships. Scholars such as Eikeland, 2006, Baart and 
Vosman, 2011, Frank, 2012, Sellman, 2012, Baart, 2018, Saraga, Boudreau and Fuks, 2018, 
and Burbules, 2019, in their publications emphasize the interconnectedness of relationality 
and practical wisdom. However, they only speak about individual care givers, not about 
continuously changing groups that provide care. Nor do they give due consideration to the 
dynamics of care situations. On the basis of this study, we maintain that the flexible 
structuring of care is necessary for the enactment of practical wisdom and relationality. This 
creates room for joint deliberation and reflection as soon as the need for this is felt. 
There is also another kind of relationality that differs from the interpersonal one in 
current complex practices. This is relationality which manifests itself in the shifting 
connections between ever-changing agents of very diverse kinds: people, material factors 
(technologies, objects, buildings, devices), immaterial factors (habits, laws, norms, 
discourses) etc. Such relationalities for instance highlight the structuring and standardization 
of practices. Practical wisdom also emerges in knowledge of the importance to focus these 
networks of relationalities on the goal that has to be achieved for the individual patient (Baart, 
2018). Our study shows this very well in cases where the bandwidth of professional standards 
was stretched in order to serve the goal established for the patient better. Saraga et al., (2018) 
have named this phenomenon ‘trespassing boundaries’. In chapter 6, we discussed 
professionals’ uncritical acceptance (there was no reflective space for dialog) of the dominant 
discourse and of the electronic patient record, and these elements consequently unwittingly 
obstructed the emergence of practical wisdom. However, in chapter 7 we showed that the 
ICT- infrastructure (designed with the participation of professionals) supported and broadened 
the relationality of the professionals and patients, thus promoting practical wisdom. Mol, 
Moser and Pols (2010) emphasize that technologies depend on people who can attune the 
techniques to the different situations through an ongoing process of ‘tinkering’; they therefore 
argue that professionals should relate critically and consciously to the technologies which are 
part of their practice so as to be able to give better care. 
Practical wisdom as enacted morality, in contrast to practical wisdom as the 
(master) virtue. What do the results of the four empirical studies tell us about the basic 
principles from which we started our investigations? One of the principles was: morality 
(practical wisdom) in medical practices involves the enactment of good medical care for 
every patient in her specific, actual situation and context, focused on a goal that is agreed 
with the patient. Moreover, this specific good needs to be in harmony with the professional 
‘telos’ of medical practice. The professional ‘telos’ of medical practices is defined by the 
medical oath: to promote health, to cure the sick, to relieve suffering, to support the patient 
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and to be there for the patient and help her to live with her illness, even when recovery is not 
possible. In order to realize good care, it is essential to be able to discern the good as a goal, 
and to focus the organization of the practice on achieving this good. 
Like Heuts and Mol (2013) we found that this good is ‘multiple’, i.e. plural. We also 
found, that its fluid character is variable over time (Vosman & Baart, 2011; Vosman & 
Niemeijer, 2017) and emergent: “good is what turns out to be good” (Klaver, Van Elst & 
Baart, 2014, p. 759). On the basis of this study, we do not therefore see the good as uniform, 
stable and computable. Morality, practical wisdom, as the enactment of good care emerged in 
the form of reasonable actions (balancing, judging, reflecting, deliberating etc.) in the four 
empirical studies, actions through which it was possible to identify the good that was the 
purpose, at least temporarily. Moreover, it became evident that morality as good care can be 
realized in professional, everyday actions agreed with the patient. 
By contrast, Aristotle and the neo-Aristotelians (see for instance MacIntyre, 1985; 
Schwarz & Sharpe, 2011; Kristjánsson, 2015; Conroy et al. 2018) see phronesis (practical 
wisdom) as a virtue, a stable characteristic of people, which people acquire by making 
recurrent efforts to practice this virtue over the course of their lives and their professional 
careers. Aristotle sees phronesis first and foremost as an intellectual virtue, which is, 
however, inextricably linked with the moral virtues in the sense that the moral virtues are 
necessary to determine the ‘ends’ at which actions and practices need to be aimed (Eikeland, 
2006), while phronesis can help to find the best possible ‘means’ to reach those ends. 
Moreover, according to Aristotle, practical wisdom integrates and coordinates the moral 
virtues as the ‘master virtue’ (Eikeland, 2006; see also Kristjánsson, 2015). In this vision 
actors can decide with the help of phronesis what moral virtues need to be exercised in 
particular situations, and to what extent and in what interrelationship. Moreover, it is 
remarkable that Conroy et al. (2018) in their study of practical wisdom among medical 
professionals, describe a virtue continuum that strongly deviates from the virtues mentioned 
by Aristotle: including courage, kindness, moderation, justice. Phronesis is admittedly one of 
the virtues they mention, but they also refer to ‘virtues’ we would in fact define as 
competences such as ‘lawful’, ‘culturally competent’, ‘interpersonal communication’. We 
assume that these ‘modern virtues’ reflect their ‘rethinking’ of Aristotle in the current social 
context. 
We did not elaborate in the current study on virtue ethics or on virtues other than 
practical wisdom, because in our vision on morality, morality is disconnected from such 
stable qualities of individuals. We certainly do not deny the importance of individual 
professional righteousness. But, as explained in chapter 3, the approach to morality and 
practical wisdom that we have chosen is in line with the practice-theoretical framework of this 
study (see in particular Gherardi, 2016 p. 686: “practices have agency”) and with the current 
complex, pluralistic and dynamic social context. After all, the influence of individual actors, 
even of medical professionals, is seriously nuanced by the complicated networks in which 
they function and in which actions count more than intentions or personal characteristics. 
Practical wisdom emerges in practices and organizations, not just in actions of 
individuals. What do the results of the four empirical studies say about the second important 
principle with which we started our research? Although we have already mentioned this on 
many occasions, we would like to emphasize it again here. The four empirical studies confirm 
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that the subjects of practical wisdom include not just individual actors, but also teams, 
groups, practices and infrastructural factors within organizations. We have studied practices 
and infrastructures not only as facilitating or obstructing the emergence of practical wisdom, 
but also as subjects of practical wisdom. A practice characterized by practical wisdom is, it 
has been shown open-minded (the current study; Jenkins et al., 2018); has a safe (the current 
study; Saraga et al., 2018), professional and supportive culture, and its structure has ‘built-in’ 
spaces (i.e. opportunities) for reflection, deliberation and dialog, both ad hoc and on a regular 
basis (the current study; Eikeland, 2006; Burbules, 2019). Eikeland argues (2006, p. 46) “that 
systemic space, for both dialogue and deliberation, is necessary in practical social life: work 
life, private life, professional, ethical and political”. He points out different functions of 
‘deliberation’ (p. 47) (“part of professional practice performing”) and ‘dialog’ (“professional 
practice reflecting and inquiring”, in which practice and organizational frameworks are 
contemplated critically). An organization or healthcare institution characterized by practical 
wisdom also has the infrastructural features mentioned. Moreover, it is primarily focused on 
the primary goal of the practices that constitute the core activities of that organization. For 
instance: a hospital, which manifests practical wisdom as an institute must identify and realize 
‘good medical care for all patients’ as its main objective (MacIntyre, 1985; Moore & Beadle, 
2006; Moore, 2005, 2008; Minzberg, 2012; Vriens et al., 2016). The practices and 
organizations studied in this research show that practical wisdom emerges verifiably in 
practices and organizations that, at least to some extent, facilitate practical wisdom, and it has 
also become clear that in these environments practical wisdom can be learned (chapter 5 and 
7). By contrast, on ‘hostile ground’ (see chapter 6) practical wisdom is more likely to be 
suppressed. 
Practical wisdom is an essential part of professional moral grammar. Finally, what 
does this empirical study tell us about the initial assumption of this dissertation: that practical 
wisdom is indispensable for medical professionalism? Our study has taught us, that everyday 
medical work is moral because it is focused on establishing the good for every patient in 
accordance with the definition of this good in the medical oath. It thus confirms that daily 
medical work must be characterized not only as a practice (in keeping with Nicolini and 
Monteiro’s definition [2017] “orderly materially mediated doings and sayings . . . and their 
aggregations”), but also as a praxis (in keeping with Kemmis’ description, (2012, p. 150): 
“Praxis is a particular kind of action that is morally committed, and oriented and informed by 
traditions in a field”. In the practices studied, the good appears to be beset with uncertainties 
related to its fluid, emergent and multiform character; that is why it can only be, to a greater 
or lesser extent, approached. The empirical sub-studies also show that, nowadays, the good 
needs to be realized in various complicated, even complex practice situations. That is why, at 
present, practitioners need a navigator to stay on track, to identify and realize this good using 
the most appropriate means. They can find that navigator in practical wisdom, which is linked 
to relationality. 
Although the knowledge, skills and attitudes (competences), partly theoretical, partly 
practical, that practitioners acquire during their long-term training, can lead to versatile 
craftsmanship (see Sennett, 2009 and Tyson, 2018), these competences are essential, but not 
sufficient to morally navigate current, complex cluttered practices, where decisions have to be 
taken and action is required, despite the fact that many things remain uncertain. Therefore, the 
navigator is more aptly characterized as a capability, which in Fraser and Greenhalgh’s 
description (2001, p.24) is: “the ability to adapt to change, generate new knowledge and 
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continuously improve performances.” Similarly, Beauchamp and Childress’ ethical principles 
(1985), although useful, are not sufficient to help enact the patient’s good in everyday 
situations: they are too unspecific and too abstract, as such authors as Hall, 2011 and 
Mukherjee, 2016 have also observed. Nor are virtues as individual achievements (as 
advocated by Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1993; Kaldjian, 2014; Kristjànsson, 2016 Kotzee, 
Paton & Conroy, 2018) sufficient, because in complex practices these individual character 
traits cannot ensure that joint actions embedded in a specific institution remain focused on the 
patient’s good. 
Our study shows clearly that, in late modern practices, practical wisdom cannot 
adequately be performed if this capability is acquired by individual practitioners only; 
practical wisdom must also be a capability of the practices and the care organizations in 
which individual professionals are embedded. (see the chapters 5, 6 and 7). 
 
I.4. Summary  
Practical wisdom involves practical reasoning and ordinary actions; it can be initiated by 
‘interruptions’; its emergence within practices can be facilitated or inhibited by specific 
‘figurations’. Practical wisdom in medicine is intertwined with techne (skills) and episteme 
(evidence). Practical wisdom and relationality are interrelated and interdependent. 
Our focus is on practical wisdom as the enacted morality of practices, not on practical 
wisdom as a virtue of individuals. Practical wisdom is the essential feature of professional 
moral logic in medicine.  
We will now reflect on the second question we mentioned in chapter 2: what do these 
results mean for the heuristic concept of practical wisdom, that we have used in the four 
empirical studies without intermediate modification, on the basis of the theoretical 
explanation in chapter 3?        
                                                                                                                                   
II. What do the results of the four empirical studies mean for the concept of practical 
wisdom?  
We retained the same tentative, heuristic definition of practical wisdom unchanged 
throughout the four empirical studies. Now, however, in this concluding chapter, we will 
critically evaluate this definition on the basis of our results. We do this by asking the 
questions: what part of the definition should remain unchanged and why? What must be 
changed and why? The definition has been reproduced once again below; the parts that must 
remain unchanged have been underlined  and the parts that must be changed in bold. We will 
subsequently clarify why we think the underlined parts should remain as they are and the bold 
parts should be changed. The words in italics will also remain unchanged, bur require no 
further discussion. 
“Practical wisdom is the capability, which emerges in acting jointly within medical 
practices, of knowing how to remain focused on achieving the good for each individual 
patient, within the context of the practice and its telos, in ever changing situations, and of 
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how to accomplish this by the most appropriate means, while dealing with complexity and 
situational and systemic pressure.”  
We will now, step by step discuss which part of the definition can remain unchanged and 
which must be adjusted on the basis of the results in the empirical study: 
1. Practical wisdom is the capability….                
Fraser and Greenhalgh (2001) have argued, that when it comes to solving 
problems in situations with many uncertainties, and as, subsequently, tasks and 
context are less familiar, professionals do not benefit much from competences 
(knowledge learned, skills acquired); by contrast, they need capabilities, i.e. potential 
abilities (“to adapt to change, generate new knowledge and continuously improve 
performances” p. 24). The situations mentioned are characteristic for the current, 
complex, professional work environment. Our research also demonstrated this trend. 
We have therefore retained the word ‘capability’.  
We do not speak of virtues, either in the original, or in the modified version of 
the definition; as we repeatedly discussed, this is because our focus is not on the 
character traits of individuals, but on united deeds within practices, on actions. 
 
2. … which emerges  
An emergent phenomenon is the opposite of a Newtonian, calculable 
phenomenon where the emergence is explained on the basis of the characteristics of its 
parts. An emergent phenomenon results from the interaction between entities, none of 
which themselves have the characteristics of the phenomenon in question, as is the 
case in complex systems (Dekker, 2011). In that sense, practical wisdom is an 
emergent phenomenon, just like consciousness, the virtuosity of a concert, the beauty 
of a ballet performance or the skillful teamwork of a football team. Thus, practical 
wisdom is a quality of the performance of a practice. The study of an emergent 
phenomenon therefore needs to take place in situations in which the diversity of 
‘agents’ and the interactions between these agents can be observed; such as complex 
case studies (the current study; Anderson, Crabtree, Steele & McDaniel, 2005), video-
recordings (Iedema, Mesman & Carroll, 2013), stories (Conroy et al., 2018), or 
biographies (Tyson, 2018). 
 
3. “acting jointly within medical practices” becomes “ joint actions within medical 
practices”. 
The second formulation, reflects more clearly than the first one that, what is at 
stake is the standard of teamwork, the quality of working together and at the same time 
of working together, or, of collaborating and at the same time coordinating. The 
second formulation indicates that practical wisdom emerges within the interactions, 
within the joint performance. Chapter 6 clearly illustrates the point: good cooperation 
between medical specialists is not the predictable result of tasks performed well 
simultaneously or successively, according to a division of tasks agreed beforehand, 
but can emerge within the teamwork of interacting actors. The functioning of a team 
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that works well together, is more than the sum of separate jobs well-done, and cannot 
be reduced to these. 
 
4. “of knowing how” becomes “incorporating the grammar of good care”. 
In the former definition, ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’ are emphasized, in 
isolation from actions. The new formulation shows more clearly that the ‘knowing 
how’ relates exclusively to knowledge, that is reflected in those actions that represent 
the specific logic of good care, within the framework of a specific ‘grammar’ (Nicolini 
& Eikeland, 2011), i.e. of specific, familiar, practical playing rules. 
 
5. “remain focused on achieving the good for each individual patient” becomes “aimed 
at discerning and focusing on each particular patient’s good ”. 
The new formulation more clearly expresses that the practice of caring for 
patients including practical wisdom, is a practice, whose goal must initially but also 
repeatedly thereafter, be discerned, so that it is subsequently possible to work 
steadfastly towards this goal (see chapters 4, 5 and 7). The new formulation, like the 
old one, still highlights the necessity of individualizing care, i.e. attuning care to the 
particularities of each specific patient in her context. Discerning the individual’s goal 
has now been integrated into the definition, because this capability to discern is also 
an aspect of practical wisdom (see chapter 7). What remains unchanged is that the 
morality of the medical practice is included in “the good”, as has been elaborated 
previously. 
 
6. “within the context of the practice and its telos” becomes “that is also in accordance 
with the telos of the practice”.  
In the former formulation, the connection that has to be guaranteed between 
the specific goal that must be achieved for the patient, and the telos of medical 
practice as laid down in the medical oath, remains obscure. The second formulation is 
less ambiguous: the patient-goal must remain within the bandwidth of the practice-
goal. In chapter 7 we discussed the difficulty of achieving maximum overlap between 
both types of goals. 
 
7. “in ever changing situations” becomes “ in a dynamic process ”.  
The new formulation more clearly expresses that care processes evolve from 
moment to moment, from week to week and sometimes from year to year. It also 
articulates more clearly, that these care processes should demonstrate continuity as 
well as adaptation to changing circumstances and conditions. And, that therefore, the 
discerning of the goal and the maintaining of the goal should again and again be 
attuned to the patient. 
 
8. “and of how to accomplish this by the most appropriate means” becomes “using the 
most appropriate means”.  
Once again, ‘knowing how’ has been omitted from the definition. Here too, 
this has been done to indicate that the focus is on actions, which also include knowing. 
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The new formulation reflects the fact that the physician’s expertise exists by virtue of 
properly using the right means in the right way at the right time. (see for instance 
chapter 4: ‘getting the time right for the patient’s sake). 
 
9. “while dealing with complexity and with situational and systemic pressure” becomes: 
“while dealing with complexity and with operational and systemic pressures”.  
The initial definition did not mention the pressure to act under which 
physicians work. Physicians are expected, even required to do something, whereas it is 
sometimes better to refrain from doing, to postpone, wait, take time to reflect, or not to 
treat at all, because the possible damage caused by or the risks involved in the 
treatment in question are judged to outweigh its benefits. (Spronk, Widdershoven & 
Alma, 2020). 
Professionals have criticized this definition because of its complexity. They would 
prefer to have a more concise formulation. They often mentioned the definition by Schwarz 
and Sharpe (2011): “To do the right thing in the right way”, as an example. Our objection to 
this definition, is the word ‘right’, which implies applying rules and regulations, or a 
reference to justice. Instead we use ‘good’, a word that refers to a comprehensive morality. 
Moreover, we think that it is not possible to force this complicated, multi-faceted concept 
onto the Procrustean bed of such a simple, and inevitably reductive definition which leaves 
essential details unnamed. We therefore propose the following revised definition of practical 
wisdom in medical practices; we believe that, although this definition may lack the elegance 
of a more compact formulation, it has the merit of being accurate.  
Practical wisdom of medical practices is the capability which emerges in joint actions, 
that incorporate the logic of good care and are aimed at discerning and focusing on each 
particular patient’s good, that is also in accordance with the telos of the practice, in a 
dynamic process, using the most appropriate means, while dealing with complexity and with 
operational and systemic pressures. 
 
III. The results of the research in relation to theories on practical wisdom in the 
literature 
It must be emphasized from the start that the current empirical research can only give rise to a 
number of fragmentary comments on the extensive theories on phronesis and practical 
wisdom in literature. The obvious reason is that the research is primarily empirical, i.e. 
focused on a limited selection of medical practices in hospitals. With this caveat, we believe 
comments are in order on the literature in respect of three major issues: 
1. Not virtues but moral actions.                   
It is remarkable, that recent publications, following Aristotle, deal with 
practical wisdom in the context of virtue-ethics, defining a virtue as a personal 
achievement, often according to MacIntyre’s (1985) interpretation. According to 
Kristjánsson (2015, p. 300), virtue-ethics has replaced deontology as “the moral theory 
of choice”, particularly in academic discourse. This is much less the case in 
professional ethical education. Again according to Kristjánsson, the latter is still 
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largely dominated by deontology or principles-ethics, laid down in Beauchamp and 
Childress’s four principles (1985): beneficence (to do good), non-maleficence (to do 
no harm), to respect the patient’s autonomy, to act justly. However, we have found 
that virtue-ethics does not meet the requirements for a workable ethical compass for 
medical practices. As we have stated above, the focus of our study of practical wisdom 
was not on virtues, but on actions and practices that have so far been neglected in the 
literature. This is why we think morality emerges mainly in ‘accomplishments’, 
‘performances’, or actions in the here and now within practices, in such actions that 
are aimed at realizing ‘the specific good-for-the-patient’, which, moreover, overlaps 
with the ‘telos’ of medical practice. It is likely, that such performances are related to 
virtues, but we have not examined this relationship further in this study. 
 
2. Not individual, but joint actions and organized reflection within practices.        
An important critical comment that arises from the current study on the way 
theory about practical wisdom has so far developed (see MacIntyre, 1981; Pellegrino 
& Thomasma, 1993; Eikeland 2006; Kinghorn 2010; Kaldjian, 2010; 2014; Kinsella 
& Pitman 2012; Tyson 2015, 2017; Conroy et al. 2018), is that practical wisdom is 
also a characteristic of joint actions and of practices, i.e. not exclusively of individual 
actions (“practices have agency”, according to Gherardi, 2016, p. 686). Moreover, 
practical wisdom appears to be embedded in the infrastructure (structure and culture) 
of a practice; in addition, the infrastructure does or does not show practical wisdom. 
For instance, we have observed this in the form of   “systemic space, for both dialogue 
and deliberation” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 46). Based on our study, we advocate, as does 
Eikeland, the introduction of reflective ‘spaces’ in professional work environments. 
These should be both structurally present, planned spaces, such as the monthly case 
discussions which were described in chapter 5, or the “care provider huddles (informal 
meetings) at the beginning of every shift” mentioned in chapter 4, and spaces created 
ad hoc during daily work. This also corresponds to the “reflection-in-action”, as 
described by Schön (1983/1991), which he observed in addition to “reflection-on-
action” for reflective practitioners. 
 
3. Not reasoning and knowledge isolated from actions, but acting sensibly, in which 
knowledge and reasoning are integrated. 
A third point of criticism on the theories of practical wisdom that emerges 
from our research is that theory has so far been developed in studies external to and 
about practices, but not from within practices. Our study was carried out from within 
medical practices; it shows that practical wisdom is not primarily about thinking and 
reasoning about actions before they are performed, but about everyday actions, into 
which wisdom is incorporated.                     
Moreover, our research fleshes out what sensible day-to-day activities look 
like; we mentioned mundane or trivial actions and inconspicuous figurations which 
can testify to skill (techne) and wisdom (phronesis). Practical wisdom was seen to 
emerge less frequently in single heroic deeds. The mundane actions for instance 
included intentionally responding to the patient’s concern (chapter 7); acting wisely 
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therefore means: to focus on what the patient needs here and now. And one of the 
figurations was for example the joint evaluation of the digital curves of measuring 
results during the outpatient diabetes clinic. In literature that is not based on 
observation of practices, practical wisdom is predominantly problematized as a form 
of knowledge: “ how do we conceive of knowledge in the professions” and described 
as “an organizing framework for professional knowledge” (Kinsella and Pitman, 2012, 
p. 1). However, in this publication, Kemmis also describes the danger that “phronesis 
comes to be regarded simply as a form of knowledge ‘in the heads’ (and moral 
commitments) of practitioners rather than in terms of practical reasoning and practical 
philosophy”. The Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues of the University of 
Birmingham (Kristjánsson, 2015; Kotzee, et al., 2017; Conroy et al., 2018) similarly 
approaches practical wisdom primarily as a form of knowledge, which, according to 
the authors is expressed by medical professionals in the decisions they take. In their 
empirical research they have especially studied decision processes (i.e. cognitive 
processes). The triviality of wise actions is one finding in particular that could not 
have been demonstrated by a theoretical study or without contacts with professionals 
and patients. This is why our study shows the importance of observing practices in the 
here and now, so that theories about practical wisdom can be criticized and completed 
on the basis of practices. When this is specifically done on the basis of examples of 
praxis (meaning “practices that are intrinsically moral”), the relevance of theories to 
acting morally within professional practices will evidently increase. 
 
 
IV. ‘Putting practice into theory’ or ‘the talk-back from empirical research to care-
ethical insights’. 
The first quotation in the sub-title above is derived from Mol, Moser & Pols (2010); the 
second from Vosman, Timmerman & Baart (2018). What critical comments or clarifications 
does our empirical research generate for care ethics? 
1. Care ethicist Van Heijst (2005, p. 66) has stated: Care is not an action, but a 
relationship and within that relationship the appropriate things are done. Other care 
ethicists, too, have emphasized that care is realized within and through relationships. 
We have seen in our study that relationality consists not only of the relationship 
between two people, a care giver and a care recipient. Instead, it consists of extensive 
relational networks between individual care givers and care recipients, between groups 
of care givers and care recipients as well as of non-human agents, both material and 
immaterial. If the appropriate things that belong to good care have to be done within 
such extensive networks, these relational networks also have to be tailored to and 
equipped for giving good care. Although Joan Tronto emphasized as far back as 1993 
that care is not limited to interpersonal relationships or to dyadic interactions, the care 
ethical study of relational networks in a wider sense has so far been limited.  
 
2. In chapter 7 in particular, the reciprocal connectedness of relationality and practical 
wisdom came to the fore. While theorists who have studied practical wisdom, have 
emphasized its connectedness with relationality (Eikeland, 2006; Baart & Vosman, 
2011; Frank, 2012; Sellman, 2012; Baart, 2018; Saraga et al., 2018; Burbules, 2019), 
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so far care ethicists (apart from the group of researchers around Vosman and Baart) 
have not paid much attention to practical wisdom. As our study shows that identifying 
and establishing the good in care practices requires not only relationality but also 
practical wisdom, we recommend that care ethicists be more attentive to practical 
wisdom. 
 
3. Although care ethicists such as Tronto (1993, 2013), Vosman and Baart (2015), 
Vosman, Timmerman and Baart (2018; 2019) see care as a practice, the connection 
between care ethics and practice theories has so far been very weak. More than a 
decade ago, in 2005, Van Heijst (2005, p. 64/65) quoted the Dutch writer Hella 
Haasse, who stated that doing odd jobs around the house, carrying out routine chores, 
and being attuned to, or involved with the personalities of the other members of the 
household, are two sides of the same coin. In other words: care, like practical wisdom 
(see chapter 7) is not only established by working explicitly on the relationship, but 
also in arranging things, in routine business, in ordinary activities. Our empirical study 
of care practices which used methods from Nicolini’s toolkit, has provided new 
insights into the relationship between routine actions on one hand and tacit 
knowledge, care-ethical assumptions and the intentions implied in these on the other. 
On this base, we recommend that care ethicists pay more attention to everyday 
activities within care practices. 
 
4. Care ethics as political ethics is concerned with (the effect of) care as an activity that 
creates, structures and legitimizes relationships between people. These relationships 
determine where the power lies, whose voice is heard and who receives attention. This 
‘political’ aspect can be clearly seen in our study; in our view this means that this 
aspect must be explicitly called political. Chapter 6 shows that factors such as the 
hierarchical position of care givers (with regard to colleagues and other professionals, 
and in relation to patients), just like the preferred medical-technical and systemic 
knowledge and structures based on efficiency rules, determine ranking within medical 
care. Conversely, in chapter 7 we illustrated that the logic of care, that is characterized 
by relationality and practical wisdom establishes a different arrangement of 
cooperation, which makes it possible for instance to deal carefully with vulnerable 
patients. Such political-ethical observations illustrate how “care as an activity that 
enables us to live together in an ordered way” (Timmerman, Vosman & Baart, 2018, 
p. 414) works out in practices. We recommend supplementing these observations of 
everyday practices with new observations to flesh out what ‘care-ethics as political 
ethics’ means.  
 
5. Our study has provided a platform for the most important persons, the ‘knowers’, in 
care practices, especially for the physicians as care givers, and to a lesser extent also 
for the patients and their relatives as care recipients (for instance, in chapter 6 the 
patient’s relatives, and in chapter 7 the patients and their parents who visit the diabetes 
consultations). This has permitted us to see, for instance, what the consequences of 
‘undergoing’ (Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017) or ‘enduring’ (Van Heijst, 2016) are for 
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care givers. They reported that they found the many (also moral) uncertainties in their 
daily work difficult to deal with. They also mentioned that the uncertainties they have 
to endure increase their sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis supervisory authorities. Such 
observations from practices of care provision give substance to theoretical remarks 
about vulnerability. Care ethics has so far paid little attention to approaching practices 
from within. 
 
Conclusion: on the basis of our empirical study we are able to provide the above 
recommendations to care ethics: incorporate greater attention to relational networks in care 
instead of focusing only on interpersonal or dyadic relationships; incorporate greater attention 
to practical wisdom, linked to relationality; incorporate the application of practice-theoretical 
research methods; incorporate the explicit study of care-ethics as a political ethics into 
practices; and finally, incorporate empirical research from the ‘knowers’ perspective into 
practices. 
 
V. Evaluation of specific practice-theories as a theoretical framework. 
Gherardi (2016) has described the ‘school’ within practice theory, that she and Nicolini 
belong to, as the ‘sociology of translation’ or the ‘actor-network theory’. One of its 
characteristics is “a mode of ordering the social in which doing and knowing are not separated 
and the knowing subject and the known object emerge in their ongoing intra-action” 
(Gherardi, 2016, p. 685). This specific practice-theoretical framework (of the sociology of 
translation) has guided our observations and analyses of practices, and we are now able to 
make the following comments concerning this theory: 
1. This framework helped us to put the role of the individual actors in medical practices 
into context (see especially chapters 6 and 7).  
 
2. This framework helped us to see the important role of ever-changing teams in 
medical-professional practices. On the one hand, groups of cooperating professionals 
of all kinds exist always and everywhere: physicians seldom, if ever, work alone. On 
the other hand, the power of these teams depends on the settings within which they 
work (see for instance the part on impact in chapter 5). 
 
3. This framework has helped us to observe and communicate the role of material and 
immaterial, infrastructural factors in medical-professional practices and of the agency 
these factors and the practices have (Barad, 2003; Gherardi, 2016). For instance, the 
role of the electronic patient record (EPR) and of professional discourse in chapter 6; 
that of the ‘culture’ within the hospital in chapter 5, and that of the individual care 
plan in chapter 7. 
 
4. This framework has helped us to observe the fluidity, the aspect of ‘becoming’ in 
practices (Gherardi, 2016; Nicolini, 2012; Baart & Vosman, 2011), including the 
influence of the history and the anticipated future of practices. For instance, the good 
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for the patient had to be re-invented time and again in changing situations in chapter 5, 
and the practice studied in chapter 7 appeared to have been molded by the participants 
over the years. 
 
5. This framework has helped us to observe and analyze the intertwinement between 
knowing and doing, between epistemology and ontology, which made it possible to 
externalize (or make explicit) tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). A good 
example of this can be found in chapter 7 where practitioners have to define – the 
boundaries of – the bandwidth within which to act. 
 
6. This framework has also taught us that giving feedback to practitioners about insights 
acquired in empirical research, will give practitioners new insights into what they 
previously took for granted, or subconsciously assumed to be true. These new insights 
make reflection and transformation possible (Eikeland & Nicolini, 2011). Chapter 7 
contains a good example of this: the insight that it is ‘allowed’ in the relationship with 
a patient to make critical comments about the patient’s behavior. 
 
Conclusion: the practice-theoretical framework, that we used in our study helped us to 
provide new perspectives on the medical practices that we studied. Having said this, our 
research may also offer feedback on this framework that may add new insights to it. For 
instance, that this research is even more time-consuming than expected, and that the balance 
that must be found between closeness to the practice and distance through critical reflection is 
hard to find. Our suggestion is, that practice-theorists, apart from a toolkit, also should 
formulate recommendations for the practice of doing practice-theoretical research.  
 
VI. Methodological evaluation 
1. We explained in chapter 2 why an empirical inquiry into practical wisdom should be 
both qualitative and explorative. In the same chapter we indicated that we used 
specific lenses to study the practices in question, so as to be able to make new 
observations, because these lenses would be able to shed light on other aspects than 
the usual professional or quantitative-empirical perspectives could. We chose care-
ethical and practice-theoretical perspectives to approach the cases we studied. When 
we compare our results with similar research (such as Visser’s, 2017, and Conroy’s et 
al., 2018) we can conclude that we have been able to make new observations (such as 
broadening the concept of relationality to include more than interpersonal 
relationships, and the fact that practical wisdom emerges at least as much in wise 
trivial actions as it does in difficult rational decisions).  
 
2. A further choice we made, was to conduct our research from within practices, using 
direct observation or observation through a mediating database. Moreover, this 
research was done by a researcher who is also a medical specialist and knows the 
nature of the practices studied from her own experience, i.e. it was participatory 
research. This research from within has made aspects of medical practices visible to 
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the researchers, which have never been observed through research from an outside 
perspective. That is the case, for instance, for the role of interruptions (and their 
manifestations) as opposed to that of dilemmas, as initiators of moral actions (practical 
wisdom). Also, for the role of changing figurations as opposed to structured 
deliberation or planning in facilitating moral actions. In addition, the research from 
within has yielded new insights for practitioners. It has undermined a number of 
previously undoubted assumptions, such as the supposed good of streamlined logistics 
(it sometimes proved to be better to meander or to reserve time for joint reflection). 
However, participatory research from within must meet certain conditions, in order to 
be able to yield valid results (see points 3 and 6). 
 
3. The researchers opted for close cooperation between the first researcher-professional 
(‘knower’ of the practices in question) and two co-researchers-ethicists who were not 
associated with the practices and who cooperated from another discipline and from 
outside the practices themselves. The resulting synergy between inside and outside 
proved to be productive. It contributed to the validity of the research, because it saved 
the first researcher from blind spots and from taking for granted what is self-evident 
within the practices studied (for instance the lack of reflective ‘spaces’ in the daily 
work environment). On the other hand, the ethicists’ theoretical insights into the daily 
practice sometimes proved not to be true or the reality turned out to be different than 
expected, as we discussed in sections II and III. 
4. Our decision to conduct case research in different forms, in order to do justice to the 
richness of detail and the contextual data of everyday practices, has made it possible to 
observe many details that have not been sufficiently recognized before, as well as 
contextual information concerning these data. This is the case, for instance, with the 
way in which the dominant professional discourse and the structuring of the clinical 
working environment influence practices, as described in chapter 6. The case study 
design with direct observation has thus proven fruitful for the description and analysis 
of the everyday reality of practices. Other researchers have used a similar design to 
approximate clinical reality. In our research, we have tried to avoid certain 
shortcomings of studies that are based upon the interpretations or views of the 
professionals involved. Iedema et al. (2013), for instance, used video footage of real-
time daily clinical practices and invited the clinicians involved to reflect together on 
the images. Timmerman and Baart (2016) used in-depth interviews and focus groups 
of general practitioners to study in what way general practitioners need practical 
wisdom and how they can cause practical wisdom to emerge when supporting patients 
at the end of their lives, even on their deathbeds. An alternative for case studies is 
narrative research. This was used by Tyson, who called it a “systematic narrative 
approach” (Tyson, 2015, p. 229) in his reflections on the “educational biography of a 
master bookbinder . . . and two stories he tells, one of his education in Paris and one of 
his own deliberations in teaching bookbinding.” Kotzee et al. (2017) chose systematic 
“in-depth narrative interviewing and analysis” of physicians at different stages of their 
careers. Unlike observation through the interpretations of professionals, direct 
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observation, as we applied in our research, can reveal issues that clinicians themselves 
see less clearly or are reluctant to raise, such as assumptions, presumptions, or 
sensitive matters. That is the specific relevance of observational case study, and it is 
on account of this that our research is an indispensable supplement to the ‘indirect’ 
observation mentioned above. 
5. We used analytical techniques, that we deemed appropriate for the research questions 
and the available data bases of the four empirical studies. The analytical techniques 
have been sufficiently underpinned in the separate studies. We can conclude here that 
they are convergent and that results mutually reinforce each other. We regard this 
convergence as an extra indication of the validity of our research. 
 
6. The validity of empirical research usually refers to the accuracy with which the object 
under investigation is presented, or the accuracy of reflections on this object. As we 
tried to observe the grammar of the practices examined, i.e. the specific, internal logic 
belonging to the practice, validity in this case also means: the accuracy with which the 
internal logic of the knowers within the practice is made explicit. Moreover, validity is 
an indication of the robustness and rigor of the research methods chosen: these 
methods must cast light on what they are focused on and not on other things. In order 
to safeguard this, we examined the ‘resonance’ with practitioners in the practice (the 
extent to which they recognized our findings and judged that these adequately 
reflected reality), through peer-debriefing, member-checking in focus groups and 
feedback from the learning community. We safeguarded the rigor of the research 
methods in all sub-studies through researcher-triangulation. Chapter 5 reports the audit 
procedure as a method of validation. This laborious procedure is to be highly 
recommended, because it requires the analytical researcher to account for and 
underpin each step of the analysis to an external auditor. Such techniques are essential 
for qualitative research to guarantee the reliability of the results, including for readers 
who are not involved in the practice studied. 
 
7. The abductive analysis (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012; Timmerman, Baart & 
Vosman, 2019) that we performed assumes, (as chapter 3 describes) that, although the 
analytical researcher did not use a deductive method (for instance by using interview 
questions entirely based on a specific theory), she is not a blank page when it comes to 
theory. We therefore as much as possible defined our theoretical frameworks 
beforehand (the heuristic definition of practical wisdom, care ethics, certain practice 
theories). A further characteristic feature of abductive analysis is that it is oriented 
towards a process in which the various aspects involved mutually unlock each other: 
the empirical insights unlock the theoretical frameworks and the theoretical 
frameworks help to observe the empirical data more precisely. The former is discussed 
in sections II and III; the latter in section V. These results show that our abductive 
analysis has been successful. 
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Research of practices, which is carried out over an extended period of time and 
through time-consuming observations and analyses, is not currently very popular, precisely 
because it takes so much time and cannot yield representative results. Moreover, this kind of 
research is not much valued in current neo-liberal social discourse, because it does not lead 
demonstrably to an increase in the effectivity or efficiency of the practices as measured by 
quantifiable criteria. Our response to these objections is that deeper insights into the 
complexity of daily professional work can only be gained through such, and similar, research. 
We also argue, that this kind of research enables positively inspired qualitative improvement 
of professional work (unlike the negative input of complaints and mistakes), because it brings 
to light matters that professionals take for granted, but which are in fact not a given at all, thus 
making it possible to change them. Finally, we contend that this kind of research gives 
morality the place it deserves: at the very heart of scholarly, professional, social and political, 
attention. 
 
VII. Transferability and relevance 
Timmerman, Baart & Vosman (2019) have described criteria for the transferability of 
empirical research of practices. Although the current research is not a phenomenological but a 
practice-theoretical study from within practices, the criteria they have devised can nonetheless 
be used to judge the transferability (rather than generalizability) of the results.  
The researcher and co-researchers have ensured that the cases we chose fulfill the first 
criterion: 1) exemplariness (“the case exemplifies the construct of interest in a highly 
developed manner”). Compliance with the second criterion: 2) extensiveness of the case 
descriptions (i.e. containing many concrete details and notes on the relevant context) has been 
confirmed by the two co-researchers and the auditor who had the opportunity to examine the 
descriptions. 3) The third criterion is the rigor of the analysis, mainly based on the validity of 
the construction and of the process. This criterion has been met in the sub-studies; the two co-
researchers validated this. 4) The fourth is the innovative potential of the concepts developed 
and the theoretical insights, for both researchers and practitioners. The innovation for 
researchers has been demonstrated above; the innovation for practitioners is that our study 
will give them new insights into the morality of practices. This will enable them to focus their 
practices more effectively on the moral goal. 5) Finally, there is the criterion of resonance 
validity, which consists in the practitioners’ agreement with the findings, or, more precisely, 
in the confirmation by the practitioners that the findings help them in their daily practices, 
especially in obscure situations where choices have to be accounted for. The resonance 
validity of our findings has been confirmed by the practitioners through member checking and 
peer debriefing in focus groups. 
The question remains, to what extent the results of observations of long-term 
admission to hospital, or outpatient care for adolescents with a chronical condition, are 
transferable to other forms of medical specialist care in hospitals, such as acute care (ED, 
ICU), care for patients with a psychiatric disease, or for patients with a simple, clear problem. 
Equally, it must be asked to what extent the results of ten or a hundred cases gathered in a 
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general hospital are transferable to other settings, such as first-line healthcare, or 
rehabilitation care, or care for the elderly. The answer is that transferability depends on the 
similarities between these forms of care, particularly when care is given in settings with 
significant differences. We contend that there are similarities on a meta-level: in all kinds of 
settings, professionals work together in groups; in all kinds of settings, calls for reflection and 
reflexivity must find a way; in all kinds of settings, professionals must judge and determine 
together with their patients what the good is that has to be enacted, and how the enacting can 
happen; in all kinds of settings, professional relationships must be established and used to 
give good care. There are thus significant formal similarities. The precise way in which 
practical wisdom can possibly emerge, may be different in other settings, but the specific 
examples described in our research can nevertheless, because of the similarities on the meta-
level, support the performance of practical wisdom in those practices. 
Another question is whether the results are transferable to other professional 
practices, such as the fields of justice, education, nursing, management and governance of 
organizations. Here too, professionals must themselves identify the similarities between 
medical practices and legal, educational, managerial etc. practices, to ensure that the results 
are transferable. General lessons from our research can possibly help; for instance, seemingly 
neutral issues, self-evident assumptions and rules contain hidden, implicit choices and value 
judgements upon which professionals should critically reflect, and which can be changed (see 
for instance the implicit choice favoring the dominant medical-professional discourse in 
chapter 6). We have called reflection, that includes critically judging and transforming 
practices, reflexivity (with Iedema, 2011; Kinsella & Pitman, 2012, and Kemmis, 2012). It is 
connected with practical wisdom. In his explanation of reflexivity, Iedema emphasizes that it 
mostly reflects social, joint reflection, aimed at conduct and situations in the here and now. 
He has underlined that attempts to comprehend and modify a practice with the help of 
reflexivity will have the best chance of success if the infrastructure within which they take 
place is open to such reflexivity and thus to learning and changing. Our study also bears this 
out, as it has identified figurations that promote or hamper practical wisdom. Recognizing 
such figurations also offers possibilities to change them. Another general lesson is that in each 
of the professions mentioned, general rules must be attuned to individual people in specific 
situations and that the professionals in question must establish a certain bandwidth, including 
its borders. These borders determine when compromising on the rules involves unacceptable 
risks for a client or the unacceptable stretching of a norm (see chapter 7). 
This discussion of the transferability of our research findings also shows the practical 
relevance of our study. Specifically, the study is relevant because it shows that it is essential 
for professionality to ‘embed’ practical wisdom in training and in daily practice. This has 
been demonstrated through analysis of the practices of medical specialists in hospitals, but 
this finding can be transferred to the practices of physicians in other settings, as well as to 
other kinds of professionals because the problems to which practical wisdom is a response 
also arise there. All professions can benefit from the promotion of reflection and reflexivity 
on the work. And, analogous to jurisprudence in legislation, forms of mores prudence for 
professional ethics (Van Doorn, 2008; Kanne & Grootoonk, 2014; Buitink, Ebskamp & 
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Groothoff, 2019) should be gathered, made transparent and discussed in broad professional 
forums. In this way, discussions about morality in daily practices, like discussions about 
evidence, could become common practice, allowing for the further development of the 
practical wisdom of professional work and of professional practices. 
VIII. Suggestions for further research of practical wisdom 
We will conclude this chapter with a number of suggestions for future research of practical 
wisdom in professional practices. In making these suggestions, we go beyond the scope of our 
research. But the limited extent of our empirical study invites us, as it were, to articulate these 
proposals. We must begin with a strong recommendation to conduct qualitative empirical 
research from within practices, preferably in conjunction with practitioners on the work floor. 
Needless to say, we argue for specific attention for the morality of those practices, that is, for 
empirical research of professional morality. It would be interesting to investigate morality and 
practical wisdom in other hospital settings. We have mentioned such possible settings as acute 
care in the Emergency Department, or an Intensive Care Unit, or elective care with a high 
patient turnover, or care for patients with psychiatric conditions. Other possibilities are 
settings involving care for specific groups, such as geriatric patients who are at the end of 
their lives, or for newborns whose lives have just begun. Does practical wisdom emerge in the 
same way in such groups and in such settings? How can morality be given the key role it 
deserves, also in different settings? 
There are sporadic examples of studies that have looked at how practical wisdom and 
relationality are incorporated into the medical curriculum and into formal training of 
physicians after registration (see the project by Conroy et al., described in their publication of 
2018; also the research of Stenersen Hovdenak and Wiese in medical training in Tromsoe, 
Norway, 2018; and the publication of Verkerk, De Bree & Mourits about training reflective 
professionalism for residents, 2007). Such research should be extended with observational 
research from within practices. Furthermore, modifications of the ‘Bildung’ (Tyson, 2018) of 
medical professionals should be implemented during the pre-clinical stage and in the work 
place. 
As we have indicated above, practical wisdom could be investigated further in the 
context of other social professions, such as legal, psychological and social work and 
education, but also in accountancy, management, government and politics. Many examples of 
such research in respect of these other professions already exist: psychology (Ardelt, 2003); 
management and organizations (Nonaka & Toyama, 2007; Schwarz, 2011; Küpers & Pauleen, 
2013); justice and politics (Mantel, 2013; Cantrell & Sharpe, 2016); accountancy (Vosselman, 
2019). Yet there is lack in these studies of observational research of practices, in cooperation 
with ‘knowers’ of the practices and focused also on the development of new concepts and 
theories. 
Our research did not give us sufficient opportunity to thoroughly investigate practical 
wisdom (and relationality) of teams, specifically teams of changing composition. The same is 
true for practical wisdom (and relationality) of organizations, condensed in the infrastructure 
of structures and cultures. A lot of theoretical literature on the moral compass of organizations 
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is already available, but here, too, there is a lack of detailed descriptions of concrete 
examples, such as Vriens et al. (2017) have done, conscientious qualitative empirical 
research. 
We expect that implementing these suggestions will not only increase the attention 
that is given to the practical wisdom of professionals, but above all cause practical wisdom to 
develop in all kinds of practices. Our research has convinced us that more practical wisdom 
can lead to better quality of care, i.e. care that it is better attuned to the individual patient. 
Also, that it can contribute to a better life for patients with a chronic or terminal disease, and, 
finally, to greater happiness for professionals who have the meaningful but difficult task to 
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Justification data management 
The data that have been investigated and analyzed for this thesis are stored under the authority 
of St Jansdal Hospital. These data include medical files: confidential information about 
patients and professionals, that may not be disclosed. 
The empirical studies have been approved by the Ethical Committee of St Jansdal Hospital as 
well as by the Board of the hospital. Verbal informed consent has been obtained from all the 
patients and professionals that were involved, after they were given accurate information 
about the aim and procedures of the study. All identifying information has been removed and 
sometimes details have been adjusted for privacy reasons. 
Rules concerning data management have been changed over time; these rules were different at 
the start of this investigation. This is the reason that we were not able to meet the actual rules 
sufficiently. 
The table below is an overview of the research data that were observed and the way they were 
analyzed.  
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Published  in 
The multiple faces of 
faces in complex clinical 
practices 
Thick descriptions of  
10 complex patient cases 
and related documentation  
On paper Qualitative Heuristics 
and elements based 
on the grounded 
theory 
 
Journal of  
Evaluation in  
Clinical Practice 
Professional workplace- 
learning: can practical  
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The self-reported lessons 
learned from 100 multi- 
disciplinary case discussions 
Digitally Content Analysis via 
the Directed Approach 




Professional medical  
discourse and the  
emergence of practical 
wisdom in everyday 
practices 
The patient’s complete 
medical file and her  
daughter’s diary about this  
hospitalization 
Digitally Thematic analysis of the 
dominant professional  
discourse and the diary 
Health Care 
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Making the best of it: 
practical wisdom in 
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Ability The power, skill, means and opportunity to perform an action; it tends to come in degrees 
Capability The competence or potential to perform an action; tend to be either-or propositions 
Capacity The power or potentiality of receiving, holding, absorbing or accomplishing something; it is said of 
persons or things 
Concern According to Sayer (2011): things that are important to people; things people care about 
Distributed intelligence Cognition, knowledge or wisdom that are not confined to an individual; rather they are spread over 
individuals, objects, artefacts and tools in the environment 
Emergence The process or event of something coming into existence or prominence; in philosophy and 
systems theory emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts don’t 
have on their own, for instance beauty or balance 
Enactment The act of putting something in action; the act of performing 
Ethnomethodology The study of how social order is produces in and through processes of social action; it is a 
fundamentally descriptive discipline 
Figurations Networks of human and non-human, material and immaterial, interrelated and interdependent 
factors, which constantly adapt in dynamic processes 
Internal logic of a 
practice 
The ways of thinking and acting that are crucial to a certain practice; for instance in health care 
good care is something that grows out of collaborative and continuing attempts to attune 
knowledge and technologies to diseased bodies and complex lives (Mol, 2009) 
Interruption in a 
medical practice 
Something that interferes with or disrupts a task, a workflow, reasoning, a professional 
relationship, planning and schedules, and therefore is a possible signal for reflection and practical 
wisdom 
Morality in medical 
practice 
The performance of medical care that is good for a specific patient in a particular situation and 
context, focused on a goal that is attuned to the patient and is also in harmony with the ‘telos’ of 
the practice 
Mores prudence Ethical jurisprudence, i.e. an ethic on the basis of previous cases 
Performativity The power (for example of language, discourse, management, systems or technologies) to 
produce or change something, to function as a form of action 
Phronesis An ancient Greek word for a type of wisdom or reasoning. In Aristotelian ethics it is an intellectual 
virtue that is to be distinguished from other intellectual virtues such as episteme and techne. It is a 
type of wisdom that is relevant to practical action 
Practice “Orderly, materially mediated doings and sayings (..) and their aggregation” (Nicolini and Monteiro, 
2017) 
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Praxis “A particular kind of action that is morally committed, and informed by traditions in a field” 
(Kemmis, 2012) 
Reflection Serious and careful thought in and on practice (Schön, 1983) that results in actions and 
interrogations of the practice 
Reflexivity Reflection that is aimed at critical interrogation of the social and (im-)material conditions under 
which knowledge comes into being. It refers to the examination of beliefs, judgments and actions 
that are embedded in a certain practice and may influence the practice 
Tacit knowledge Skills, ideas and experiences that people have but are not codified and may not or not easily be 
expressed; for instance the knowledge enclosed in riding a bike 
Telos A term used by Aristotle to refer to the full potential or inherent purpose or objective of a person or 



























Praktische wijsheid staat vanaf de laatste decennia van de 20ste eeuw toenemend in de 
belangstelling van professionals van allerlei aard: psychologen, juristen, docenten, managers, 
bestuurders en medici. Deze vernieuwde belangstelling is toegeschreven aan factoren als: de 
toenemende complexiteit en de alsmaar versnellende ontwikkelingen van laatmoderne 
samenlevingen en de eraan gekoppelde onzekerheden, aan het wegvallen van vertrouwde 
ideologieën en denkkaders, en aan de technologisering en instrumentalisering behorend bij het 
momenteel in de westerse wereld overheersende, door marktdenken beheerste neoliberale 
discours. 
Met name professionals die te maken hebben met morele vraagstukken hebben 
daardoor toenemend behoefte aan een kompas dat hen helpt te koersen op moraliteit: het doen 
van het goede en het geen schade toebrengen. Het dagelijks werk van medische professionals, 
artsen, is doordrenkt met moraliteit. Medici-practici vragen zich voortdurend af: wat is hier en 
nu voor deze individuele patiënt goed om te doen (of te laten)? Hoe voorkom ik schade of te 
grote risico’s op schade voor deze mens die aan mijn zorgen is toevertrouwd? Zou het 
ontwikkelen van de Aristotelische phronèsis, die wij vertaalden als ‘praktische wijsheid’  
kunnen helpen bij het vinden van de juiste weg in de wirwar van alledaagse morele vragen in 
door onzekerheid en complexiteit gekenmerkte moderne praktijken? Dat was de vraag die het 
uitgangspunt vormde voor dit onderzoek. 
Wij onderzochten in actuele dagelijkse praktijken van medici in een algemeen 
ziekenhuis of en zo ja hoe praktische wijsheid een rol speelt bij het vinden van moreel 
verantwoorde wegen en oplossingen voor patiënten. Het is een kwalitatief-empirisch 
onderzoek van binnenuit praktijken. De onderzoekers hebben zich echter tevens (en 
onvermijdelijk) laten leiden door theoretische kaders nl. die van de zorgethiek en van 
bepaalde praktijktheorieën en tevens door het streven praktijken te onderzoeken van 
binnenuit, niet van een afstand. De zorgethiek is de stroming in de ethiek die ‘zorgen voor’ als 
onmisbare basisfunctie van menselijk samenleven beschouwt en van daaruit de betekenis van 
relationaliteit, van onderlinge afhankelijkheid, van kwetsbaarheid én van het politieke in het 
samenleven beoordeelt. De praktijktheorie, in dit onderzoek vooral vertegenwoordigd door 
Nicolini, Schmidt en Gherardi, ziet als eenheid van samenleven en als studieobject niet 
primair het individu, ook niet het sociale, maar praktijken. En praktijken zijn steeds 
wisselende samenstellingen van individuen, groepen, materiële en immateriële 
infrastructurele factoren die ‘doen’, die ‘tot-stand-brengen’. Het onderzoek van binnenuit, 
betekent dat de onderzoekers bewust niet willen abstraheren van voor buitenstaanders 
onbegrijpelijke of onbetekenend lijkende details, en dat zij ook niet de werkelijkheid willen 
reduceren door slechts in te zoomen op deelaspecten. Zij hebben juist actief gezocht naar het 
ervaringsweten en –beleven van de meest betrokkenen in de bestudeerde praktijken: de 
professionals en de patiënten. 
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Wij hebben, alvorens te beginnen met de vier empirische studies die het leeuwendeel 
van het onderzoek vormen, oriënterend literatuuronderzoek gedaan naar praktische wijsheid 
en zijn daarbij tot een voorlopige, heuristische definitie van praktische wijsheid gekomen:  
praktische wijsheid is het vermogen, dat emergeert in gezamenlijke acties binnen medische 
praktijken, en dat bestaat uit het gefocust weten te blijven op het bereiken van het goede voor 
elke individuele patiënt, binnen de context van de praktijk en haar telos, in steeds wisselende 
situaties; aangevuld met het tot stand brengen van het goede met behulp van de best passende 
middelen, waarbij adequaat wordt omgegaan met complexiteit en met institutionele en 
systemische druk. 
Het empirische onderzoek had steeds een dubbele doelstelling: wij wilden enerzijds 
meer aan de weet komen over praktische wijsheid in de dagelijkse praktijk (hoe ziet die er uit, 
waardoor wordt ze bevorderd of tegengewerkt, kunnen medici praktische wijsheid leren en zo 
ja, hoe dan etc.), anderzijds wilden wij nagaan of de hierboven geformuleerde definitie in 
stand kon blijven of gewijzigd diende te worden én wilden wij de theoretische kaders die wij 
hierboven hebben beschreven vanuit de onderzoeksresultaten kritisch bevragen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 omvat een uitgebreide verantwoording van de methodologie die we 
hebben toegepast bij de empirische onderzoeken. De moeilijkheid was het onzichtbare 
(praktische wijsheid) zichtbaar te maken, ofwel een moeilijk grijpbaar, niet direct 
waarneembaar concept in te kleden met kenmerken ontleend aan de dagelijkse praktijk van 
het medisch werk. Daarbij wilden wij, hoewel onontkoombaar kwalitatief, verantwoord 
onderzoeken door transparant te zijn over de toegepaste observatie- en analysetechnieken en 
subjectieve oordelen en interpretaties laten toetsen aan criteria van beproefde en valide 
technieken en werkwijzen. 
De hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 7 bevatten het verslag van de empirische onderzoeken, 
waarbij achtereenvolgens de nadruk ligt op verschillende thema’s. In hoofdstuk 8 brengen wij 
die thema’s weer met elkaar in verband en komen wij tot integratie en conclusies. 
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt verschijningsvormen van praktische wijsheid in de dagelijkse 
praktijk. Wij vonden onder meer: het resoluut in gesprek met de patiënt teruggaan naar het 
begin van de klachten, wanneer er een schijnbaar onoplosbare medische puzzel is ontstaan; 
ook een meanderende werkwijze in tegenstelling tot planmatig recht op het doel afgaan. Wij 
ontdekten de interessante ‘onderbrekingen’ of ‘verstoringen’ van het gaande werk, van de 
routine of van een gedachten stroom, die als signalen voor het emergeren van praktische 
wijsheid kunnen fungeren, mits professionals ervoor open staan en erop bedacht zijn. Als 
dergelijke ‘verstoringen’ ontdekten wij: een spoedcasus die tussendoor komt en waarvoor 
geplande werkzaamheden opzij moeten worden gezet zonder betrokkenen tekort te doen, een 
bevinding die tegenstrijdig is met een vermoede diagnose, een hevige emotie bij professional 
of patiënt. En tenslotte ontdekten wij dat ‘figuraties’ van belang zijn: netwerken van 
menselijke en materiële met elkaar verbonden en van elkaar afhankelijke factoren, die telkens 
veranderen in dynamische processen. Die figuraties kunnen het emergeren van praktische 
wijsheid bevorderen of juist belemmeren. Tijdsdruk, allerlei bindende regels of verplichtingen 




was misschien wel, dat praktische wijsheid inderdaad gewoon blijkt voor te komen op de 
werkvloer, ook al heeft niemand er expliciet aandacht aan besteed. En verder dat de 
manifestaties van praktische wijsheid bijna banale, gewone, alledaagse vormen aannemen; 
deze bevindingen werden in alle volgende onderzoeken bevestigd. 
In hoofdstuk 5 onderzochten we of praktische wijsheid geleerd kan worden gedurende 
het dagelijks werk, met name door het systematisch houden van multidisciplinaire 
casusbesprekingen die gericht zijn op ‘ervan leren’ in het algemeen. Dit bleek inderdaad het 
geval, althans voor zover gemeten aan vier indicatoren voor praktische wijsheid: 
doelgerichtheid, balans, oordeel en reflectie/reflexiviteit. Wij toonden geen individueel leren 
aan, wel sociaal en organisatieleren, hetgeen respectievelijk naar voren kwam in het 
toegenomen vermogen van gezamenlijke reflectie en reflexiviteit, en in het regulier scheppen 
van reflectieve ruimten in de organisatie; daarnaast uit talrijke andere voorbeelden. Wij 
toonden ook aan dat dergelijke op leren gerichte besprekingen bijdroegen aan het gezamenlijk 
tot stand brengen van een cultuur waarin het elkaar als collega steun verlenen prevaleerde 
boven competitie, een cultuur waarbinnen praktische wijsheid kan gedijen.  
In hoofdstuk 6 zochten wij naar de invloed van het overheersende professionele 
discours op de verhouding tussen een rationeel-technische logica en een logica van praktische 
wijsheid in de onderzochte praktijk. Wij vonden een disbalans ten gunste van de rationeel-
technische logica en ten koste van praktische wijsheid. Wij vonden tevens dat deze scheve 
verhouding deels werd bepaald door het overheersende traditionele medisch-technische 
discours (kenmerken: ziekte-gericht, reductionistisch, korte-termijn-georiënteerd, gefocust op 
het volgen van richtlijnen en protocollen, een bilaterale in plaats van een multidisciplinaire 
samenwerking, een hiërarchische werkwijze waarbij de medici aan de top van de hiërarchie 
staan en te eenzijdig de dienst uitmaken), maar ook door de organisatiestructuur en –cultuur, 
waarbij maatregelen om continuïteit van zorg te garanderen bij transfers van patiënten en bij 
de verdeling van de zorg over grote aantallen professionals ontbraken.  
In hoofdstuk 7 was het thema: het schipperend op koers blijven in een ambulante 
diabetespraktijk voor adolescenten met diabetes mellitus type 1. Hoe te verbijzonderen naar 
de individuele patiënt bij het tegelijkertijd verplicht toepassen van internationale richtlijnen? 
Hoe adequaat kennis van de patiënt in haar situatie te verwerven en die te verbinden met de 
wetenschappelijke kennis over de ziekte, hoe een ideaal gesteld einddoel van de behandeling 
te rijmen met een voor de patiënt haalbaar doel, waarbij zij ook nog een goed leven geniet en 
hoe de in richtlijnen vastgelegde standaarden te verbinden met de morele norm van ‘het goede 
voor deze patiënt’? Wij zagen in dit onderzoek dat zowel de individuele professionals, als de 
teams die gevormd waren in het kader van de diabetesspreekuren, als de deels zelf gecreëerde 
infrastructuur geïmpregneerd waren met relationaliteit en praktische wijsheid, waardoor alle 
genoemde actoren in staat waren meestal en grotendeels een goede balans te vinden tussen de 
dwingende richtlijn en dat wat voor de patiënt het zwaarste woog. Praktische wijsheid in deze 
situatie betekende vooral dat de professionals de juiste bandbreedte wisten te bepalen 
waarbinnen zij nog verantwoord konden afwijken van de richtlijnen, terwijl zij tegelijkertijd 
de grenzen wisten vast te stellen die niet meer verantwoord (dus zonder kans op schade) 
overschreden konden worden. Een andere leerzame bevinding was, dat de professionals de 
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knagende en onoplosbare onzekerheid die hun vak kenmerkt, wisten te verlichten met behulp 
van discussies in het team van professionals, waarbij zij hun onzekerheden deelden en 
gezamenlijk een route uitstippelden. 
In het concluderende hoofdstuk 8 integreerden wij de uitkomsten van de vier 
empirische onderzoeken als volgt: praktische wijsheid omvat praktisch redeneren en 
alledaagse professionele activiteiten; praktische wijsheid kan geïnitieerd worden door 
‘verstoringen’, en de emergentie van praktische wijsheid kan worden belemmerd of 
gefaciliteerd door specifieke ‘figuraties’. Praktische wijsheid is verweven met technè 
(vaardigheden) en met epistèmè (evidence). Praktische wijsheid en relationaliteit zijn 
onderling verbonden en onderling afhankelijk. Wij concludeerden bovendien dat wij in dit 
onderzoek de nadruk gelegd hebben op praktische wijsheid als de gerealiseerde moraliteit van 
praktijken, niet op praktische wijsheid als een deugd van individuen. En ook dat praktische 
wijsheid de essentiële component is van de professionele morele grammatica (logica) in de 
geneeskunde. 
In hoofdstuk 8 beredeneerden wij ook, dat wij op basis van dit onderzoek op 
onderdelen de heuristisch gebruikte definitie van praktische wijsheid moesten wijzigen. De 
nieuwe definitie luidt:  
praktische wijsheid is het vermogen dat emergeert in gezamenlijke acties binnen medische 
praktijken, die de logica van goede zorg belichamen doordat zij gericht zijn op het 
onderscheiden en het verwerkelijken van het goede voor elke individuele patiënt afzonderlijk, 
dat tevens in overeenstemming is met het telos van de praktijk; in een dynamisch proces, met 
inzet van de best passende middelen, terwijl de situatie-gebonden complexiteit en 
operationele en systemische druk adequaat worden gehanteerd. 
Wij gaven op drie punten commentaar op de bestaande literatuur over praktische 
wijsheid, en wel als volgt: praktische wijsheid gaat niet op de eerste plaats om deugden maar 
om morele acties; ze gaat niet voornamelijk over activiteiten van individuen maar over 
gezamenlijke acties en over georganiseerde reflectie binnen praktijken; praktische wijsheid 
omvat niet op de eerste plaats redeneren en kennis, geïsoleerd van acties, maar wel verstandig 
doen en laten, waarin redeneren en kennis zijn opgenomen.  
Ook becommentarieerden wij in hoofdstuk 8 de bestaande zorg-ethische literatuur, 
resulterend in de aanbeveling dat de zorgethiek zich meer met praktische wijsheid gaat bezig 
houden omdat deze naast relationaliteit nodig is om het goede in praktijken te identificeren en 
tot stand te brengen. Ten aanzien van de practice theory maakten we de opmerking dat zij 
behalve aan een gereedschapskist voor het verrichten van praktijkonderzoek ook aandacht 
moet besteden aan de juiste uitvoering van dergelijk onderzoek. 
Tenslotte vroegen wij ons af of de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek overdraagbaar zijn 
naar andere vormen van medisch-specialistische zorg in ziekenhuizen en naar andere 
professionele praktijken. En wij beantwoordden die vraag als volgt: de overdraagbaarheid 
hangt af van de overeenkomsten tussen de verschillende vormen van professionele zorg, 




allerlei settingen functioneren professionals in samenwerkende groepen; in allerlei settingen 
dienen gezamenlijke reflectie en reflexiviteit een vorm te vinden; in allerlei settingen moeten 
professionele relaties worden gevormd en benut om goede zorg te verlenen, etc. etc. Daarbij 
kunnen algemene lessen uit dit onderzoek zeer behulpzaam zijn. Een voorbeeld: schijnbaar 
neutrale routines, vanzelfsprekendheden en regels omvatten verborgen, impliciete keuzes en 
waardeoordelen, waarover professionals kritisch moeten nadenken en die zij kunnen 
veranderen, zoals het vigerende medisch-professionele discours waarvoor impliciet gekozen 
is. Hiermee is ook de praktische relevantie van dit onderzoek gegeven: Op de eerste plaats 
geeft het professionals in medische praktijken nieuwe inzichten in praktische wijsheid en haar 
belang voor het dagelijks werk, dat intrinsiek moreel van aard is. Op de tweede plaats levert 
het inzichten op in de invloeden die zich doen gelden op dat dagelijks werk, en in hoe die de 
moraliteit van dat werk (dat wil zeggen het tot stand brengen van goede medische zorg) 
kunnen ondergraven of bevorderen. Die inzichten kunnen professionals gebruiken om de 
betreffende invloeden te veranderen. Op de derde plaats heeft het onderzoek onderbouwd dat 
het voor professionaliteit essentieel is om praktische wijsheid ‘in te bouwen’, zowel in de 
opleiding als in de dagelijkse praktijk. Dat geldt voor medische en voor andere professionele 
praktijken, voor zover zich ook daar de problemen, waarop praktische wijsheid het antwoord 
betekent, optreden. Daarom zou in alle professionele praktijken het bevorderen van reflectie 
en van reflexiviteit op de werkvloer aandacht moeten krijgen, en voor de professionele ethiek 
zouden vormen van moresprudentie moeten worden verzameld, inzichtelijk worden gemaakt 
en bediscussieerd in brede professionele fora (vergelijkbaar met de jurisprudentie in het 
recht). Daarmee zouden discussies over moraliteit, net als die over evidence, gemeengoed 
kunnen worden. Vervolgens zou de moraliteit, de praktische wijsheid van professioneel werk 
en van praktijken verder ontwikkeld kunnen worden. Ten slotte zou praktische wijsheid meer 
aandacht moeten krijgen van professionele opleidingen, van professionele organisaties en van 
de instituten waarbinnen professionals werken; immers die instituten bepalen verregaand de 
figuraties die de emergentie van praktische wijsheid (dus van moraliteit) steunen of 
belemmeren. 
Wij eindigden met een aantal aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek. Daarnaast met het 
uitspreken van ons vermoeden, door dit onderzoek tot overtuiging gegroeid, dat meer 
praktische wijsheid 1) kan leiden tot een betere kwaliteit van zorg: zorg die beter aansluit bij 
de individuele patiënt, 2) dat zij kan bijdragen aan een beter leven van patiënten na of met een 
ziekte en 3) aan meer geluk voor professionals die een zeer zinvolle maar moeilijke taak 

















Het tot stand brengen van een proefschrift zonder hulp van anderen is onmogelijk; ik ben dan 
ook blij dat ik die anderen hier de erkenning kan geven die zij verdienen. Mijn dank gaat in de 
eerste plaats uit naar mijn promotor Frans Vosman; ik ben hem zeer erkentelijk voor de 
zorgvuldige en zorgzame begeleiding van dit onderzoek. Frans was altijd beschikbaar voor 
overleg, hij kwam met vele nuttige leestips, stelde de juiste, prikkelende vragen en steunde 
met zijn enorme belezenheid en zijn kiene observaties. Hij formuleerde de betekenis van 
bevindingen en relativeerde als dat nodig was; hij zocht actief mee naar oplossingen als er 
problemen rezen. Het is heel verdrietig dat hij de verdediging van dit proefschrift niet meer 
kan meemaken. Wel heeft hij nog zijn goedkeuring verleend aan het volledige manuscript. 
Andries, jij raakte als tweede promotor al in een vroeg stadium betrokken, aanvankelijk 
vooral vanwege je methodologische expertise, maar geleidelijk steeds meer inhoudelijk omdat 
je soms maandenlang Frans moest vervangen wanneer hij wegens zijn ziekte noodgedwongen 
uitviel. Ondanks ziekte en tegenslag waarmee jullie beiden in de loop der jaren te kampen 
hadden, bleven jullie steeds goed onderling communiceren, zodat voor mij duidelijk was 
waarover we het met zijn drieën eens waren en waarover nog nagedacht diende te worden. 
Andries, in jou bewonder ik je werkkracht, je kritische zin en de moedige manier waarop je 
kritiek naar voren weet te brengen. En natuurlijk je vermogen om ingewikkelde materie 
overzichtelijk samen te vatten in een tabel! Zelfs in Zuid-Afrika bleef je bereikbaar voor 
overleg als dat nodig was; het was voor jou vanzelfsprekend dat je na het overlijden van Frans 
als promotor zou optreden. Dat waardeer ik zeer.  
Ook dank ik de leden van de promotiecommissie voor hun bereidheid zich in het onderzoek te 
verdiepen en voor hun kritische opmerkingen; dankzij kritiek en tegenspraak ontwikkelt de 
wetenschap zich. 
De leden van de Stichting CEC hebben mij geholpen door als klankbord en discussieforum te 
fungeren; ik heb uit onze regelmatige bijeenkomsten veel stof tot nadenken en inspiratie 
gehaald. 
Vooral wil ik de patiënten danken die geheel belangeloos meewerkten aan dit onderzoek; ik 
dank hen voor hun openheid en eerlijkheid en voor alles wat ik van hen heb geleerd. Daarmee 
verbonden is mijn dank aan de leden van de medische staf van ziekenhuis St Jansdal. 
Collega’s, jullie hadden de moed je kwetsbaar op te stellen bij het tot in detail openbaar 
evalueren van het eigen medisch handelen, de wijze van samenwerken en de relatie en 
communicatie met patiënten, een voorwaarde voor het samen tot stand brengen van goede 
zorg. Ik dank jullie ook voor het veilige en inspirerende samenwerkingsklimaat dat jullie 
wisten te realiseren. Binnen de medische staf dank ik speciaal de collega’s die lid waren van 
de commissies multidisciplinaire patiëntenbesprekingen, ethiek en waarden en de Ghana-
commissie, voor het meedenken en discussiëren over allerlei patiënt- en breder zorg-
gebonden kwesties; daarmee vervulden jullie voor dit onderzoek een betekenisvolle rol.  
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Collega-kinderartsen, leden van het diabetesteam en alle medewerkers van de klinische en 
poliklinische kinderafdeling, jullie hebben mij geholpen door mij de ruimte te bieden om 
naast mijn werk als arts ook de bestuursfunctie te vervullen, met jullie geïnteresseerde 
medewerking aan dit onderzoek en met jullie collegialiteit. Dank daarvoor. 
Daarnaast dank ik de zorg- en zorg-ondersteunende afdelingen van het ziekenhuis; zonder 
jullie medewerking is goede patiëntenzorg onmogelijk. 
Last but not least dank ik de raad van bestuur en het management van het St Jansdal voor de 
faciliteiten die mij geboden werden om dit onderzoek uit te voeren en voor hun 
belangstelling.  
Dit proefschrift zou nooit in zo goed Engels geschreven zijn zonder de assistentie van Ciska 
Renkens-Bontemps en van Brian Heffernan. Ciska en Brian, jullie schroomden niet om mij 
behalve op correct Engels ook te wijzen op onduidelijkheden of formuleringen die niet 
ondubbelzinnig genoeg waren. Jullie werk heeft zeker bijgedragen aan de kwaliteit van de 
tekst. 
Mijn vrienden Hendrik de Vries en René Dijkgraaf hebben regelmatig als sparring partner 
willen fungeren voor zeer uiteenlopende zaken die direct of indirect met dit onderzoek te 
maken hadden. En vooral voor veel gezelligheid en plezier gezorgd tijdens onze regelmatige 
etentjes. 
Hetzelfde geldt voor mijn twee paranimfen Corinne en Saskia. Jullie meedenken en jullie 
enthousiasme voor dit onderzoek hebben mij geholpen door te gaan ook als het even tegenzat, 
vooral rond het geaccepteerd krijgen van artikelen door de diverse tijdschriften. 
Sander, Joep en Saskia, jullie hebben mij laten ervaren dat het opvoeden van kinderen veel 
praktische wijsheid vraagt en tegelijkertijd een groot geluk vertegenwoordigt. Jullie zijn nu 
ook collega-medici en hebben niet alleen actief meegedacht en commentaar geleverd als ik 
daarom vroeg, maar mij ook deelgenoot willen maken van jullie eigen ervaringen in het 
dokteren. Daarvan heb ik genoten en geleerd; maar vooral: de manier waarop jullie omgaan 
met je vak en je patiënten vervult mij met trots.  
Amarins en Judith, jullie hebben ons gezin compleet gemaakt; dank voor jullie support. Jullie 
zijn respectievelijk als medicus en pedagoog professionals met een gouden randje. 
Loet, Ties, Doutzen, Sef en Elske, jullie hebben ons laten ervaren welk groot geluk 
kleinkinderen betekenen. Voor jullie speciaal, en ook voor alle lezers van dit boek, zijn de 
citaten uit kinderboeken bedoeld die de acht hoofdstukken openen; zij vertegenwoordigen elk 
lezenswaardige boeken van uitstekende auteurs. 
Jacques, jij was en bent er altijd voor mij, onvoorwaardelijk en kritisch, precies zoals ik dat 













Marij Hommen werd geboren in Heerlen, op 7 maart 1948 en groeide op in Pey-Echt. Zij 
studeerde pedagogiek van 1969-1972 aan de Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht, behaalde Colloquium 
Doctum in 1972 en startte vervolgens de opleiding geneeskunde aan dezelfde universiteit. In 
1979 deed zij artsexamen, waarna zij de specialisatie kindergeneeskunde begon in het Sint 
Josephziekenhuis te Eindhoven. Zij werd in 1984 als kinderarts geregistreerd en werkte 
daarna nog een jaar als chef de clinique kindergeneeskunde in genoemd ziekenhuis. 
Van 1985 tot 1996 was zij kinderarts in het Dr. J.H. Jansenziekenhuis, Emmeloord; van 1993 
tot 1996 tevens vertrouwensarts inzake kindermishandeling te Lelystad. Van 1996 tot 2016 
was zij als kinderarts verbonden aan ziekenhuis St Jansdal in Harderwijk. Hier werd zij in 
1997 tevens benoemd tot lid, in 2005 tot voorzitter van de raad van bestuur. Zij beëindigde 
haar bestuurlijke werkzaamheden eind 2008. Van 1999 tot 2019 bekleedde zij diverse functies 
als lid en voorzitter van raden van toezicht in de zorg. Van 2008 tot 2013 was zij behalve 
kinderarts adviseur kwaliteit en veiligheid voor de medische aansprakelijkheidsverzekeraar 
Centramed. Van 2016 tot 2018 was zij docent ethiek en moreel beraad aan de St 
Jansdalacademie; als zodanig formuleerde zij ethische beleidskaders en ontwierp zij een 
model voor moreel beraad in de dagelijkse werksituatie. Sinds 2014 fungeert zij als 
kwaliteitsauditor van het NIAZ (Nederlands Instituut voor de Accreditatie van 
Zorginstellingen). 
Vanaf 2009 volgde zij enkele modules van de masteropleiding Zorgethiek aan de Universiteit 
Tilburg, gevolgd door dit promotieonderzoek dat zij afrondde aan de Universiteit voor 
Humanistiek te Utrecht. 
Marij Hommen is getrouwd met Jacques Bontemps; zij hebben drie kinderen: Sander, Joep en 
Saskia, en vijf kleinkinderen: Loet, Ties, Doutzen, Sef en Elske. 
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